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This report presents the results of a Global Economic and 
Sector Work (ESW) Study on the Political Economy of 
Sanitation in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal that was 
conducted by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and 
the World Bank. The purpose of the study is to help WSP 
and the World Bank—through a better understanding of the 
political economy of sanitation—in their efforts to support 
partner countries and development practitioners in the de-
sign, implementation, and effectiveness of operations that 
aim to provide pro-poor sanitation investments and services 
to improve health and hygiene outcomes.
This synthesis report was prepared by Sabine Garbarino and 
Jeremy Holland (Oxford Policy Management), with Simon 
Brook, Ken Caplan and Alex Shankland (OPM consultants). 
The background literature review, the research strategy, and 
the report were authored by Jeremy Holland and Sabine 
Garbarino, who also led the case studies for India and Sene-
gal, respectively. Kit Nicholson and Jeremy Colin provided 
valuable contributions to the research design. The case study 
for Brazil was led by Alex Shankland and Ken Caplan, and 
the Indonesia case study was led by Simon Brook. The case 
studies benefited from vital support from national sanitation 
experts and researchers, namely, Ivan Paiva, Klaus Neder, 
Hernán Gómez Bruera, and Luciana Lupo (Brazil); Padmaja 
Nair (India); Risang Rimbatmaja and Prathiwi Widyatmi 
(Indonesia); and Ousseynou Guène (Senegal).
The study was conceptualized and financed by the WSP 
Sanitation Global Practice Team and the World Bank. The 
authors carried out their work under the leadership of Eduar-
do A. Perez (Senior Sanitation Specialist, TWIWP, WSP), 
Sabine Beddies (Senior Social Scientist, MNSSO, World 
Bank), and Pete Kolsky (Senior Water and Sanitation Spe-
cialist, TWIWA, World Bank). Input was provided by Tina 
Soreide (Economist, FEU, World Bank) and Daniel Alberto 
Benitez, (Senior Economist, FEU, World Bank). Guidance at 
the Concept Note stage was provided by the following Bank 
staff: Eustache Ouayoro (Country Director, LCCHT), Junaid 
Ahmad (Sector Manager Urban and Water, AFTUW), and 
Meskerem Brhane (Senior Urban Specialist, MNSUR).
WSP and World Bank colleagues actively contributed to the 
case study design and reviewed the draft country case studies. 
These include Joseph Ravikumar (Senior Water and Sanita-
tion Specialist, TWISA), J. V. Raman Murthi (Water Institu-
tions Development Specialist, TWISA), Soma Ghosh Moulik 
(Senior Institutional Development Specialist, SASDU), 
Pierre Boulenger (Senior Water Supply Specialist, TWIAF), 
Ousseynou Diop (Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist, 
TWIAF), Isabel Blackett (Senior Water and Sanitation Spe-
cialist, TWIEA), Martin Gambrill (Senior Water Engineer, 
SASDU), Carlos Velez (Lead Economist, LCSUW), Thadeu 
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Juliana Garrido (Infrastructure Specialist, LCSUW), and 
Abel Mejia (Sector Manager, TWIWA).
The peer reviewers were Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez (Sector Manager, 
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Background and objectives
According to the Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP 
2006), 2.6 billion people—about half of the world’s po-
pulation—lack access to basic sanitation. There is ongoing 
concern that governments, at many levels, are not devoting 
enough attention and resources to sanitation services, par-
ticularly when compared to spending on water supply and 
other infrastructure services. Additionally, existing sanitation 
investments and service provision rarely place sufficient stress 
upon the distinct and urgent needs of the poor. Recent World 
Bank research shows that this limited focus on sanitation 
is driven largely by political motivation in the context of 
competing demands for resources, and to a lesser extent by 
technical or economic considerations. 
This global study on the political economy of sanitation 
in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal—conceptualized 
and financed by the Sanitation Global Practice Team of 
the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and the World 
Bank—attempts systematically to understand and thus help 
practitioners manage the political economy of pro-poor sani-
tation investments and service provision. It aims to provide 
practical advice to World Bank Task Team Leaders and other 
sanitation practitioners to help them better manage stakehol-
der relations and effectively maneuver within the complex 
institutional relationships of the sanitation sector in order 
to enhance the design, implementation, and effectiveness of 
operations that provide pro-poor sanitation investments and 
services. The ultimate goal is to improve health and hygiene 
outcomes.
This study follows current approaches to political economy—
interdisciplinary inquiry  drawing upon social and political 
theory and economic principles—to understand how poli-
tical actors, institutions, and economic processes influence 
each other. The “political economy of sanitation,” therefore, 
refers to the social, political, and economic processes and 
actors that determine the extent and nature of sanitation 
investment and service provision. 
conceptual framework, methodology, and case study 
overviews
This study’s conceptual framework combines a diagnostic 
component with a typology of actions to help translate 
analytical findings into more effective support to operations 
and investments. The Diagnostic Framework aims to identify 
political economy constraints as well as opportunities that 
are entry points for subsequent operational actions. It does 
this by focusing on understanding country context, the sec-
tor arena—institutions that shape stakeholder relationships, 
interests, and influence—and the sector process, which looks 
at information flows, public debate, coalition building, and 
participation over time. The Action Framework illustrates 
operational implications and practical advice to Task Team 
Leaders and practitioners to support sector investments. It 
demonstrates how an analysis of the political economy of 
sanitation can be translated into project design and action to 
better meet the sanitation needs of the poor. The Action Fra-
mework includes recommendations to improve the timing, 
tailoring, and sequencing of support to sector investment, 
informed by an understanding of the relevant institutional 
constraints and opportunities as well as key participants in 
the sanitation sector. The Action Framework furthermore 
stresses the importance of strengthened relationships of ac-
countability among citizens, civil society organizations, and 
government and other service providers. Finally, a partners-
hip strategy—often linked to an inclusive communications 
strategy and measures to foster public debate—provides 
opportunities to overcome institutional constraints and 
stakeholder opposition to pro-poor sanitation investment 
and service provision. 
The study was conducted through a qualitative analysis of 
stakeholders, institutions, impacts, risks, and opportunities 
that was linked to processes and policy debate. This Synthesis 
Report is based on the findings from the secondary literature 
review and the results of primary research in the four case 
study countries, which examined how each had identified 
and managed political economy risks and opportunities in 
executive summary
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its sanitation interventions. The four country case studies 
were chosen purposively by the World Bank/WSP team and 
represent a range of sanitation contexts. The Brazil case study 
analyzed the national-level political economy dynamics of 
urban sanitation investment over the lifetime of the Water 
and Sanitation Sector Modernization Project (known in 
Brazil as Programa de Modernização do Setor Saneamento, 
PMSS). In addition to this national (policy) component, the 
case study includes a regional (program) component that 
focused on the Bahia Azul program, implemented by the 
Bahia state utility, Empresa Bahiana de Águas e Saneamento 
(EMBASA), in the Salvador Metropolitan Region in nor-
theastern Brazil. The India case study looks at the political 
drivers for the success of the Total Sanitation Campaign 
(TSC) in rural Maharashtra, contrasting it with earlier, failed 
attempts to implement TSC in most of the country’s states. 
In Indonesia the analysis focused on the reasons behind the 
recent increase in government interest in urban sanitation 
provision. While this interest has not yet translated into 
increased investment levels, it constitutes a major shift from 
the previous understanding that sanitation is a private matter 
for households. Finally, the Senegal case study took the water 
and sanitation reforms at the end of the 1990s as the starting 
point of the analysis and explored political economy factors 
that explained the increased investment in urban sanitation 
in the capital, Dakar.
Diagnostic analysis
Country context refers to a country’s socioeconomic, poli-
tical, cultural, and historical characteristics, including its 
development trajectory and the current development aid 
architecture. Examining country context  also involves 
looking at political processes within the sanitation sector, 
their potential links to national political institutions and 
stakeholders, the assumptions that underpin sanitation sector 
investment, and how and why sanitation investment was 
developed, and by whom. The research tests the influence 
of cultural and historical factors on sanitation attitudes and 
behavior, outlines the multifaceted risks and opportunities 
that decentralization provides for sanitation investments, 
and examines the extent to which political opportunism 
determines sector decision making.
Beyond sanitation’s country context, a political economy 
analysis focuses attention on the sector arena - the formal 
and informal institutional arrangements that govern relations 
and behaviors of stakeholders, as well as those stakeholders’ 
interests in the choice, management, and implementation 
of sanitation service provision and investments. The study 
showed that perceived political rewards, organizational resis-
tance from the center of government, and/or implementers’ 
lack of capacity to manage increased budget allocations sig-
nificantly influenced whether and how policy priorities are 
translated into budget allocations and disbursements. Politi-
cally motivated decision making was found to be driven by a 
preference for highly visible, big infrastructure investments. 
In some but not all instances this is linked to opportunities 
for influential individuals or groups to use these investments 
to generate income by privileged access or politically created 
monopolies (rent seeking).1 While all case studies came across 
evidence of corrupt practices and rent-seeking behavior, it 
was overall not identified as the predominant feature distor-
ting sanitation investment decisions. There is evidence that 
civil society and the private sector not only can contribute 
to strengthening accountability but also can be reliable and 
trusted partners for delivering sanitation services and creating 
community demand for sanitation provision. 
The sector process in this context refers to the dynamic and on-
going process of negotiation, bargaining, and identification 
of political economy risks and opportunities by government 
and development agency stakeholders. The study explores the 
potential for community participation, incentives for collecti-
ve outcomes (an end to for example open defecation), and the 
trade-offs that strong political backing can have in terms of 
a sustainable engagement with a range of local stakeholders, 
including civil society and private sector organizations. The 
sector process discussion looks in detail at the role of evidence 
in decision making and considers when and how research was 
successfully used to inform investment decisions. Finally, this 
study confirms the potential of individual sector champions 
to secure higher priority for sanitation investments.
The research looked particularly for evidence of the impact 
on distributional outcomes in pro-poor sanitation investment 
from the interplay of political and economic factors. Some 
case studies found that political incentives (for example, ca-
reer advancement or electoral support) played a positive role 
1 Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to productivity.
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in the extension of coverage to the poor. Moreover, all the 
case studies made the case that decentralized governance of 
sanitation investment can create stronger incentives for, and 
accountability in, pro-poor investment. Subsidies for sanita-
tion investment have proven successful when combined with 
information campaigns and community mobilization. 
Overall, the study confirms the importance of assessing stake-
holder interests, identifying potential winners and losers, 
identifying incentives, and examining formal and informal 
institutions (such as norms and behavior). When such an 
analysis is done well, by development practitioners in part-
ner countries or development organizations, it provides the 
empirical evidence for both the support of and opposition 
to development, and the rationales behind them.
Operational implications 
The report presents a number of significant operational les-
sons designed to inform future World Bank/WSP interven-
tions that support sanitation investment. Several interlinked 
elements have contributed to the success of the sector process 
in the case study countries. Combining understanding of the 
political economy risks and opportunities in the sanitation 
sector with evidence marshaled on the economic, social, and 
political impacts of investment choices can promote greater 
accountability, partnership, and communication.
•	 The	case	studies	have	shown	that	understanding	the	
political economy of sanitation investment provides 
the basis for adequate timing, tailoring, and location 
of investment and operations. This process includes 
recognizing windows of opportunity for formal and 
informal engagement, identifying sector champions, 
and strategically sequencing development partner 
support levels to create incentives for long-term in-
vestments and institutional reform. 
•	 Donors	and	international	institutions	have	successfully	
used their comparative advantage in providing timely 
and rigorous analysis to inform pro-poor sanitation 
investments. Examples from the case studies show 
how donors and lenders can successfully facilitate an 
exchange of experience among countries and support 
local policy makers with studies that find resonance 
with national debates.
•	 Strengthening accountability in the delivery and 
accessibility of sanitation services is a vital element in 
the successful management of the political economy 
of sanitation investments. It includes horizontal ac-
countability mechanisms in which branches of the 
state engage in mutual oversight (for example, through 
performance contracts or regulations) combined with 
vertical accountability relationships between citizens 
and policy makers whereby more systematic support 
to civil society and grassroots organizations can suc-
cessfully create a demand for sanitation services.
•	 The	study	has	confirmed	that	political	economy	analy-
sis in the sanitation sector can support a partnership 
strategy that is based on sustained, flexible engage-
ment with strategic external support of acknowledged 
government leadership.
•	 Wider participation and clear communication of 
key issues are two important tools to address the power 
of vested interests who neglect the needs of the poor 
in sanitation investment and services provision. There 
is some experience of using related sectors (water su-
pply, waste treatment) as an entry point for discussing 
sanitation provision with communities, particularly 
the poor.
conclusion 
The report presents a brief assessment of lessons learned 
from the retrospective political economy analysis of the case 
studies. It highlights how a better understanding of the risks 
and opportunities associated with institutions and stakehol-
der interests in the sanitation sector can be used to better 
support more pro-poor sanitation investment. In a sector 
whose default mode can be very technical, donor and lender 
involvement can facilitate practical operational guidance for 
political economy analysis of more pro-poor service delivery. 
Using the Action Framework, the following table—table 5.1 
from the report’s conclusion—summarizes value insights that 
political economy analysis can add.  
The Political Economy of Sanitation    Executive summary
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Optimize timing, 
tailoring, and 
location of 
investment and 
operations
Understand the 
sector through 
rigorous analysis
Realign
accountability
Partner 
strategically
Support public 
debate and 
communication
action recommendations for donor/lender 
support for pro-poor sanitation 
investment
recommendations and added value insights 
from political economy analysis
•	 Ensure	that	support	to	sanitation	
investment is aligned with existing 
policy and planning cycles.
•	 Recognize	windows	of	opportunity	
for reform.
•	 Use	available	evidence	and/or	
commission research to inform 
program design.
•	 Support	strengthened	technical	
systems and information flows.
•	 Support	decentralization	and	
clarification of technical roles and 
responsibilities.
•	 Ensure	effective	engagement	with	
key central and sector ministries.
•	 Support	information	campaigns	
“from one to many” (policy makers to 
public).
•	 Manage	the	political	economy	risks	and	opportunities	to	increase	
impact on pro-poor sanitation investment.
•	 Ensure	careful	and	strategic	sequencing	of	operations	to	increase	the	
overall impact of investments in later phases.
•	 Lobby	through	political	economy	insights	for	sanitation	investments	
that are effective in different locations.
•	 Recognize	and	support	government	commitment	and	local	
leadership to help partners succeed and scale up their impact.
•	 Identify	opportunities	to	support	investment	through	political	
incentivizing.
•	 Donors	and	lenders	are	well	placed	to	identify	appropriate	evidence	
for different stakeholders and tend to have a comparative advantage 
in providing rigorous analysis to inform reform and sector choices.
•	 The	timing	of	information	flow	is	important.	Even	when	rigorous	
analysis is undertaken dissemination of key findings can get lost, 
sidetracked, potentially misused, or captured if the timing is wrong 
(for example, at the start of a new political administration).
•	 Use	analysis	of	comparative	advantage	in	global	practice	to	support	
local policy makers and administrations to learn lessons from 
elsewhere and refine their operational framework.
•	 Support	strengthened	horizontal	accountability	through	careful	
design of contracts and specification of roles and responsibilities.
•	 Support	initiatives	to	build	demand	and	strengthen	vertical	
accountability.
•	 Be	flexible:	Adapt	and	support	models	of	vertical	accountability	
and	apply	to	the	country	context.	The	sector	process	may	not	be	
characterized by the kinds of vertical accountability relations central 
to	much	donor	and	lender	thinking.	This	means	that	support	for	
accountability must be tailored to the country context.
•	 Realign	accountability	by	combining	horizontal	accountability	with	
vertical accountability to allow, for instance, top-down changes to 
be complemented by a more systematic attempt to engage with 
grassroots, collective association and mobilization for institutional 
change.
•	 Ensure	that	the		partnership	strategy	is	based	on	sustained,	flexible	
engagement with strategic external support.
•	 Get	the	process	of	political	economy	analysis	right:	Ensure,	where	
appropriate, that analysis is conducted with a broad group of 
stakeholders to ensure greater inclusion, and link this process to 
strengthened public debate and communication.
•	 Support	wide	two-way	communication	to	democratize	debate,	
prevent capture, and secure and sustain public support for 
institutional change.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
AddEd vAluE from PoliTicAl Economy AnAlySiS in SuPPorT of Pro-Poor SAniTATion invESTmEnT
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The Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP 2006) states 
that 2.6 billion people—about half of the world’s popula-
tion—lack access to basic sanitation. The majority live in 
low- and middle-income countries: three out of five people 
in low-income countries, one in three in middle-income 
countries, and one in six in upper-middle-income countries 
have no access to basic sanitation. Without a rapid increase 
in the scale and effectiveness of sanitation programs, the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target for 2015 will 
be missed by a wide margin.1 This will have severe impacts on 
public health, social indicators, well-being, human dignity, 
and economic development worldwide.
While 2.6 billion people do not have access to a pit latrine or 
toilet in their homes, many more lack access to the kinds of 
sanitation provision that minimizes the risk of excreta-related 
diseases. This difference between “improved” and “adequate” 
sanitation shows the difficulties in knowing where and how 
to define and measure who is adequately served by sanitation 
services.2 Needless to say, different standards for sanitation 
are associated with different levels of health risk. Moreover, 
moving up the so-called sanitation ladder—starting from 
very basic pit latrines to improved pit latrines, pour-flush fa-
cilities using water and septic tanks, through to conventional 
sewers—has financial implications. According to the Human 
Development Report 2006, it costs 20 times more to connect 
a household to a modern sewerage system than to purchase 
a basic pit latrine. Also, any form of improved sanitation has 
to compete with cheap practices like defecating in the open 
or in a plastic bag.
All good sanitation has the same basic attributes, but di-
fferent contexts influence which form of sanitation works 
best where. The “best” sanitation model is influenced by 
population concentration (individual farms in remote 
rural areas versus mega-cities), population density, site 
characteristics (for example, the level of the water table), 
the resources available to an individual, and the capacity 
of government provision. Where sewerage systems in rural 
areas are often not available, simple pit latrines and septic 
tank latrines are plausible options. In high-density urban 
areas, sewerage systems have obvious advantages. However, 
where the reach of the sewerage network is limited and a 
large part of the population is not served, costs associated 
with connecting all households can be substantial, although 
this may be offset by the adverse impact on health if less than 
the entire community is covered. Often, sewerage systems 
are sold (at a high cost) as a solution to all the problems 
associated with the temporary storage of human waste and 
its collection, transport, treatment, and disposal. However, 
they work well only if everyone is connected, and in many 
cases it is the poor who have no access.
There is ongoing concern that governments, at many levels, 
are not devoting enough attention and resources to sanita-
tion services, particularly when compared to spending on 
water supply and other infrastructure services. While there 
are no general figures showing on- and off-budget expenditu-
res in the sanitation sector at regional levels, evidence at the 
country level illustrates that investments and expenditures 
1 Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 7c, calls on countries to «Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking-water and basic 
sanitation.»
2 For definitions and categories please see the WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation, http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions/
infrastructure.html.
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are very low compared to those for water supply and other 
infrastructure services. Additionally, existing sanitation 
investments and service provision are not always pro-poor. 
Efforts to increase access to sanitation infrastructure provi-
sion can benefit better-off urban residents at the expense of 
the urban poor, slum dwellers or the rural population. Many 
documents suggest that governments’ limited sanitation 
expenditures are determined largely by political, rather than 
technical or economic constraints in the context of compe-
ting demands for resources (Kolsky et al., 2005; World Bank 
2006; Satterthwaite and McGranahan 2006).
It is against this background that the Sanitation Global Prac-
tice Team of the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and 
the World Bank commissioned a global study on the political 
economy of sanitation with case studies from Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, and Senegal. The purpose of the study is to help 
WSP and the World Bank—through a better understanding 
of the political economy of sanitation—in their efforts to 
support partner countries and development practitioners in 
the design, implementation, and effectiveness of operations 
that aim to provide pro-poor sanitation investments and 
services to improve health and hygiene outcomes.
The study uses the strict definition of sanitation as “the safe 
management of excreta” only. This excludes consideration 
of drainage and solid waste management, which often have 
a higher political profile and expressed demand. We ack-
nowledge that the chosen definition has implications for a 
study of this sort. There are potential benefits to adopting a 
broader definition, for example, around mobilizing support 
for investment. There are also drawbacks of expanding the 
definition, particularly if support mobilized for wider ele-
ments, such as solid waste management, diverts resources 
away from excreta.
Considering these tradeoffs, a political economy framework 
is well suited to address the study’s key questions:
•	 Why are sanitation investments and service provision 
not given adequate priority in both lending and 
nonlending work?
•	 When	 sanitation	 investments	 in	 such	 efforts	 are	
undertaken, why are they not strategically targeted 
toward increasing access to sanitation for the poor?
The primary audience for this study includes World Bank 
operational task teams engaged in projects, programs, 
and nonlending activities involving sanitation, as well as 
Country Management Units. The study aims to enhance 
operational design and implementation for improved 
outcomes in the provision of pro-poor sanitation services 
by providing World Bank Task Team Leaders and other 
sanitation practitioners with tools to understand and more 
effectively manage the political economy of sanitation. The 
audience for this work will have diverse backgrounds and 
will include social scientists and sanitation engineers. The 
report therefore attempts to use language and terminology 
understood by all readers. When political economy and 
sanitation-specific terminology is used, we provide expla-
nations where necessary.
The term political economy itself is subject to multiple 
understandings and definitions. In its original use in aca-
demic literature, political economy referred simply to the 
application of economic principles to the practice of public 
policy of nation-states. We follow the current common 
understanding of political economy as referring to interdis-
ciplinary studies that draw upon social and political theory, 
in addition to economic principles, in order to understand 
how political actors, institutions, and economic processes 
influence each other.3
The political economy of sanitation, therefore, refers to the 
social, political, and economic processes and actors that 
determine the extent and nature of sanitation investment 
and service provision. Understanding and managing the 
political economy of sanitation consists of identifying and 
3 For an overview of political economy, see, for example, World Bank/OPM 2008.
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addressing stakeholder interests and institutional deter-
minants of sanitation investment process and outcomes, 
including an assessment of the risks and opportunities for 
better management of political economy toward pro-poor 
investment.4
This Synthesis Report goes beyond a consolidation of the 
four country case studies to provide common lessons and 
concrete operational recommendations and guidance that 
sanitation practitioners can apply to their work. It seeks to 
support and enhance policy dialogue as well as the design, 
implementation, and performance of evidence-based and 
pro-poor sanitation operations. 
The Synthesis Report is structured as follows: Section 2 pre-
sents the study’s conceptual framework, which is based on 
earlier work on the political economy of policy reform (World 
Bank/OPM 2008) and was tailored to this study. Section 2 
also briefly summarizes the study’s methodology.
4 While the study’s terms of reference define sanitation as «infrastructure and service provision required for the safe management of human excreta, for example, latrines, sewers, 
and wastewater treatment,» some of the case study country contexts or programs utilize different definitions that do not necessarily count as «safe management of human excreta» 
and are not considered as «improved» sanitation by the UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Program.
Section 3 uses the Diagnostic Framework to synthesize the 
case studies’ findings with reference to a set of study hypo-
theses and specifically looks at evidence on the distributional 
impact of sanitation investments.
Applying the Action Framework, section 4 outlines a number 
of significant operational lessons from the country case stu-
dies that can help inform future World Bank interventions 
that support sanitation investment.
Section 5 briefly concludes by pointing out the value that 
a better understanding of the risks and opportunities as-
sociated with institutions and stakeholder interests in the 
sanitation sector can add to support sanitation investment 
and service delivery.
Annex A provides a detailed overview of the study’s me-
thodology, and annex B presents summaries for the four case 
studies in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal.
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2.1 conceptual framework
The conceptual framework for the research, illustrated 
in figure 2.1, describes how political economy influences 
sector investments. The framework was initially developed 
by the World Bank Social Development Department and 
was tailored to the sanitation context within this study. It is 
one of several similar frameworks used by development and 
research organizations for political economy analysis.
1. Country context refers to a country’s socioeconomic, 
political, cultural, and historical characteristics, 
including its development trajectory and the current 
development aid architecture. It also looks at political 
processes within the sanitation sector, the potential 
links to national political institutions and stakeholders, 
the assumptions that underpin sanitation sector 
investment, and how and why sanitation investment 
was developed, and by whom. 
2. Sector arena comprises the 
institutions that govern relations 
and behavior within the sanitation 
sector and the stakeholders, with their 
economic and political interests that 
both influence and are affected by the 
changes in sanitation service provision 
and investment. 
3. Sector process refers to change 
through information flows, public 
debate, coalition building, participation, 
transparency, communication, and the 
interaction of actors in the sanitation 
sector arena over time.
The Action Framework (right hand 
side of figure 2.1) illustrates operational 
implications and offers measures that 
development practitioners such as 
World Bank Task Team Leaders and 
their government counterparts can use 
to design and implement pro-poor 
sanitation services and investments. It demonstrates how 
an analysis of the political economy of sanitation can be 
translated into project design and action to better meet 
The Diagnostic Framework (left hand side of figure 2.1) 
focuses on analysis and understanding the country context, 
sector arena, and sector process.
Conceptual 
framework and 
methodology
II.
COUNTRY CONTEXT
Country's socioeconomic, historical and
cultural characteristics
Political processes within the sanitation sector
SECTOR ARENA
Stakeholders &
institutions:
Economic interests
(rents, asset, capture,
etc)
Political interest
(authority, clientelism,
etc.)
SECTOR PROCESS
Dialogue & decision
making
Coalition building
Participation
Public debate &
information
Diagnostic Framework Action Framework
Timing, tailoring and location
of investment and operations
Understanding the sector
through rigorous analysis
Realigning accountability
Public debate and
communication
Partnership strategy
Source: Authors, based on World Bank/OPM 2008.
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the sanitation needs of the poor. Effective management of 
the political economy of sanitation, in the terms of this 
study, integrates a better understanding of the political 
economy and of policy impacts with actions that promote 
greater accountability, partnership and communication. The 
Action Framework therefore emphasizes first the timing, 
tailoring, and locating of support to sector investment in 
order to address political economy risks and opportunities. 
Alongside the operational objective of identifying the 
political economy risks to sector progress is the need to 
identify the social and economic risks of sector policy and 
investment in terms of distributional equity. Rigorous and 
transparent analysis of the poverty and social impacts of 
policy impact is therefore an important element of this 
Action Framework.5
Ongoing analysis can continue to generate feedback for 
reflection and course corrections through monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) and dissemination. 
The Action Framework also stresses the importance of 
realigning accountability in sanitation investment to 
empower citizens to hold policy implementers (government 
or private service providers) accountable. On the supply side 
of this accountability equation, legislation and regulation 
can reduce undesirable political economic influence. On the 
demand side, mobilizing and empowering poor consumers 
and communities can increase access and strengthen the 
equity outcomes of sanitation investment. The sustainability, 
effectiveness, and impact of sector investment are in large 
part a function of developing institutions and building the 
capacities of the actors involved. These institutions and actors 
can include government agencies, contractors and service 
regulators, implementing/delivery agencies, and producer 
and consumer institutions.
5 The Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) approach was jointly developed 
within the Bank by the Social Development Department and the PREM Poverty 
Reduction Department, with collaboration from a range of bilateral development 
partners, such as the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the German Development Cooperation (see World Bank 2003). The political 
economy framework used in this study is based on what might be termed «the 
social perspective of PSIA» and was developed by the Bank’s Social Development 
Department with Oxford Policy Management (OPM). See The Political Economy of 
Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations 
(World Bank/OPM 2008).
Box 2.1 Sample queStionS for political economy 
analySiS of Sanitation inveStmentS: DiagnoStic 
framework
country context
Historical	 legacies:	What	 is	 the	 past	 history	 of	 the	 sector,	
including previous reform initiatives? How does this influence 
current stakeholder perception?
Cultural	and	religious	context:	To	what	extent	do	religious	or	
cultural values shape public debate around sanitation and 
demand for services? 
Ideologies:	What	are	the	dominant	ideologies	that	shape	views	
and debates around the sanitation sector? 
Policy	context:	What	 is	 the	policy	context	 for	 sanitation?	 Is	
there	a	(pro-poor)	vision	for	sanitation?	What	is	its	relationship	
to the water sector?
Sector arena—institutions and stakeholders
Decision	making	and	budget	allocations:	How	are	decisions	
around budget allocations made within the sanitation sector?
National—subnational	 relationships:	What	 is	 the	 institutional	
relationship between national and subnational governments? 
Are	subnational	governments	accountable	to	the	national	level	
or local electorate? 
Power	 relations:	 To	what	 extent	 is	 power	 over	 investment	
decisions	vested	in	the	hands	of	specific	individuals/groups?	
Which	 interest	 groups	 and	population	groups	do	politicians	
represent when deciding over sanitation investments? How 
do different interest groups outside government (for example, 
private	sector,	NGOs,	consumer	groups,	 the	media)	seek	 to	
influence policy?
Corruption	and	rent	seeking:	Is	there	significant	corruption	and	
rent	seeking	in	the	sector?	Where	is	this	most	prevalent	(for	
example, at point of delivery; procurement; allocation of jobs)? 
Who	benefits	most	 from	 this?	What	 are	 the	 consequences	
(for example, preference of investment in big infrastructure 
projects)?
Financing:	What	 is	 the	balance	between	public	 and	private	
investment?	How	is	the	sector	financed	(for	example,	public/
private	partnerships,	user	fees,	taxes,	donor/lender	support)?	
What	are	the	discussions	around	cost	recovery?
Demand	 for	 services:	To	what	extent	 is	 there	a	demand	 for	
sanitation	services	from	the	communities?	What	are	the	factors	
shaping community demand for improved sanitation?
Sector process
Sector	 champions:	What	 role	 do	 champions	play	 in	 raising	
the profile of sanitation and supporting increased sector in-
vestment?
Civil	 society:	What	 roles	do	media,	NGOs,	and	community-
based	organizations	(CBOs)	play	in	the	sector?
Development	partner	 influence:	How	do	donors	and	 lenders	
attempt to influence decision making and reform implementa-
tion in the sanitation sector?
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The Action Framework stresses the need for a partnership 
strategy to address and overcome blockages to pro-poor 
sanitation investment. This broad-based partnership strategy 
can be linked to an inclusive and widespread public debate 
and communications strategy that ensures transparency and 
helps reduce suspicion, resistance, or ideological capture. 
In this way, evidence transparently produced and widely 
debated becomes an opportunity for a sector dialogue with 
a two-way communication that shapes service provision and 
investment and moves communication away from a public 
relations exercise.
2.2 Methodology
This Synthesis Report consolidates the findings from a 
secondary literature desk review (OPM 2009b) and the 
results of fieldwork in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal. 
The fieldwork employed a mixed-method approach, primarily 
using qualitative analysis of stakeholders, institutions, and 
processes, complemented by quantitative data and analysis 
of budget allocation and coverage. Data collection was 
necessarily limited by the time and resources available for 
the fieldwork phase. A fuller discussion of the methodology 
is found in annex A.
Using and refining the conceptual framework that was 
developed through earlier work (World Bank/OPM 2008), 
the review included analysis of (1) key political economy 
literature in the sanitation sector in general; (2) the main 
issues of the political economy of sanitation in Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, and Senegal; and (3) an overview of the political 
economy issues regarding WSP and World Bank projects in 
the case study countries. The results from the review were used 
to identify research hypotheses and questions. A universal 
set of research hypotheses and questions was developed 
during the inception phase of the study for each part of the 
Diagnostic Framework. These are listed in annex A. These 
hypotheses and questions were then tailored to each country case 
study context. A sample of political economy questions linked to 
the Diagnostic Framework is provided in box 2.1.
The fieldwork data collection was driven by two qualitative 
research methods: semistructured key informant interviews 
and focus group discussions. Interviews were conducted 
with key informants from national and subnational 
government, private and public service providers, civil 
society, international donors and lenders, and project teams. 
Focus group discussions were conducted with representatives 
from private sector and civil society stakeholder groups. 
Two analytical instruments—stakeholder analysis and 
organizational mapping—were used to examine the interplay 
between political factors and economic factors by assessing 
stakeholder influence and interests, formal and informal 
institutions, and respective dynamics and processes.
The countries for case studies were chosen purposively by 
the World Bank/WSP team. The countries selected represent 
a range of sanitation contexts identified to generate useful 
operational lessons learned through the application of 
political economy analysis6. Within the selected countries, 
there was an element of initial stratification involved in the 
purposive sampling methodology. In the case of Brazil, for 
example, discussions of project contexts identified a typology 
of urban sanitation contexts and then purposively selected 
sites based on their learning potential. Annex B provides 
detailed summaries for all the case studies. Brief overviews 
are provided in box 2.2.
A time lag was deliberately built into the fieldwork schedule 
for the global study, with fieldwork conducted in India ahead 
of subsequent fieldwork in Brazil, Indonesia, and Senegal. 
Methodological lessons learned from India subsequently 
informed research in the other three case studies. 
6 Case studies were selected based on the following criteria: the existence of WSP and Bank sanitation operations, in order to assess how they have managed political economy issues; 
interest by task teams; the presence of political economy issues commonly faced by the sanitation sector, in order to draw transferable lessons for other countries and regions; 
the opportunity to examine basic access versus improved sanitation via urban/rural infrastructure investments; available information on both demand and supply side aspects of 
governance; different degrees of decentralization; community and private sector engagement, in order to learn from non–public sector schemes; and an urban/rural and regional 
mix of cases. 
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The terms of reference made a distinct differentiation 
between projects with positive experience (Brazil, India, 
and Senegal) and the Indonesia situation where political 
economy challenges had hindered increased investment. 
However, during the case study preparation it was clear that 
the context in Indonesia was rapidly changing, with increased 
government interest in and commitment to sanitation. This 
led to a change of focus from that initially envisaged, in 
which the cases studies generated lessons for Indonesia on 
designing actions that help manage the political economy of 
sanitation. The new focus aimed at an examination of why 
the current changes are occurring. This revised focus ensured 
that equally important lessons were captured from a context 
of ongoing donor and lender efforts to encourage sanitation 
investment in the face of minimal initial government—and 
public—interest in sanitation.
The case studies were conducted by a multidisciplinary 
team of international and national researchers. International 
social scientist led the research process and was supported 
by a national sanitation engineer. The Brazil case study team 
included an additional international sanitation expert. The 
case studies were conducted as part of a research process that 
aimed to gain in-country stakeholder interest, buy-in, and 
support for the political economy analysis. This included 
World Bank/WSP country offices, which—to varying 
degrees—were involved in the case studies, contributing 
to the identification of research hypotheses and providing 
insights as key informants. Debriefing sessions or workshops 
held at the end of the fieldwork or following production of 
initial draft reports helped to validate findings and initiate 
dissemination.
Box 2.2 Brief SummarieS of the four caSe StuDieS 
Brazil: The	case study analyses the national-level political 
economy dynamics of urban sanitation investment over the 
lifetime	of	the	Water	Sector	Modernization	Project	(known	in	
Brazil	as	Programa	de	Modernização	do	Setor	Saneamento,	
PMSS).	Since	the	PMSS	launch	in	1993,	Brazil’s	urban	sa-
nitation sector has undergone an institutional transformation 
and gained a reputation for innovative and pro-poor sewerage 
programs.	 In	 addition	 to	 this	 national	 (policy)	 component,	
the case study includes a regional (project) component that 
focuses	on	the	Bahia	Azul	program,	implemented	by	the	state	
utility	Empresa	Bahiana	de	Águas	e	Saneamento	(Water	and	
Sanitation	Company	of	Bahia,	or	EMBASA)	in	the	Salvador	
metropolitan	region	in	northeastern	Brazil.
india: The	case	 study	 looks	 at	 the	political	 drivers	 for	 the	
success	of	the	Total	Sanitation	Campaign	in	rural	Maharashtra.	
Designed	as	a	supply-driven	sanitation	program,	the	campaign	
has a set of defined components that include information, 
education and communication, community mobilization 
activities, construction of household toilets and community 
complexes, and provision of toilets in government schools 
and anganwadis.7	 The	 India	 case	 study	examines	why	 the	
Total	Sanitation	Campaign	failed	to	take	off	in	most	the	states	
until 2004–05 and provides political economy insights on the 
Maharashtra	success	story	
indonesia: The	analysis	focuses	on	political	economy	constra-
ints that have limited investment levels for urban sanitation and 
examines the factors behind the recent increase in government 
interest	in	sanitation	service	provision.	While	this	increased	
interest has not yet translated into increased investment levels, 
it constitutes a major shift from the previous understanding 
(both within and outside government) that sanitation is a pri-
vate matter for households and not something for which the 
state has responsibility or obligations.
Senegal: The	case	study	looks	at	the	political	economy	risks	
and	opportunities	 influencing	 investment	 in	Dakar’s	 urban	
sanitation sector. Starting with the wide-ranging reforms of 
the	water	and	sanitation	sector	 in	the	mid-1990s	the	study	
explores the institutional environment, including the role of the 
innovative contractual arrangements regulating the water and 
sanitation	sector,	as	well	as	more	recent	World	Bank/WSP-
supported initiatives of onsite sanitation that for the first time 
extend	services	to	Dakar’s	poor peri-urban areas.
7 An anganwadi is a government-sponsored child-care and mother-care center.
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In this section the case study diagnostic findings are synthesi-
zed and summarized with reference to the study hypotheses. 
The analysis is organized around the Diagnostic Framework 
presented in figure 2.1. The discussion includes general 
analytical findings and  notes and explains differences bet-
ween country case studies. Detailed summaries of the case 
studies are presented in annex B.
3.1 country context
A country’s socioeconomic, political, cultural, and historical 
characteristics, including its development trajectory and the 
current development aid architecture, make up the country 
context. An analysis of this context also involves looking at 
political processes within the sanitation sector, the potential 
links to national political institutions and stakeholders, the 
assumptions that underpin sanitation sector investment, 
and how and why sanitation investment was developed and 
by whom.
cultural and historical context
The research confirmed that the cultural and historical context 
is a significant determinant of sanitation investment. In each 
country, contemporary attitudes and behavior toward sanita-
tion investment could be explained at least in part by histori-
cal factors. Where an appropriate combination of historical 
cultural norms and devolved political authority prevailed, 
these could be cultivated by progressive decision makers to 
generate demand for sanitation among citizens. In contrast, 
where hierarchical political and social norms prevailed, they 
created a block to progress in sanitation investment.
In India, for example, successful investment in sanitation in 
Maharashtra could be attributed to a long history of social 
movements led by local leaders supporting the liberation 
of oppressed castes. Senegal’s cultural and religious context 
places a high importance on privacy. Combined with a rapid 
growth in urbanization, it created a demand for increased 
water and sanitation provision in urban areas, particularly in 
the capital city, Dakar. This combination was reinforced 2000 
by the new political leadership under President Wade with 
slogans such as “Sanitation is a matter of dignity.” In socially 
and economically dynamic Brazil, persistence of sanitation 
problems, although decreasing over time, remains  a source 
of embarrassment, as sanitation (especially sanitary sewerage) 
is associated with modern society. From a political point of 
view, since President Lula was elected, access to sanitation 
has been linked to human dignity and a citizen’s right, similar 
to the case in Senegal. 
In contrast, sanitation investment in Indonesia has been 
constrained by a historical context of authoritarian rule, in 
which advocacy is difficult, and, crucially, a sociopolitical 
view both within and outside of government that sanitation 
is a private responsibility. For cultural reasons, sanitation, in 
terms of wastewater treatment and disposal, is also generally 
not a subject that is discussed either widely or easily within 
Indonesian society. The central government had not sought to 
change the perception that sanitation was solely a household 
matter. Awareness of and concern about what happens to 
waste is low across all socioeconomic groups within Indone-
sian society. Public sanitation investment in urban areas of 
Indonesia has been low over many decades, and the majority 
of the existing investment has been by private householders, 
who generally expect little from government. These factors 
have all had a significant, long-term effect on limiting public 
policy debates and maintaining a low demand for facilities 
and services that effectively and safely treat and dispose of 
wastewater among all sections of the population.
Diagnostic findings 
from the fieldIII.
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Political opportunism and investment promotion
There is evidence from across the cases studies that sanita-
tion investment promotion can be motivated by political 
opportunism. This represents an encouraging shift, as it 
reflects a higher political visibility for sanitation investment 
in some contexts. With the exception of Indonesia, there is 
increasing cross-party awareness of—and consensus over—
the importance of sanitation investment. 
In Brazil, political parties that obtain support from poorer 
voters certainly have a different attitude to sanitation, but 
this is not necessarily associated with advocacy of different 
technologies or investment decisions. The main political 
dispute in the Brazilian sanitation sector, not necessarily 
defined in terms of the traditional “right” or “left,” concerns 
the respective roles of local municipalities and the water and 
sanitation companies controlled by the state governments. 
The municipalistas  emphasize the benefits of responsiveness 
and accountability associated with municipal control. The 
estadualistas emphasize the management and investment 
capacity and economies of scale provided by state utilities. 
Increased sanitation investment has benefited from a grow-
ing cross-party consensus since President Lula’s decision to 
include it as a priority sector in the 2007 Growth Acceleration 
Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC). 
While Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) is most clearly associated 
in the minds of poorer voters with an emphasis on sanita-
tion as an issue of dignity and citizenship, all parties benefit 
from the opportunities to make political capital out of large 
sewerage contracts.
In Maharashtra, the behavioral change among national and 
local political leaders toward promoting and supporting 
sanitation investment indicates a consensus across parties. 
It has been  stimulated in part by an understanding of the 
growing political importance among rural voters of sanita-
tion investment. As a consequence, there is little evidence of 
partisan politics in sanitation investment debates.
While there is no evidence that political considerations drive 
pro-poor sanitation investments in Senegal, highly visible 
investments, with a corresponding emphasis on cultural or 
religious importance, are made in Dakar and other areas, 
and this emphasis undoubtedly appeals to a large number 
of voters.
Global policy debate and external aid agencies
The research looked at the facilitating role of external aid 
agencies and global policy debates for more pro-poor sanita-
tion policies and investments. Global debates have impacted 
positively on national sanitation strategies and investments 
in contexts where they strike a chord with the progress of 
internal debates. Where sanitation debates are externally 
initiated or seen to be ideologically imposed, claims that 
external agencies have an impact are less convincing. 
It is important to note that in three of the four cases (India, 
Brazil, and Indonesia) the international financial institu-
tions (IFIs) are, unusually, small players with a facilitative 
or supportive role. The authors would argue that political 
economy analysis is even more important for IFIs and donors 
in smaller countries where they have stronger influence and 
a more critical role and therefore need to be more aware of 
these dimensions. 
International attention to sanitation in Senegal via the 2004 
Global WASH Forum in Dakar kept water and sanitation 
high on the country’s agenda. This provided a platform for 
donor support and a clear demonstration of national com-
mitment by the government, with President Wade himself 
attending the conference. 
In Brazil, perceived enthusiasm by IFIs for privatization of 
state water and sanitation utilities in the 1990s contributed 
to a backlash against “neoliberal” policies in the sector that 
succeeded in derailing the privatization process. IFIs such 
as the World Bank had more success with their support for 
home-grown innovations such as the condominial approach,8 
sponsoring conferences and other events that helped to spread 
these innovations and legitimize their uptake by utilities such 
as EMBASA (the state company responsible for the successful 
Bahia Azul investment program in Salvador).
8 Condominial systems refer to the process of implementing simplified sewerage service coupled with consultations and ongoing interactions between users and agencies during 
planning and implementation. The term is primarily used in Latin America, particularly in Brazil, and is derived from the term condominio (housing block).
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In Indonesia, external agency influence has clearly been im-
portant. Government interest has been stimulated through, 
among other factors, a WSP comparative study on the eco-
nomic impacts of sanitation, a WSP/US Agency for Inter-
national Development regional workshop in the Philippines, 
and the Indonesia Sanitation Sector Development Project 
(ISSDP) implemented by the Government of Indonesia 
together with the Water and Sanitation Program–East Asia 
and the Pacific (WSP-EAP) (and cofunded by the Govern-
ment of the Netherlands). However, in the case of ISSDP, 
donors’ influence rests on their ability to understand and 
manage effectively their relationship with government. The 
consultant team employed by WSP to work on ISSDP, for 
instance, physically sits and interacts with government on 
a daily basis. While letting go of certain aspects of project 
planning, or accepting slower time frames, is not always 
comfortable for IFIs and donors, in a context where the 
government does not want to be seen in any way as donor 
driven, a back seat role is key to encouraging government 
ownership and commitment.
The water and sanitation sector in India is heavily funded by 
government and strongly government led. The policy debate 
on the need for sanitation investment at the national level 
has been won and is government owned rather than being 
externally driven. The perceived urgency of this need is linked 
to external engagement with IFIs and donors on MDG 
commitments. At the state level in Maharashtra, WSP helped 
support pro-poor sanitation investment by introducing state 
and local government colleagues to promotional approaches 
and low-cost sanitation technologies. WSP then used the evi-
dent success of the Maharashtra program in advocacy at the 
national level for a shift in emphasis in the Total Sanitation 
Campaign from household inputs (toilet construction) to 
collective outcomes (an end to open defecation). In 2004, 
significant changes were made to the Total Sanitation Cam-
paign Guidelines to reflect this policy shift.
3.2 Sector arena
Beyond the sanitation country context, a political economy 
perspective focuses attention on the sector arena, meaning 
the formal and informal institutional arrangements for—and 
stakeholder interests in—the management and implemen-
tation of sanitation investments and service provision. The 
literature suggests that this political economy challenge can 
be particularly problematic in the sanitation sector, with 
its need for cross-sectoral delivery and with a wide range of 
delivery strategies from which to choose.9
institutional challenges and opportunities
The institutional complexity of the sanitation sector has long 
been recognized as a major obstacle to pro-poor sanitation 
investment. Despite this, the cases studies illustrate that op-
portunities for institutional change have been recognized and 
supported. These changes have demonstrated that institutio-
nal complexity need not be a barrier to increased investment 
and that Task Team Leaders and practitioners can work to 
support progressive change within complex landscapes, with 
decentralization often providing more room for institutio-
nal maneuver. Despite political sensitivity and institutional 
constraints, there is still a space where pragmatic work can 
be done to support institutional change without huge loans. 
This work can support formal rule changes, as with regulatory 
reform in Senegal, or informal cultural change, as illustrated 
by institutional support in Maharashtra.
The research confirms the constraints that arise from a lack 
of a clear organizational home for sanitation investment. 
This lack of a home can add to the complexity of sector 
planning and resource allocation processes while limiting 
organizational accountability for progress. In Indonesia, for 
example, there is no single national level ministry responsible 
for sanitation policy;  responsibilities are shared among at 
least five ministries. It is clear that urban sanitation has no 
distinct organizational home, and so unsurprisingly there 
are historically and currently varying degrees of interest in 
sanitation. In Senegal, in contrast, there was a consensus 
among key informants that the National Sanitation Office 
(ONAS) was increasingly taking responsibility for urban 
sanitation policy and investment. One went as far as to say 
that “ONAS is the real ‘Ministry of Sanitation.’”10 Figure 
3.2, from the Senegal report, maps institutional delivery of 
sanitation investment.
9 For a review of available literature, see OPM 2009b.
10 Under recent public administration reform, sanitation had been bundled together with other sectors into a single ministry (the Ministry of Urban Affairs, Housing, Water and 
Sanitation).
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The research findings emphasize the 
important status of decentralization 
as a key determinant of the pattern 
and impact of sanitation investments. 
With the exception of Senegal, where 
sanitation is not decentralized,11 the 
case studies highlighted several facets 
of centralization/decentralization. 
On the demand side, the strength of 
decentralized authority can empower 
stakeholders to debate and contest 
sanitation investment with which they 
are dissatisfied. Decentralized budge-
tary authority can encourage pressure 
from regional government, civil socie-
ty, and citizens to allocate budget to 
sanitation investment. On the supply 
side decentralization can keep politi-
cians and bureaucrats in touch with 
their grassroots constituents. In all 
cases, the positive influence of decen-
tralization on sanitation investment is 
conditional upon the level of aware-
ness and strength of demand among 
budget holders and citizens. While 
in some cases, as in Maharashtra and 
in Brazil, decentralization can prove 
to be hugely significant in promo-
ting institutional arrangements that 
facilitate more effective cross-sectoral 
11 In Senegal, local governments are tasked to develop local water and sanitation plans. However, a combination of capacity constraints at the local level and weak accountability 
between central and local government means that this hardly ever happens in practice. Remote rural areas are sometimes forced to take responsibility for their own sanitation 
services, as their needs are more easily ignored by the central Government in Dakar. 
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decision making at the subnational level, in other cases, such 
as in Indonesia, a lack of clarity over institutional authority 
at the national level can be reproduced and magnified at 
subnational level. 
Decentralization is long established in Maharashtra, and 
some senior political leaders and officers have worked their 
way up though the hierarchy, bringing with them an unders-
tanding of, and commitment to, village-level action. Some 
maintain close links with their village. Indeed so strong was 
the decentralized nature of sanitation investment innovation 
in Maharashtra that the national program borrowed from 
the incentive program initiated at the local level rather 
than the other way around. Also in Maharashtra, a range 
of social sector departments and programs including pres-
chool centers, education, health, and sanitation fall under 
the district council (Zilla Parishad) chief executive officer. 
This makes it easier to secure cross-sectoral bureaucratic 
support for development programs and to maintain good 
coordination between the bodies concerned.
In Brazil, the federal government—which sets national 
sector guidelines and serves as the principal source of 
sanitation investment funds, whether through grants or 
loans—functions more as a dynamic arena for struggles 
between different stakeholders than as a stakeholder in its 
own right. For example, the military regime from 1964 to 
1985 used the resources of an authoritarian and highly cen-
tralized state to push through national strategies such as the 
National Water Supply and Sanitation Plan (PLANASA). 
In contrast, today’s democratic, pluralist, and highly de-
centralized Brazil forces national policy making to respond 
to competing pressures from promunicipal municipalistas, 
prostate utility estadualistas, and pro–private sector privatis-
tas. These advocates mobilize support across different levels 
of government and from different parts of political society, 
civil society, and the private sector and can form tactical 
alliances around points of ideological convergence. Figure 
3.3 illustrates these competing pressures.
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figurE 3.2 SAniTATion SEcTor STAkEholdErS’ 
idEologicAl PoSiTionS, BrAzil
The case study of the Bahia Azul investment program showed 
that in the 1990s it was possible for a state government to 
rapidly scale up sewerage provision with a go-it-alone ap-
proach. But with this approach came missed opportunities 
for cross-sectoral work, including synergy with advocates 
for the upgrading of health and neighborhood services by 
the municipal administration authority. In today’s sector 
arena this approach would no longer be possible, given the 
strengthened role of the municipalities and the need for im-
proved federal cooperation between states and municipalities 
under the 2007 Basic Sanitation Law, which also covers water 
supply. Sanitation investments under the flagship Growth 
Acceleration Program (PAC) include a much greater focus 
on collaboration between state and municipal government 
departments, though some cross-sector coordination issues 
remain. Stakeholder power and interest mapping (figure 3.4) 
clearly shows how political economy factors made it impos-
sible for one side to prevail in the struggle over the 2007 
law. Using information gathered through key informant 
interviews, a graphical presentation of stakeholder interests 
and power relations places stakeholders on a matrix; each 
stakeholder’s position is determined by its interest (x-axis) 
and its ability to influence decision making (y-axis).
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Source: Shankland et al. 2010.
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local government departments
Bappeda X
Municipal	Department	of	Public	Works	(PU) X X
Municipal	Cleaning	and	Landscaping	Agency	(DKP) X X
Neighborhood	administrative	units	(RT/RW) X X
Environmental	Services	Agency	(DLH) X X X
Environment	Watch	Body	(BPLHD)	at	provincial	level X
Water	Resource	Body	(Dinas	Sumberdaya	Air)*** X
local government enterprises
PDPAL	(sewerage	utilities)* X X
PDAM	(water	utilities)* X X
nongovernment stakeholders
Private enterprises X**
NGOs	/	CBOs	/	community	groups X X
Individuals	/	households X X
In Indonesia, rapid decentralization gave greater administra-
tive independence to local governments and moved finan-
cial resources and responsibility for the provision of many 
public services (including water and sanitation) directly to 
the district level. However, the effects of the lack of clear 
responsibilities at national level are compounded by a lack 
of clarity over the roles of different levels of local government 
and of different institutions within local governments. Fur-
thermore, responsibilities of local agencies may vary between 
different districts and cities as there is no national policy on 
institutional configuration or allocation of responsibilities for 
sanitation between local bodies at the local level. figure 3.5 
presents an institutional map of Indonesia’s urban sanitation 
sector and clearly highlights the lack of clarity over responsi-
bility. This reduces accountability for sanitation service deli-
very. It is unclear to ordinary members of the public whom 
they could approach and/or complain to. This contrasts to 
electricity suppliers, for instance, where advertised hotline 
numbers enable clients to contact providers directly when 
there is a problem.
A further key issue faced due to decentralization in Indonesia 
is the increasing practice of redistricting, through which local 
politicians can petition for districts to be split into smaller 
administrative units through a mechanism called pemekaran. 
In theory this should facilitate better service delivery, more 
equitable resource distribution, and more representative go-
vernment. While redistricting has increased revenues, local 
budget generally give priority to free education, (curative) 
health services, and the construction of new government offi-
ces to house newly formed local administrations. These easily 
crowd out sanitation and other public health promotion issues. 
This bottom-rung perception of sanitation is entrenched by 
an attitude among mst local governments that responsibility 
for sanitation rests with others: NGOs, the private sector, or, 
despite decentralization, the national government, and most 
importantly perhaps, with individual households.
Notes:
* Depends on district / city arrangements (only two cities have PDPAL separated from PDAM—Jakarta and Banjarmasin).
** Pit emptying.
*** Can take the role of managing septic tanks operators.
**** As with sanitation, organizational responsibility for drainage is complex and depends largely on the grade of roads and associated drains. The Ministry of Public Works is responsible 
for drainage on first- and second-level roads (interprovince and intercity roads). Tertiary roads and local streets are often under local government responsibility but neighborhood streets are 
often neglected. Developers build drainage systems for new housing estates and formal developments, but drainage in informally growing settlements is often unaddressed.
Sources: WSP-EAP 2009; Brook et al. 2010.
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Budget allocations and disbursements
The research focused on the political economy factors that 
might explain the gap between sanitation as an expressed 
priority and actual changes in budget allocation and dis-
bursement. The challenge of translating political statements 
into budget commitments was confirmed. In some cases this 
is a function of the pressure to allocate scarce resources to 
sectors with a traditionally higher perceived priority or with 
higher perceived political rewards. In cases where resource 
scarcity is less of an issue, the importance of organizational 
resistance from within the executive can become apparent. 
In these cases, executive ministries, departments, and 
agencies have insufficient pressure from above and from 
below to allocate budgets to (more progressive) sanitation 
investment. Therefore, even where there is high-level buy-
in, and demand generated within civil society, this will not 
necessarily change political preferences within institutions 
implementing government policy. Another explanation for 
the funding gap is seen where implementing agencies lack 
the technical and governance capacity to absorb and mana-
ge increased budget allocations. Where governments have 
successfully bridged these policy-to-funding gaps, national 
or federal level sanitation programs can provide a protected 
institutional vehicle for sanitation investment.
In Indonesia there has often been a huge gap between public 
statements and budget execution levels. This is less a function 
of resource scarcity and more a matter of organizational re-
sistance or lack of real interest within government. Despite 
certain formal processes being in place, informal patron–
client relationships play a key role in determining investment 
priorities and funding from central to local governments. 
This is particularly evident in the influence of provincial level 
government stakeholders and actors over budget allocations, 
where personal relationships and political considerations are 
key to obtaining funding.
In contrast, these political economy gaps have been largely 
bridged at the federal level in India, with the government 
putting in place a transparent institutional mechanism of 
disbursement and authority that ensures the transfer of 
government investment into various elements of the natio-
nal Total Sanitation Campaign. At the subnational level in 
Maharashtra, the ability of the Maharashtra government 
to secure strong and sustained bureaucratic support for its 
political commitments was fundamental to the progress of 
sanitation investment in the state.
In Senegal, budget allocation has been hampered by capacity 
constraints at the policy and planning level as well as by com-
peting investment priorities with potentially greater political 
rewards, such as investments in Dakar’s road network. An 
organizational mapping, undertaken during the fieldwork, 
identified key decision and political economy entry points 
during the budget process, including the president’s ability 
to influence the budget process or the importance of line 
ministries’ capacity to present a sound budget proposal to the 
Ministry of Finance. figure 3.6 summarizes this analysis and is 
divided into three parts: the formal rules of the budget process 
(in the center), key points of decision making (in blue, on 
the left), and a description of the informal processes (circled 
in red, on the right). Moreover, cost recovery is subject to 
much debate in Senegal’s urban sanitation sector today. With 
little actual contribution from local government, ONAS gets 
its main revenue from the sanitation surcharge collected 
within the water billing. In August 2008 ONAS signed a 
performance contract with the government confirming that 
the state would cover the financing gap if ONAS performed 
satisfactorily.12 The sanitation sector has therefore followed 
the successful example of the water sector in designing con-
tracts that shape stakeholders’ incentives in order to protect 
investments from adverse political economy impacts.
12 ONAS’s performance was tracked in wastewater treatment, investment in the network (extension and rehabilitation), new connections and new onsite facilities, network 
maintenance, and financial management.
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In Brazil there is a significant gap between the amounts 
earmarked for sanitation investment in congressional 
budgets and those actually released by the national trea-
sury, with political as well as financial criteria governing 
the ultimate decisions on disbursements. Most sector 
investment has historically derived from federal govern-
ment loans, with strict technical and financial viability 
criteria that limit uptake to the larger and better-run state 
utilities. The inclusion of sanitation in the Growth Ac-
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celeration Program has, however, significantly increased 
the availability of grant finance for investment by smaller 
and more heavily indebted utilities in poorer states and 
municipalities. figure 3.7 graphically represents the mix of 
loans and grants with different institutional and political 
pathways to decision and disbursement. (Where relevant, 
sites or moments of political input to decision making are 
noted in red alongside the official technical and financial 
decision pathways.)
FORMAL PROCESS
MoF publishes budget envelopes
INFORMAL PROCESSKEY POINTS OF DECISION-MAKING
AND PE ENTRY POINTS
Budget proposal & preparation in
Ministry’s Sanitation Department
Submission of department budgets
Submission of ministry budgets to MoF
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Source: Garbarino and Guène (2009). 
FIGURE 3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL MAPPING OF THE BUDGET PROCESS FOR URBAN SANITATION IN SENEGAL
26 Global Practice Team of Sanitation
The Political Economy of Sanitation    diagnostic findings from the field
CAIXA = Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal Savings Bank); BNDES = Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (National Bank for Economic and Social Development); COFIEX = Comissão de 
Financiamentos Externos (Brazil’s federal government external financing commission).
Source: Shankland et al. 2010.
figurE 3.6 BudgET dEciSionS And rESourcE flowS for 
SAniTATion invESTmEnT grAnTS And loAnS in BrAzil
The key constraint to increasing both 
the quantity and the quality of sanita-
tion investment in Brazil is now percei-
ved to be weak technical and financial 
capacity resulting from the decades-
long neglect of the sector. While the 
private sector is already beginning to 
respond to the new, more positive sce-
nario, significant investments continue 
to be needed in the technical and ma-
nagement capacity of the public bodies 
(at federal, state, and municipal levels) 
that commission, monitor, regulate, 
and in most cases operate sewerage and 
other sanitation services.
corruption and rent seeking
A particular dimension to the budget 
allocation and disbursement debate is 
the incidence of corrupt practices based 
on rent-seeking behavior within organi-
zations with control over budgets and 
authority over sanitation investment 
decisions. While all case studies came 
across evidence of rent seeking and 
corruption, it was not identified as the 
predominant feature distorting pro-
poor sanitation investments. 
In Indonesia sanitation investments 
were said to be less popular with many 
civil servants than other types of larger 
infrastructure projects (for example, 
roads and buildings), as they provided 
fewer opportunities for corruption. One 
senior civil servant argued, “If you go 
into sanitation, you are signing up to 
be poor.” There are, however, corrupt 
practices in sanitation investment: 
private sector interviewees involved in 
building sanitation infrastructure in the 
past explained that they were usually 
asked for kickbacks of up to 20 percent 
of the total budget. Corruption is a 
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widely and often discussed topic within the national media, 
and there is a general public perception that someone always 
gets rich with infrastructure investment.
Another opportunity for rent seeking is created in Indonesia 
through the ongoing decentralization process. The practice of 
splitting districts into smaller administrative units should in 
theory facilitate better service delivery, more equitable resource 
distribution, and more representative government. However, 
as decentralization means more central funding is available, 
and more money is also raised locally through taxation, a key 
motivation for splitting districts has often been control over 
resources and rent-seeking opportunities for local elites.
Within the low technology investment arena in rural sa-
nitation in India, opportunities for corruption prevail in 
the disbursement of a large central budget under the Total 
Sanitation Campaign and for rent seeking in the approval of 
financial awards for clean village status. This study, with its 
relatively brief period of fieldwork, did not elicit evidence of 
corruption in the disbursement of TSC budgets from central 
to subnational administration. Nor was there any evidence of 
rent seeking by officials responsible for confirming clean village 
status in Maharashtra. While it is reasonably safe to assume 
that corruption and rent seeking play their part in this sector, 
as they do in others, the fieldwork team did not conclude that 
this distorted the process and its outcomes significantly.
In Senegal, the fieldwork team did not come across concrete 
evidence for corrupt practices within the onsite investments. 
Works are closely monitored through the Global Partner-
ship on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) initiative. However, 
the overall preference of politicians for big infrastructure 
investments—while on one hand explained by a technological 
bias—is likely to be influenced by the opportunities created 
for rent seeking.
In Brazil the political commitment to condominial investment 
has been pro-poor while generally maintaining the appeal for 
different stakeholders. For politicians, this creates relatively big 
public works programs for investment, and key informants in 
Bahia raised the issue of the closeness of the state government to 
particular construction companies. Moreover, according to key 
informants, there are expectations by construction companies 
who finance politicians’ election campaigns that they will be 
repaid out of inflated contracts when that particular politician 
is successfully elected. While not covered in the case study 
(as it is not funded by World Bank or WSP), FUNASA, the 
Ministry of Health agency responsible for small-town sanita-
tion, has been involved in numerous corruption scandals, and 
its former administrative director was arrested by the Federal 
Police on suspicion of embezzling roughly US$30 million in 
spring 2010.
Technological choice and pro-poor sanitation provision
The research explored whether and why decisions about pro-
poor sanitation investment can also be derailed by technologi-
cal preferences. Politically driven decision making was  char-
acterized by a preference for highly visible, big infrastructure 
investments, with in some instances rent-seeking opportunities 
being an important incentive for those in power. Among 
engineers, there is a strong technical bias for traditional sani-
tation investments, such as sewerage-based service provision, 
often at the expense of appropriate technological choices. The 
sector arena is therefore often characterized by political and 
technological preferences that benefit the minority of well-off 
urban residents rather than the poor majority.
In cases where technological and political preferences are not 
the same, an interesting debate emerges between sector stake-
holders. In Senegal, many high-ranking politicians are sup-
porters of investing in the expansion of the sewerage network 
and costly treatment plants, whereas many technical sector 
specialists and bureaucrats have been increasingly convinced 
by examples of onsite sanitation and condominial systems that 
successfully work in poor semi-urban areas of Dakar. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this experience echoes the situation in 
many other countries. However, bureaucrats in Senegal have 
limited power compared to politicians. This lack of influence 
over technological discussions by engineers and bureaucrats 
has limited the adoption of large-scale onsite sanitation and 
condominial systems and has undermined efforts to expand 
sanitation provision to the country’s poor outside the reach 
of the network. 
In Brazil, a discourse of modernity shared by popular and 
elite actors has favored investment in “modern” sewerage over 
other forms of sanitation provision. Moreover, the engineer-
The Political Economy of Sanitation    diagnostic findings from the field
28 Global Practice Team of Sanitation
ing community has initially resisted the condominial sewers 
technology; it was simply not what they have been trained in. 
However, the resulting high costs of increased sanitation access 
and the bias away from pro-poor investment have been partially 
offset by the use of innovative low-cost sewerage technologies 
such as the condominial approach.
In India, the federal government has ensured that affordability 
of rural sanitation technologies has not hindered the delivery 
of sanitation investment. Subsidies for household latrines for 
designated (below poverty line) poor households are readily 
available through the federal Total Sanitation Campaign. In 
Maharashtra these subsidies resolved affordability problems 
for many households, which was confirmed by observable 
behavioral change and by below poverty line households 
interviewed for this study.
In Indonesia, private investment is the norm in a context 
where sanitation is widely seen as a private and not a public 
responsibility. The traditionally low political interest in sani-
tation means that there is little or no prominent discussion 
on technological choice among political decision makers. 
Between 1970 and 2000, government spending on sanitation 
averaged just Rp 200 (US$0.021) per person per year. It is 
not surprising then that the primary source of investment for 
sanitation is households and communities, who invest in onsite 
sanitation. In the city of Jakarta, for instance, this results in 
self-provisioned investments in septic tanks by households, 
while in rural areas, pit latrines are the most popular tech-
nological choice.
Private sector involvement
The research tested the hypothesis that governments actively 
encourage nongovernmental and private sector actors in 
sanitation infrastructure and delivery, with a focus on how 
that relationship can be established in a way that effectively 
manages political economy risks and opportunities. The re-
search confirmed the potential institutional effectiveness of 
contractual relationships that provide flexible entry for the 
private sector and NGOs in sanitation promotion, invest-
ment, and delivery.
In India, the Total Sanitation Campaign has been designed 
to be sufficiently flexible to allow for subnational autonomy 
and to encourage the participation of NGOs and the pri-
vate sector in the implementation of crucial elements of the 
program. In Maharashtra, however, sanitation promotion is 
undertaken by government officers, not contracted to exter-
nal organizations. This adds legitimacy to the promotional 
campaign. NGOs are involved, but in the background, as 
resource centers for government. Similarly, in Senegal, the 
World Bank/WSP Sanitation Program for Peri-urban Com-
munities of Dakar (PAQPUD) delegate the active role of 
promoter and implementer to community-based organiza-
tions and private operators, which are trusted partners in 
many communities.
In Brazil, both service provision and sector investment 
finance are dominated by the public sector. However, the 
proportion of sewerage services provided by private-sector 
concession holders is growing, albeit from a very low base. 
Private investment in the sector suffered from long-standing 
uncertainty over the legal and regulatory framework, partially 
resolved by the 2007 National  Basic Sanitation Guidelines 
Law, which also includes water supply as part of basic 
sanitation. Evidence from Brazil has also highlighted that 
long-term engagement with communities matters. The case 
study of the Bahia Azul program showed that the hard work 
of the community mobilizers in organizing neighborhood 
meetings and pursuing individual households to ensure their 
adherence was very successful in creating the condominiums 
and paving the way for investment and construction. 
However, the lack of any systematic links with community 
associations and other neighborhood groups may have 
made it harder to mobilize subsequent collective action for 
operation and maintenance in a sustainable fashion.
In Indonesia, where recently increasing political commitment 
has not yet translated into concrete actions, there is currently 
little role for private sector involvement in the sanitation sector. 
Not actively encouraged by the government, the private sector 
is, however, involved through private investment in onsite fa-
cilities or maintenance, for example, in those cases where septic 
tanks are operational and emptied on a regular basis.
Demand for sanitation services and willingness to pay
The research considered whether communities and house-
holds are less interested in sanitation investment than in other 
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services and are less willing to pay for sanitation services. It 
is evident that while demand for sanitation has traditionally 
been weaker than for water and other services, demand in 
both urban and rural areas can be generated with a selection 
of rewards and sanctions, an affordable mix of technologies, 
and a long-term strategy of engagement and promotion. 
In Maharashtra the demand for water is much stronger than 
that for sanitation. It is also highly significant, however, 
that under the state’s Sant Gadge Baba scheme, commu-
nity investments have been much larger than government 
expenditure due to a careful combination of incentives and 
sanctions. Indeed, the experience in Maharashtra has demon-
strated that in this context, rewards for sanitation outcomes 
are a key motivating factor for communities. Interest in and 
demand for sanitation in Indonesia has traditionally been 
low among communities, and stakeholder analysis confirmed 
low interest among the media, consumer groups, and within 
households.
Rapid urbanization and population growth have put pres-
sure on service provision in Senegal’s cities. In most settings, 
however, community demand for services focuses on what 
are perceived as more urgent problems: drinking water, solid 
waste collection, wastewater and drainage (in particular in 
the rainy season), or acute environmental problems as the 
case of the Cambérène treatment plant demonstrates (box 
3.1). However, in Dakar, NGOs and CBOs have successfully 
used community interest in better drainage and wastewater 
collection to stimulate demand for sanitation services. By 
offering a wide range of technological options13 (in different 
price categories) supported by a one-off subsidy, sanitation 
provision is becoming more affordable. 
In Brazil, demand for sewerage investments in high-density 
urban informal settlements (favelas) has historically been 
driven not by favela residents themselves but by downstream 
middle-class and elite communities. In the case study city of 
Salvador, a particular factor was these communities’ concern 
about the discharge of raw sewage onto “their” beaches. There 
is evidence, however, that near-universal access to electric-
ity and water supply has made room for sanitation to move 
up the list of poor Brazilians’ priority demands. Sewerage 
investment in informal settlements is now perceived as a key 
part of the transition from favela (slum) to bairro (neighbor-
hood) and from social exclusion to cidadania (citizenship). 
The benefits of improved sanitation for both human health 
and dignity are now clearly present in the discourse of favela 
residents, as well as in high-profile statements by President 
Lula.
13 The available technology includes wash basins or showers with a «soak away,» which do not count under the MDG target or the «safe management of human excreta» (the 
definition of sanitation in the terms of reference for this study).
Box 3.1 conSumer action: the camBérène treatment 
plant in Dakar
From	December	2001	to	March	2002,	the	Cambérène	was-
tewater treatment plant had problems with the pipe that 
discharged	treated	wastewater	into	the	Atlantic	Ocean.	The	
pipe was broken, and treated wastewater was discharged into 
the sea directly on the shore instead of 200 meters from the 
coast	as	intended.	It	further	came	to	light	that	the	National	
Sanitation Office proceeded to pass raw sewage directly to 
the sea during maintenance periods at the plant. 
Once people living nearby understood what was happening 
(and what caused the smell), they decided to physically block 
and	clog	the	last	manhole	leading	to	the	shore.	This	did	not	
leave	ONAS	any	choice	but	to	stop	pumping	raw	sewage	into	
the	sea,	and	the	Cambérène	treatment	plant	was	eventually	
closed down for four months. 
Following	this	concrete	consumer	action,	ONAS	was	forced	
to install a new, flexible pipe with an outlet 200 meters from 
the	shore.	In	addition,	the	minister	responsible	for	sanitation	
had to personally negotiate with the community before the 
manhole was unblocked
Source: Garbarino and Guène 2009.
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Sanitation as vote winner or career maker?
The research also looked at the incentives and interests of 
government stakeholders in relation to sanitation investment, 
testing the hypothesis that within government, sanitation is 
perceived as a vote winner (or career maker). There was en-
couraging evidence from the India and Brazil case studies of 
perceived political returns to sanitation investment, and some 
progress apparent at the city level in Indonesia in generating 
political incentives through the Indonesian Sanitation Sec-
tor Development Program. The political incentives operate 
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where demand among the public has been generated or 
strengthened and/or where there is a higher visibility given 
to sanitation in national and international policy debates.
In Maharashtra, the political returns to sanitation inves-
tment have become increasingly apparent. Some of the 
senior officials committed to sanitation in the early years 
have risen to more senior positions, albeit often to unre-
lated sectors, and the government recognizes and rewards 
officers who perform well in the sanitation program. Sig-
nificantly, this form of political incentive has started to 
be reflected in other states. The program also gives Gram 
Panchayat (village-level government) leaders greater access 
to senior decision makers, raising their public profile if they 
are sanitation supporters. This is clearly illustrated in the 
country case study stakeholder analysis (figure 3.8), which 
maps stakeholders according to their level of interest (on the 
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horizontal x-axis) and influence (on the vertical y-axis). This 
shows high levels of support for rural sanitation investment 
among powerful state and district officials. In Maharashtra, 
stakeholder positions on sanitation investment have shifted 
over time to the point where there is now no significant stake-
holder opposition to rural sanitation investment (illustrated 
by the blank cells B and D). Fifteen or more years ago this 
type of stakeholder analysis would have shown active stake-
holder opposition, in particular from the state water board. 
The challenge now is not one of active opposition but of 
agenda setting and prioritization in a resource-competitive 
environment. In this environment, the strongest push for 
sanitation investment and creative programming has come 
from sanitation champions—state politicians and executive 
officials—within the Department of Drinking Water Supply 
and Sanitation, backed by supportive activities from the 
donor community.
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19	 Gram	Panchayat	secretary	-	(A:	Support	+	influence)	
20	 Other	GP	level	functionaries	like	ANM,	Anganwadi	
worker  
(C:	support	and	influence	more	towards	neutral)
PrivATE SEcTor
21 Rural sanitary marts (community-based product sale 
centers	)	-	(C:	High	support	+	low	influence)
22	 Sanitary	product	suppliers	(C:	support	and	influence	
more toward neutral) 
23	 Local	Masons	-	(C:	support	and	influence	more	
toward neutral)
donorS
24	 World	Bank	(Jalswaraj	Program)	-	(A:	Support	+high	
influence)
25	 WSP	-	(A:	Support	+high	influence)
26	 UNICEF	-	(A:	Support	+high	influence)
civil SociETy
27	 NGOs	(capacity	building/	KRC)	 
(C:	High	support	+low	influence)
28	 Consultants**	(as	key	resource	centers) 
(C:	High	support	+low	influence)
29	 Media	-	(C:	Significant	support	+	influence)
30	 Village	residents	-	(C:	neutral	or	supportive	with	low	
influence)
govErnmEnT And STATE AgEnciES
national
1	 Ministry	of	Rural	Development	-	(A:	Support	+ 
high influence)
2	 Department	of	Drinking	Water	Supply	(DDWS) 
(A:	Support	+high	influence)
3	 The	Rajiv	Gandhi	National	Drinking	Water	Mis-
sion 
(A:	Support	+high	influence)
State level
4	 State	Minister	for	Drinking	Water	Supply	and	
Sanitation 
(A:	Support	+high	influence)
5	 State	Water	and	Sanitation	Mission	(headed	by	
Chief	Secretaryof	State)	(A:	Ability	to	influence	
high but neutral interest) 
6	 Water	Supply	and	Sanitation	Department	
(WSSD)* 
A:	Support	+high	influence)
District level
7 Zilla Panchayat 
(A:	Support	+high	influence;	influence	could	be	
varied depending on the individual capacity of 
the Sarpanch)
8	 District	Water	and	Sanitation	Management 
Committee	(DWSMC) 
(A:	Support	+high	influence)
figurE 3.7 PowEr/inTErEST mATrix, rurAl SAniTATion invESTmEnT, mAhArAShTrA, indiA
Notes:
* In other states the nodal agency could be the Rural Development Department, The Panchayat Raj Department, or the Public Health Engineering Department. 
** Technical consultants could go under the private sector category as profit-making stakeholders.
Source: Colin et al. 2009.
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High
Influence
Low
A B
C D
Support Neutral Opposition
Interest
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 23
2425
26
27 28
29
30
	9	 District	Core	Team/	TSC	Cell	-	(A:	Support	+high	in-
fluence; however, influence will be more toward neutral 
because of relatively little decision-making power)
10 	Officials	of	district-level	units	of	the	Departments	of	
Education	(district	education	officer),	Health	(chief	
medical	officer),	Women	and	Child	Development	
(chief district project officer-integrated child develop-
ment	schemes);	(C:	support	and	influence	both	more	
toward neutral, as these have no authority over funds)
11	 District	heads	of	ongoing	water	supply	projects	of	
Jalswaraj/	KfW/	Mahajal	-	(A:	Support	+	influence)	
12	 MPs	and	MLAs	-	(A:	Support	+	influence)	
Block level
13	 Janpad	Panchayat	-	(A:	Support	+	influence)	
14	 Block	development	officer	-	(C:	support	and	influence	
both more neutral) 
15 Officials of various government 
departments/agencies	like	education,	health,	and	
women	and	child	development	-	(C:	support	and	
influence more neutral) 
village level
16	 Gram	Panchayat	(GP):	Sarpanch	and	elected	ward 
members	-	(A:	Support	+	influence)	
17	 VWSC	members	-	(A:	Support	+	influence)	
18	 School	Management	Committee	/PTA	 
(C:	support and influence more neutral)
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Source: Photograph by authors.
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figurE 3.8 ElEcTion PoSTEr in SEnEgAl’S 
locAl ElEcTionS 2009
In Senegal, in contrast to the Maharashtra case, political 
incentives for supporting sanitation investment were low. 
While the political leadership with broad popular support 
for President Wade’s Sopi (change) coalition decided to make 
infrastructure including sanitation one of the government’s 
priorities, after the 2000 elections priorities seemed to be 
shifting with the government’s decreasing popularity. Politi-
cians notably emphasized other sectors in the local elections 
of 2009 (which took place during the fieldwork for the case 
study). The challenge of improving Dakar’s strained road net-
work was clearly believed to be the number one vote winner 
by President Wade’s Sopi coalition (see figure 3.9).
In Indonesia, in a context of low political prioritization of 
sanitation, progress has been made at the city level to create 
political incentives for support to sanitation. The ISSDP 
started a process of bringing together six cities to show and 
discuss what each had done and achieved. This process took 
on a dynamic of its own, and there is increasing friendly 
competition among the cities to perform well against each 
other. In one case, a mayor was embarrassed at the low level 
of achievement compared to the others, so he immediately 
instructed his local administration to address the issues. In 
some cities, sanitation is becoming a political electoral issue, 
with potential positive impacts on accountability-driven in-
vestment. In Payakumbuh, for instance, the mayor is known 
as the “sanitation mayor” and sanitation investment has been 
a campaign issue.
3.3 Sector process
The sector process in this context refers to the dynamic and 
ongoing process of negotiation, bargaining, and identification 
of political economy risks and opportunities by government 
and development agency stakeholders.
civil society participation and citizen oversight
The study examined the extent to which the promotion and 
use of civil society participation as an element of the sanita-
tion sector strategy are key factors in accelerating progress. In 
Maharashtra it is clear that social investment in civil society 
participation (meaning, in this case, community participa-
tion rather than NGO participation) has been essential to 
the success of the government’s demand-driven strategy for 
sanitation investment in the state. Among its other deve-
lopmental goals, the Sant Gadge Baba scheme incentivizes 
collective outcomes (an end to open defecation) rather than 
household inputs (toilet construction). It does this not only 
through financial rewards but through public and peer recog-
nition of the achievement. The state government prioritizes 
other development assistance support to villages that attain 
Open Defecation Free status, as an additional reward. This 
is a “soft” approach, and benefits are not explicitly withheld 
from those that do not achieve Open Defecation Free status. 
Significantly, while officers and communities were incentiv-
ized toward a common goal of ending open defecation, they 
were given considerable latitude in how they achieved it.
The Brazil case study showed how the unique strength of the 
political group behind Bahia Azul allowed it to ignore the 
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that did not challenge powerful political economic interests 
or was built into a well-designed decision-making process, it 
could be an effective tool for unblocking or revising policy 
decisions and budget allocations.
In Indonesia, despite the country context that has limited 
sanitation investment, decision makers within national gov-
ernment were increasingly using and acting upon evidence 
regarding the impacts of low levels of urban sanitation 
investment, and particularly the economic impacts. While 
evidence regarding the links between poor sanitation and 
poor health outcomes was not particularly powerful or dis-
cussed much at the national level, economic evidence has 
played a greater role. A comparative study on the economic 
impacts of sanitation in four Southeast Asian countries was 
consistently mentioned by stakeholders within government 
and among lenders and donors as a key document in galvaniz-
ing government interest. This puts a figure on the economic 
losses caused to Indonesia due to poor sanitation, and in a 
country that is striving to maintain its regional status as an 
economic leader, had a significant impact on government 
interest in sanitation.14 In December 2009, the National 
Sanitation Conference was opened by the Indonesian vice 
president, who quoted extensively from this study, demon-
strating increased high-level awareness of sanitation issues 
and political prioritization of the sector. In 2010 the national 
budget allocation for sanitation to local governments has 
been announced as equal to the water allocation. Although 
the overall water and sanitation budget has been reduced, the 
sanitation portion has increased to Rs 376 billion (US$40 
million) representing a fourfold increase over 2009. Such 
an increase is unprecedented and confirms the increased 
understanding among decision makers of the seriousness 
of underinvestment in sanitation. However, while these are 
significant improvements in investment levels compared to 
the past, this is still just 2 percent of the amount needed to 
fund the sanitation road map outlined by the government. 
The Senegal case study has shown that donor support in 
providing evidence is particularly efficient if it is embed-
need to engage with municipal governments, civil society, 
and statutory citizen oversight institutions, and its political 
orientation influenced an approach to working with com-
munities that privileged top-down, short-term mobilization 
over sustained participation. While it enabled the program to 
scale up rapidly, it did not maintain and support the social 
capital created by the program at neighborhood level, which 
consequently may have exacerbated the challenges of system 
operation and maintenance. The process also failed to seize 
opportunities to take advantage of community cohesion by 
linking these investments with other programs for health 
and urban upgrading. 
In Senegal, the Millennium Water and Sanitation Programme 
(PEPAM, Programme d’Eau Potable et d’Assainissement du 
Millénaire)—a framework for unified intervention in the 
sector that aims to attract investments to reach the MDG—
provides the platform for civil society and private sector 
participation in the sector’s monitoring. PEPAM’s annual 
review is usually well attended by government representa-
tives, donors, private sector actors, and civil society and 
provides information to all stakeholders on how the water 
and sanitation sector develops. It is, however, criticized by 
some as having a backward-looking nature that prevents it 
from taking a more active role in shaping the sector’s future 
development.
The research confirmed the need for different approaches 
to social investment between rural and urban communities. 
The operational approach in Maharashtra, for example, was 
very effective for smaller, cohesive rural communities—the 
focus of this research—but has had less impact (so far) in 
larger, peri-urban areas.
evidence-based policy making in sanitation
The research also looked at whether governments listen to 
evidence linking sanitation to development outcomes. It 
confirmed the observation that purely evidence-based policy 
making is unrealistic and naive. But it also revealed that when 
the evidence generated assisted policy deliberations in a way 
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interest in increasing sanitation investment. A WSP/USAID conference was organized in the Philippines in 2006–7. Attended by national government stakeholders, there was a 
perception that if the Philippines could do something, then so could Indonesia, which contributed to the start of the 2007 national summit on sanitation.
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ded in a wider process for the sector’s development. The 
wide-ranging institutional reform of the water and sanita-
tion sector in the mid-1990s was facilitated by the World 
Bank through a range of carefully prepared and organized 
workshops and informal meetings. Analyses on privatization 
models and financing issues provided the basis for the design 
of the contracts and institutional arrangements, such as the 
separation of the water and sanitation sectors from each 
other. Including the sanitation sector in the responsibilities 
of the private operator was seen as too burdensome, given 
the sector’s poor state (Brocklehurst and Janssens 2004). 
Similarly, donor-supported analysis informed the design of 
the performance contract between the ONAS and the Gov-
ernment of Senegal in 2008 (ONAS/Banque Européenne 
d’Investissement 2008).
The national government in India reflected carefully on the 
failure of the supply-driven Central Rural Sanitation Pro-
gram and has devised a program that combines elements of 
incentives and rewards to generate demand for sanitation 
investment. This has shifted the levers of power and influence 
downward to local government bodies.
In Brazil, a well-documented research piece on the health 
benefits of the Bahia Azul investment program (ultimately 
made available in the Lancet, see Barreto et al. 2007) found 
itself caught between two political administrations. The 
timing of the launch was unfortunate in that the incoming 
political administration was not keen to give credit to the 
investments of the previous administration.
relationship between accountability and sanitation 
investment
The relationship between accountability and sanitation in-
vestment was also explored through the case studies. Good 
“accountability relations” emerged as vital to securing the 
delivery of and accessibility to sanitation investments. They 
were important both as triggers of change and as a means of 
monitoring change. The research revealed a wide range of 
types of accountability relationship. On the whole, donors 
supporting sanitation sector investment recognized the 
critical role of accountability relations but did not promote 
off-the-shelf, pre-determined approaches to strengthening 
accountability. Instead, they followed a learning-by-doing 
approach that was sensitive to different contexts for ac-
countability.
Within India, for example, rural sanitation investment is 
characterized by small-scale private household investment 
and therefore is outside of the citizen-and-service-provider 
model—also known as the “short route of accountability” 
(World Bank 2004). Hence, in the case of Maharashtra, 
the government created and strengthened demand outside 
the governance framework of the “rights claimers and duty 
bearers” model of public service provision.15 Instead, the 
emphasis encourages private investment and private behavior 
change. In this way government accountability shifts from 
delivery to outcomes. This has been achieved by having 
the state focus on creating a demand-driven approach to 
sanitation investment, facilitated by the state using a mix of 
consciousness raising, subsidies, collective financial rewards, 
“soft” conditionality, and enforcement.
In Indonesia—the least promising context for accountabil-
ity relations in sanitation investment—the political culture 
has discouraged demand-driven accountability hat would 
involve a stronger voice and greater advocacy from civil so-
ciety. Some key informants working in the media suggested 
that advocacy is generally difficult and that the government 
generally doesn’t want to listen to opinions from the media 
and civil society. So far, in the reformasi era, only the Agency 
for National Development Planning (Bappenas) and the 
Ministry of Women Empowerment were seen as being open 
to activists and academics. However, this needs to be put into 
the context of extremely low demand (as outlined earlier) 
and low awareness within civil society and the media itself 
of sanitation issues.
In Brazil, the emerging regulatory framework for the sector 
emphasizes the role of conselhos (oversight committees) or 
other types of institutionalized participatory mechanisms 
with consultation/oversight roles and guaranteed service-
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user participation. Despite the considerable potential of 
these structures to enhance accountability, disputes remain 
over the appropriate balance between this kind of participa-
tory regulation and the more technical approach favored by 
the arms-length regulatory bodies that are being set up by 
several state governments. The issue is further complicated 
by the challenge of determining the correct representatives 
for participation. 
While Senegal’s urban water supply sector has been regulated 
by innovative contracts since the mid-1990s, the sanitation 
sector has recently followed this example by entering a per-
formance contract between the ONAS and the Government. 
By contractually protecting sector investments in operations, 
this arrangement strengthens accountability between state 
institutions and leaves fewer opportunities for adverse politi-
cal economy influences.
Sector coalitions
Finally, the research confirmed the importance in a wide ran-
ge of contexts of sector coalitions in securing a high priority 
for sanitation investments. Sector coalitions are built within 
government and between government and nongovernmental 
actors. Sensitive lender and donor support can add value to 
the coalition-building process. Coalitions anchored all ele-
ments of the sector process discussed above, drawing on the 
evidence base for pro-poor sanitation investment, encoura-
ging civil society participation, and developing accountability 
relationships to ensure investment and delivery.
The common characteristics of sector coalitions across the 
cases studies included a capability to translate a general vision 
into concrete steps: “they knew where they wanted to go,” as 
one key informant in Senegal put it. Sector coalitions were 
often motivated by empathy with citizens or by a concern 
with distributive equity. They were able to stand outside the 
political economy of the sector while understanding and 
manage the political economy risks and opportunities. They 
had credibility and had earned respect from all stakeholders 
involved in the process.
A striking feature of sanitation investment in Maharashtra 
has been its success in translating political commitment into 
bureaucratic action. This translation was achieved largely 
through dynamic and committed political and bureaucratic 
leaders, many of whom had worked their way up from the 
grassroots. Political leaders and departmental officials led the 
process, but they worked effectively with nongovernmental 
partners toward a shared vision. This process was supported 
in a low-key but effective way by WSP. In Senegal, sector 
coalitions from the Ministry of Water, Ministry of Finance, 
the World Bank, and WSP played a crucial role in pushing 
through a successful organization and implementation of the 
WSS reform process. Well-connected Bank staff members 
based in Senegal were able to identify committed counter-
parts and engage with them on a continuous basis (through 
formal and informal meetings) to prepare decision making 
and government support. In Indonesia, the ISSDP employed 
someone able to facilitate and negotiate who was trusted 
by different government stakeholders and understood their 
relationships with each other. This helped build and streng-
then partnerships and relationships between key government 
stakeholders in the urban sanitation sector.
Evidence from all of the case studies has also shown the 
importance of local champions and community leaders. 
Influential community members—once convinced of the 
benefits of better sanitation provision—become credible 
advocates for sanitation services with their neighbors, rela-
tives, and friends. Local or state political leaders at the nexus 
of constituencies, providers, and policy makers played a key 
role in shaping the debates in Brazil. In Indonesia a few city 
mayors are increasingly committed to sanitation, increasing 
local sanitation budgets, and contributing to increased pres-
sure being brought to bear upon the national government.
3.4 interplay of political and economic factors on 
sanitation outcomes
With its focus on pro-poor sanitation investment, the re-
search looked for evidence of the impact of political economy 
factors on distributional outcomes in access to sanitation. The 
interplay of political and economic factors played a major 
role in influencing pro-poor investment. The emergence of 
political incentives—in the shape of career advancement or 
electoral support—for extending coverage to the poor were 
apparent in the cases of Brazil and India. 
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There was evidence from all the case studies that decentral-
ized governance of sanitation investment can create stronger 
incentives for, and accountability in, pro-poor investment. 
Household subsidies, targeted for sanitation investment in 
below-poverty-level households, have been successful in 
Maharashtra, but crucially only as a minor element of a 
community-based reward approach to incentivizing invest-
ment. Similar evidence emerged from Senegal, where the 
work of CBOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) was 
instrumental in creating demand. The experience with onsite 
sanitation in Dakar also showed, however, that the poorest 
households are unlikely to be able to move up the sanitation 
ladder, despite the subsidies. 
In contexts of sustained resistance to pro-poor sanitation as 
a policy priority, an instrumental case for investment can be 
built, as illustrated by recent developments in policy debates 
in Indonesia. Technological and social solutions to the chal-
lenge of pro-poor investment are illustrated well in Brazil, 
where a progressive administration has provided the funds 
and support for appropriate technology and social mobiliza-
tion to extend sanitation investment into low-income urban 
communities.
In the Maharashtra case study, the growing political recogni-
tion and reward for sanitation investment success, discussed 
above, is closely linked to the success of the national and state 
campaigns to build demand for sanitation investment and so 
improve distributional outcomes for the rural poor. This has 
shifted political motivation from a point in the mid-2000s 
when policy makers in India perceived that a poverty-targeted 
sanitation program might actually lose them votes, sanitation 
not being a priority or a felt need among rural communities. 
The design of sector investment, with community-level “clean 
village” awards backed by targeted subsidies for below-poverty-
line households, has extended investment to poorer households 
within villages striving for clean-village status. This was a key 
shift in approach away from the failed supply-driven subsidy 
format of the Central Rural Sanitation Program. The social 
stigma attached to households without pit latrines, illustrated 
by the increasingly widespread expectation that brides should 
not go to households without them, illustrates the progressive 
impact of this trend.
In recent decades in Brazil, millions of poor households 
have been connected to public sewerage networks through 
the expansion of conventional services and the introduction 
of innovative alternatives, such as the condominial system. 
The Bahia Azul program, implemented by the Bahia state 
utility EMBASA in the Salvador Metropolitan Region in 
northeastern Brazil between 1995 and 2007, was quick 
to adopt the condominial approach to providing sewerage 
services to low-income neighborhoods, making significant 
investments in social mobilization work alongside construc-
tion. In Bahia Azul as elsewhere, the technological shift to 
condominial systems has made the service more affordable 
and more appropriate to the geography and social organiza-
tion of low-income communities.
The inclusion of water supply and sanitation as a priority 
sector in the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) in 2007, 
backed by the allocation of R$40 billion (US$20 billion) 
from the federal budget (R$8 billion), loans (R$20 billion), 
and local funding (R$12 billion) over four years, signaled a 
progressive shift in investment, although as discussed above, 
spending has lagged due to low absorptive capacity and the 
absence of a clear policy and legal framework. Overall, with 
a progressive government favoring poorer municipalities, the 
increase in federal grant funding through the PAC provides 
a political payoff as well as being a pragmatic response to 
limited local investment capacity.
In Indonesia the lack of interest across all sections of society 
(from metropolitan elites to the urban poor) in the notion 
of sanitation as a public good has hindered pro-poor or 
indeed any significant investment. Encouragingly, this is 
increasingly being challenged through, among other things, 
a strong economic case for investment. With increasing 
evidence of improved economic and health outcomes from 
extended sanitation coverage (or equally, the negative eco-
nomic outcomes of poor sanitation), the political incentives 
for investment in sanitation are now increasing, including 
for low-income communities. 
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In Dakar, access to sanitation facilities was traditionally pro-
vided for those living in the areas covered (and connected) 
to the sewerage network. The PAQPUD for the first time 
brings onsite sanitation facilities and to a lesser extent con-
dominial systems for the poor peri-urban areas of Dakar. 
The program offers technologically appropriate sanitation 
solutions, and households can chose from a range of differ-
ent options in different price categories—although some of 
these solutions are not categorized as “improved” sanitation 
under the MDGs. The subsidies are a one-off investment 
subsidy and are not intended to cover either consumption 
or maintenance costs. Moreover, there is awareness within 
local communities that there is a clear difference between 
the willingness and the ability to pay for sanitation provi-
sion. As one community leader in a semi-urban community 
in Dakar summarized: “Some of our neighbors don’t have 
enough money for regular meals. How should they afford 
the expense of a latrine?” Some communities have responded 
to this problem by setting up a fund at community level (for 
example, the fund in Diamaguene led by UN HABITAT) to 
cover the contribution for those who cannot afford to pay 
for sanitation and encourage support from micro-finance 
institutions (for example, in Ngor).
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With these diagnostic research findings in mind we can draw 
a number of significant operational lessons to help lender 
and donor task teams to translate political economy analysis 
(presented in section 3) into actions supporting pro-poor 
sanitation investment. Several interlinked elements have 
contributed to the success of the sector process in the case 
study countries. We discuss the operational significance of 
these below, drawing on elements of the Action Framework 
introduced earlier. 
The case studies confirm and illustrate that effective ma-
nagement of sanitation investment processes integrates 
understanding and evidence with support for behavioral 
and institutional change. This means combining a better 
understanding of the political economy risks and opportu-
nities in the sanitation sector with evidence marshaled on 
the economic, social, and political impacts of investment 
choices in order to support processes that promote greater 
accountability, partnership, and communication.
4.1 Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and 
operations
Political economy analysis can support Task Team Leaders and 
practitioners to identify and manage the political economy 
risks and opportunities for pro-poor sanitation investment. 
Task Team Leaders, who lead on investment dialogue, often 
recognize this and generally have a keen sense of political eco-
nomy that can support decision making on timing, tailoring, 
and location. Some Task Team Leaders struggle to deal with 
political risks, being more comfortable in a bounded technical 
relationship with a familiar ministry, department, or agency 
within government. Box 2.1 provides sample questions for a 
political economy analysis of sanitation investments based on 
the study’s Diagnostic Framework and the research strategy 
developed and utilized for this study.
Recognizing windows of opportunity for investment requires, 
at a minimum, long-term engagement and development 
partner flexibility. This type of flexibility was demonstrated in 
Senegal, for example, where the World Bank was also able to 
bring a loan forward in order to avoid losing an opportunity. 
Beyond this, the case studies have shown that where lenders 
and donors have understood the political economy and res-
ponded appropriately, they have increased the acceptability 
of funding mechanisms and eased negotiations. 
Furthermore, careful and strategic sequencing of operations 
can encourage reforms that increase the overall impact of in-
vestments in later phases. In Brazil, the conditions laid down 
for access to the relatively modest capital investment com-
ponent of the Water Sector Modernization Project (PMSS) 
provided sufficient incentive for institutional upgrading by 
the Bahia state utility (EMBASA), which was then able to 
leverage much larger volumes of investment resources due to 
its enhanced credibility and increased absorptive capacity.
Tailoring support based on an understanding of political 
economy also means being more responsive to local policy 
and investment processes. The first step is usually to align and 
sequence operations and support with national planning and 
policy cycles. In Indonesia, for example, a 2009 government 
agreement that the lender-supported City Sanitation Strategy 
approach could be replicated and scaled-up fitted with the 
next five-year planning cycle. Sequencing different inter-
ventions over different time scales (for example, awareness 
raising and improving local planning capacity) has been a 
necessary first step before making local investments for phy-
sical infrastructure in order to ensure they are appropriate, 
effective, and efficient.
Tailoring of support can also benefit from a better unders-
tanding of the incentives and interests of stakeholders. One 
Operational
implicationsIV.
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consistent theme in the case studies was the importance of 
recognizing and supporting progressive leaders or champions 
to succeed and scale up their impact. Stakeholder mapping, 
of the type illustrated in this research project, can help Task 
Team Leaders identify champions, who may well be indivi-
duals or organizations that the World Bank does not normally 
do business with—for example, a Ministry of Health official 
rather than a Ministry of Water representative. In this way, 
stakeholder analysis can be a useful tool for seeking out 
champions among a wider range of stakeholders.
These commitments and the championing of sanitation 
investment can be bolstered by political incentives, as is 
particularly evident in the case of Maharashtra. Through 
sustained engagement, WSP was able to tailor its support to 
this process of political reward for sanitation improvements. 
Significantly, this form of political “incentivizing” is now 
being adopted in other states in India.
The case studies confirmed the significance of understanding 
the location of sanitation investments when designing sani-
tation investments. Technical options and social investment 
(in incentives, demand generation, strengthened accoun-
tability, and social mobilization) varied widely within and 
across urban and rural locations in the studies. The success 
in rural Maharashtra of encouraging collective responsibility 
for low-tech sanitation investment through a careful mixture 
of rewards and sanctions was based on strong village identity 
and mutual accountability. In Brazil, program design in 
Bahia Azul aimed to strengthen local social capital around 
block-based condominial delivery of appropriate low-tech 
sanitation in densely populated communities. In Senegal, 
onsite sanitation and condominial systems were extended 
to Dakar’s urban poor, who were previously widely exclu-
ded from existing network-based service provision. Donor 
support for the City Sanitation Strategy in Indonesia has 
encouraged city administrations to base sanitation investment 
decisions on their own assessment of their location.
4.2 Understanding the sector through rigorous 
analysis
The case studies confirmed the utility of rigorous analysis of 
poverty and social impacts of sector policy and investment 
(World Bank 2003). This analysis provides the evidence 
necessary to make a case for pro-poor sanitation investment 
and to support policy makers in identifying what types of 
investment will have the biggest pro-poor impact. Moreover, 
evidence can be used strategically by donors and international 
organizations to facilitate the dialogue and process in favor 
of more pro-poor investments and service delivery. 
Donors and international institutions in close collaboration 
with local entities are well placed to identify appropriate 
evidence for policy makers and tend to have a comparative 
advantage in providing rigorous analysis to inform reform and 
sector choices. In Senegal, donors have successfully funded 
studies—for example, the tariff study by ONAS/Banque 
Européenne d’Investissement (2008)—using national and 
international expertise, to offer policy choices to government 
stakeholders and contribute to the evidence used during wor-
kshops relating to institutional sector reform. A comparative 
study on the economic impacts of sanitation was undertaken 
by WSP-EAP in four Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia (WSP-EAP 2007, 2008). This was cited by key 
informants (from both within government and international 
lenders and donors) as having been a powerful tool in moti-
vating central government stakeholders into action.
Furthermore, the research has shown how lender and donor 
sector support can use analysis of comparative advantage 
in global practice to support local policy makers and admi-
nistrations as they learn lessons from elsewhere and refine 
their operational framework. The kind of support provided 
by WSP in Maharashtra was geared toward lesson learning 
through exposure to Community-led Total Sanitation 
(CLTS) and scaling up of good practice. This, rather than 
capital investment or strong steering, was exactly what was 
required from external partners in this context.
The timing of information flow is important when one seeks 
to influence sector dialogue. Even when rigorous analysis 
is undertaken, dissemination of key findings can get lost, 
sidetracked, potentially misused, or captured if the timing is 
wrong. This was the case with the Bahia Azul health impact 
study, which was launched in the transition period between 
one political administration in Bahia and another. It is 
impossible to judge whether sanitation investments would 
have achieved even wider traction had the results of this 
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study been more widely acknowledged. However, neither 
the World Bank nor the state government as a whole reali-
zed at the outset just how strategic effective communication 
could be. Had they been so cognizant, a different timetable 
(for example, with release of interim findings based on mo-
nitoring data) could have been agreed to with the research 
organization. This might have helped steer the debate on the 
value of sanitation investments much more clearly toward 
health benefits, which is now where the center of gravity of 
this debate lies in Brazil, as elsewhere. 
The process of conducting analysis itself can be instrumental 
in democratizing the policy process, building and sustaining 
consensus over change. This implies that, where possible, 
appropriate lenders and donors, in close collaboration with 
local entities, should promote analysis that is conducted with 
a broad group of in-country stakeholders to ensure greater 
inclusion. They should link this process to strengthened 
public debate and communication. This is discussed further 
in section 4.5.
4.3 realigning accountability
The research has confirmed that it is vital in managing the 
political economy of sanitation investment to create the con-
ditions for strengthened accountability in the delivery of and 
accessibility to sanitation services. This includes horizontal 
accountability mechanisms in which different branches of 
the state provide checks and balances. It also includes vertical 
accountability relationships in which citizens advocate for 
change or provide an oversight function of government or 
service providers. Finally, it includes realigning accountability 
by combining horizontal and vertical accountability to allow, 
for instance, top-down changes to be complemented by a 
more systematic attempt to engage with grassroots collective 
association and mobilization for institutional change.
The research has illustrated the value of supporting accoun-
tability mechanisms as a means of managing the risks from 
political economy interests and influence. In Indonesia, 
increasing clarity over institutional roles and responsibilities 
could help increase accountability between citizens and the 
state. In Senegal, the carefully designed contracts in the 
water and sanitation sector provided the right incentives and 
strengthened accountability. A recently signed performance 
contract between the government and the National Sanitation 
Office guarantees state financing if certain performance crite-
ria are met. Financing for the sector’s operations are therefore 
protected from potential adverse political influence. 
Moving to a decentralized system of decision making, resour-
ce allocation, service delivery, and regulation requires signifi-
cant attention. The Brazil case study has demonstrated that 
helping to further clarify the roles and responsibilities (or at 
least the pros and cons of different roles and responsibilities) 
at the federal, state, and municipal levels and the capacity 
requirements at each level is an important contribution.
Vertical accountability focuses on the relationship between 
citizens and policy makers and between citizens and ser-
vice providers. Vertical accountability mechanisms can be 
strengthened by increasing transparency and information 
availability, generating demand for sanitation investment 
(and therefore for accountability in delivery of sanitation), 
and strengthening institutional channels for oversight and 
redress. In Senegal, the World Bank/WSP partnership has 
supported information campaigns in order to strengthen ac-
countability initiatives from the private sector and from civil 
society more broadly. The PAQPUD has relied on targeted 
information campaigns to generate demand for sanitation 
investments using local CSOs or the private sector. Despite 
these efforts, however, there are still few examples of citizens 
actively demanding better sanitation provision. If upgrades 
are made they are mainly driven by waste collection or ra-
inwater drainage efforts rather than sanitation in the narrow 
sense of the definition. 
In urban Indonesia and in rural India, traditional top-down, 
supply-driven approaches to sanitation investments have 
often been unsuccessful or unsustainable. Additional social 
investments in bottom-up processes have helped to increase 
accountability and the sustainability of investments even 
when there is low initial demand. The City Sanitation Stra-
tegy approach in Indonesia recognizes the difference between 
perceived demands, which often form the basis of top-down 
approaches, and actual demands.
Perhaps the most significant lesson learned from the research 
is the importance of maintaining a flexible approach to 
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strengthening accountability rather than going for a one-size-
fits-all approach. In the case of Maharashtra, for example, the 
government has encouraged a different type of relationship 
in which the emphasis is on encouraging private investment 
and behavior change at household and community level. In 
this way government accountability shifts from delivery to 
outcomes. This has been achieved by having the focus on 
creating a demand-driven approach to sanitation investment, 
facilitated by the state using a mix of consciousness-raising 
efforts, subsidies, collective financial rewards, “soft” condi-
tionality, and enforcement.
New forms of social oversight have been promoted by the 
current left-wing government in Brazil. The challenge is to 
find ways to link the contributions these various stakeholders 
have made toward effective regulatory mechanisms. The 
government can help to inform and seek support from the 
public about sensitive issues like tariff setting. Social oversight 
bodies provide a platform for discussions around the costs 
of providing the service in relation to the price and how this 
links to further investments in upgrading and expanding the 
system. Social oversight bodies, however, are not expected to 
make technical decisions about water quality and technical 
standards, which is more clearly under the purview of the 
regulatory body. Finding ways to ensure clarity around the 
roles and responsibilities of these two mechanisms will remain 
critical in the Brazilian context.
4.4 Partnership strategy
The research has confirmed that effective management of 
political economy in the sanitation sector requires a partner-
ship strategy based on sustained, flexible engagement with 
strategic external support. This strategy can also take Task 
Team Leaders and practitioners outside their comfort zone 
of engagement with technical ministries to include central 
ministry partnerships. Ministries of Finance, in particular, 
are usually far more influential than any sector ministry in 
shaping public investment. Bank Task Team Leaders usually 
have good relationships in-country within their respective 
sectors, but the overall country dialogue takes place between 
the Country Management Unit and the Ministry of Finance. 
For this reason, Country Management Unit support is crucial 
to any attempt at placing sanitation firmly on a Bank country 
program, the starting point from which decisions on tasks 
and budgets all flow.
The case studies in this report illustrate well the instrumental 
value of partnerships for pro-poor sanitation investment. The 
Maharashtra sanitation program, for example, is strongly 
government led. Nevertheless, technical and policy support 
from WSP has been strategically important. This support has 
helped to expose government officials and community leaders 
to new ideas in order to improve program effectiveness. In Se-
negal, long-term ongoing engagement has built trust among 
key stakeholders and placed donors in a position where they 
can play the role of a facilitator of reform. Well-connected 
national donor staff can play a crucial role in understanding 
the government’s position and negotiating with the main 
stakeholders—both supporters and opponents of reform. 
Carefully organized and facilitated workshops combined with 
informal encounters have provided a vehicle for presenting 
evidence on policy choices, managing potential resistance to 
reform, and allowing for continuous engagement.
In Brazil, the World Bank is a potential convener or broker 
of unlikely marriages of convenience between seemingly 
disconnected technical, political, and financial interests. 
Historically the Bank could have done more to broker these 
relationships, and admittedly it is not perceived to be neutral. 
The perception of being aligned with a political grouping may 
have reduced the Bank’s ability to leverage continuity bet-
ween programs created by different political administrations. 
That said, the Bank does bring institutional sector memory 
to the table and must remain supportive of the exploration 
of various options to enhance service delivery. In Indonesia, 
continued strong long-term support and collaboration with 
the government on planning and policy issues, with the 
Bank and government viewed as partners, is beginning to 
show results. This approach has strengthened the capacity 
and willingness of government (central and local) to scale up 
sanitation planning, while ensuring high levels of national 
ownership of the process.
4.5 Public debate and communication
Broad participation in sanitation dialogue prevents the de-
bate from being captured by powerful interest groups and at 
the same time builds and sustains commitment to pro-poor 
sanitation investment. To encourage this dialogue, develo-
pment partners are encouraged to support policy makers 
and bureaucrats in their efforts to secure and sustain public 
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support for institutional change. The state government and 
district administrations in Maharashtra have sought to ensure 
that the sanitation program is well known across the state, 
and to this end have made extensive use of local mass media, 
with awards reported widely and given a high profile. This 
has been critical to the program’s success and is reflected in 
the program budget allocation for communication.
Investment in communication is crucial to generating “effec-
tive demand” (linked to advocacy) for sanitation within low-
income communities. Such engagement can enhance both 
program quality during implementation and sustainability 
by securing broader buy-in to program aims. In Senegal, 
using popular topics (water supply, drainage) can provide the 
platform for discussions around improving sanitation provi-
sion with local communities, consumers, and champions of 
change within the communities. (For example, wastewater 
and drainage are a problem for many Senegalese communities 
during the rainy season) In Brazil, the World Bank achieved 
a strong partnership with the incumbent right-wing political 
grouping in Bahia. However, the Bank could have made more 
effort to demonstrate to the government’s critics on the left 
that it was using its leverage with this grouping to push it 
toward greater openness to public debate and engagement 
with civil society. This would in turn have strengthened the 
Bank’s credibility with future administrations from the left 
wing. 
Although the media in Indonesia are generally no more aware 
of sanitation issues than the general public and coverage is 
limited, there is potential to develop partnerships that enable 
sanitation messages to be conveyed effectively. The Indone-
sian Sanitation Sector Development Program (ISSDP) has 
recognized this potential in the design of its second phase, 
which will have components on advocacy, campaigning, 
communications, and promotion.
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This report synthesizes analysis from four country case stu-
dies. In each case study the authors retrospectively applied 
political economy analysis to a sanitation sector investment 
process. Overall, the study confirms the importance of asses-
sing stakeholder interests, winners and losers, and incentives. 
It also confirms the importance of examining the activities 
of formal and informal institutions (including norms and 
behavior) while engaging in parallel dialogues and processes 
to develop technically feasible and politically acceptable sa-
nitation measures. When such an analysis and dialogue are 
done well, by development practitioners in partner countries 
or development organizations, it provides the empirical evi-
dence for and the rationales behind the following:
•	 why	sanitation	investments	and	service	provision	are	
not given adequate priority in lending and nonlending 
work, and 
•	 when	sanitation	investments	in	such	efforts	are	under-
taken, why they are not strategically targeted toward 
increasing access to sanitation for the poor.
The study found that the interplay of political and economic 
factors played a major role in influencing pro-poor inves-
tment. The emergence of political incentives—in the shape 
of career advancement or electoral support—for extending 
coverage to the poor was apparent in some case studies. 
There was also evidence that decentralized governance of 
sanitation investment can create stronger incentives for, and 
accountability in, pro-poor investment. 
The study also showed that an instrumental case for sani-
tation investment can be built in contexts where pro-poor 
sanitation faces resistance as a policy priority. With increasing 
evidence of improved economic and health outcomes of 
extended sanitation coverage (or equally, the negative eco-
nomic outcomes of poor sanitation), the political incentives 
for investment in sanitation are increasing, including such 
investment for low-income communities. There was also 
evidence, that technological and social solutions can help 
address the challenge of pro-poor investment—for instance, 
through a progressive administration that provides the funds 
and support for appropriate technology and social mobiliza-
tion to extend sanitation investment into low-income urban 
communities. Investment design that included community-
level “clean village” awards, backed by targeted subsidies at 
below-poverty-line households, have been successful in some 
cases. The work of CBOs and CSOs was instrumental in 
creating demand in other cases.  Table 5.1 summarizes the 
added value of insights from political economy analysis in 
support of the Action Framework introduced in this report. 
Good practice in aligning lender and donor support with 
in-country policy and planning cycles can be enhanced by an 
in-depth understanding—and effective management—of the 
political economy dynamics underpinning the policy process. 
Management in this context does not imply assuming greater 
control but means strategically supporting progressive pro-
cesses and actors. This type of engagement can be enhanced 
through the timing and tailoring of sanitation interventions. 
The introduction of evidence supports the case for pro-poor 
sanitation investment, with lenders and donors well placed 
to help coordinate this flow of evidence.
Lender and donor attention to the institutional arrangements 
for sanitation investment has been crucial in strengthening 
accountability in the delivery of sanitation services. Politi-
cal economy analysis can help lenders and donors support 
emerging systems of incentives and sanctions—including 
regulatory mechanisms backed by greater civil society 
oversight—that fit the sanitation country context. Lenders 
and donors clearly emphasize partnership in their support 
for sanitation investment: by focusing on processes, political 
economy analysis reinforces the importance of sustained and 
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flexible partnership arrangements. Political economy analysis 
further highlights the significance of going beyond partner-
ship to get the broader policy process right. This involves 
supporting communication and public policy debate toward 
securing and sustaining investments. This is not just about 
the principle of democratizing policy discussion but about 
overcoming organizational resistance or capture by seeing 
communication as an opportunity rather than a risk.
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action Donor support for pro-poor 
sanitation investment
added value insights from political 
economy analysis
Optimize timing, 
tailoring, and 
location of 
investment and 
operations 
Understand the 
sector through 
rigorous analysis
 
 
 
Realign accoun-
tability
Partner 
strategically
Support public 
debate and 
communication
•	 Ensure	that	support	to	
sanitation investment is 
aligned with existing policy 
and planning cycles.
•	 Recognize	windows	of	
opportunity for reform.
•	 Use	available	evidence	and/
or commission research to 
inform program design.
 
•	 Support	strengthened	
technical systems and 
information flows.
•	 Support	decentralization	and	
clarification of technical roles 
and responsibilities.
•	 Ensure	minimum	effective	
engagement with key central 
and sector ministries.
•	 Support	information	
campaigns from one to many 
(policy makers to public).
•	 Manage	the	political	economy	risks	and	opportunities	to	increase	impact	on	
pro-poor sanitation investment.
•	 Ensure	careful	and	strategic	sequencing	of	operations	to	increase	the	overall	
impact of investments in later phases.
•	 Lobby	through	political	economy	insights	for	sanitation	investments	that	are	
effective in different locations.
•	 Recognize	and	support	government	commitment	and	local	leadership	to	help	
partners succeed and scale up their impact.
•	 Identify	opportunities	to	support	investment	through	political	incentivizing.
•	 Lenders/donors	are	well	placed	to	identify	appropriate	evidence	for	different	
stakeholders and tend to have a comparative advantage in providing rigorous 
analysis to inform reform and sector choices.
•	 The	timing	of	information	flow	is	important.	Even	when	rigorous	analysis	is	
undertaken dissemination of key findings can get lost, sidetracked, or potentially 
misused or captured if the timing is wrong (for example, at the start of a new 
political administration).
•	 Use	analysis	of	comparative	advantage	in	global	practice	to	support	local	policy	
makers and administrations to learn lessons from elsewhere and refine their 
operational framework.
•	 Support	strengthened	accountability	through	careful	design	of	contracts	and	
specification of roles and responsibilities.
•	 Support	initiatives	to	build	demand	and	strengthen	vertical	accountability.
•	 Be	flexible:	Adapt	and	support	models	of	vertical	accountability	and	apply	to	
the	country	context.	The	sector	process	may	not	be	characterized	by	the	kinds	
of	vertical	accountability	relations	central	to	much	lender/donor	thinking.	This	
means that support for accountability must be tailored to the country context.
•	 Realign	accountability	by	combining	horizontal	accountability	with	vertical	
accountability to allow, for instance top-down changes to be complemented by 
a more systematic attempt to engage with grassroots collective association and 
mobilization for institutional change.
•	 Ensure	that	the	partnership	strategy	is	based	on	sustained,	flexible	engagement	
with strategic external support.
•	 Get	the	process	of	political	economy	analysis	right:	Ensure	where	appropriate	
that analysis is conducted with a broad group of stakeholders to ensure 
greater inclusion, and link this process to strengthened public debate and 
communication.
•	 Support	wide	two-way	communication	to	democratize	debate,	prevent	capture	
and secure and sustain public support for institutional change.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
TABlE 5.1 AddEd vAluE from PoliTicAl Economy AnAlySiS in SuPPorT of Pro-Poor SAniTATion invESTmEnT
Political economy analysis is not a separate or competing 
approach to economic, social, or financial analysis. It is simply 
a supporting tool for designing and implementing sanitation 
interventions. Political economy analysis cannot instruct Task 
Team Leaders in what to invest, but it can help them, with 
in-country partners, to navigate a process toward pro-poor 
investment and service delivery in sanitation, while defining 
realistic limits on what can be done in any given context.
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a.1 research hypotheses and questions
The desk review informed the research strategy in two ways: 
it confirmed the usefulness of the conceptual framework as 
guiding the methodology for this research, and it generated 
a set of issues for individual country case studies that were 
subsequently explored further through the fieldwork.16 Ta-
ble A.1 provides an overview of these issues following the 
analytical distinctions among country context, sector arena, 
and sector process introduced in section 2. 
country context Sector arena Sector process
The	relationship	between	public	•	
opinion regarding the importance 
of sanitation provision and the 
demand for better services
The	significance	of	contextual	•	
perceptions regarding whether 
sanitation is a public or private 
(household) responsibility
The	implications	of	stigma	at-•	
tached to sanitation
The	contextual	importance	of	•	
sanitation compared to other 
infrastructure investments, includ-
ing water 
The	visibility	of	sanitation	in	the	•	
political discourse
The	impact	of	the	historical	(in-•	
cluding colonial) legacy 
The	impact	of	urbanization	on	•	
sanitation sector challenges
The	degree	to	which	there	is	a	•	
national vision and strategy for 
sanitation
The	strength	of	the	link	between	•	
sanitation visions and pro-poor 
policies
The	degree	of	clarity	of	stakehold-•	
er responsibilities for sanitation 
policy at the federal level
The	significance	of	decentraliza-•	
tion and the relationship between 
institutions at the federal and 
regional levels
The	significance	of	subsidies	to	•	
provide incentives for pro-poor 
sanitation provision 
The	nature	and	impact	of	public-•	
private partnership institutional 
arrangements for sanitation provi-
sion
The	degree	of	institutionalized	•	
civil society involvement in service 
provision
The	role	and	impact	of	regulation	•	
and	quality	control
The	impact	on	sanitation	sector	•	
investment priorities of institutional 
commitments to cost recovery
The	ongoing	nature	and	extent	of	•	
public debate and space for civil 
society participation in sanitation 
decision making
The	relationship	between	partici-•	
patory	planning/	budgeting	and	
sanitation investment
The	sector	processes	underpin-•	
ning technology choices in sanita-
tion investment
The	ongoing	and	changing	influ-•	
ence of international donors and 
organizations on sanitation invest-
ment
The	risks	and	opportunities	asso-•	
ciated with champions of change 
and opponents
The	role	of	key	events	and	turning	•	
points
The	equity	implications	of	ongoing	•	
debates over cost recovery in the 
sanitation sector
16 This annex draws heavily on the research strategy (OPM 2009a) but does not repeat information provided elsewhere in the Synthesis Report.
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A set of research questions (presented in table A.2) has been 
developed to guide the country case study teams in testing 
and analyzing country-specific hypotheses. These questions 
emerged out of the desk study, from the study terms of refe-
rence, and from discussions with the World Bank team and 
(national and international) consultants. This table represents 
a menu of questions from which individual country teams 
have selected a set to develop their country-specific hypo-
theses. Under each framework area the country teams have 
identified a set of risks and opportunities for effective poli-
tical economy management of sanitation sector investment 
processes. The sets of country case-study-specific hypotheses 
were developed before going into the field, through detailed 
conversations with World Bank/WSP staff in India (the 
pilot country for this fieldwork), Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Senegal.
Overall
research
Questions
•	 Why	are	sanitation	investments	and	service	provision	not	given	adequate	priority	in	lending	and	nonlending	work?
•	 And	when	such	efforts	are	undertaken,	why	are	they	not	strategically	targeted	toward	increasing	access	to	
sanitation for the poor?
framework focus country context
hypotheses •	 The	cultural	and	historical	context	is	a	significant	determinant	of	sanitation	investment	(country	hypotheses	need	to	
specify a key determinant).
•	 Public	policy	debates	on	sanitation	within	and	outside	government	are	usually	limited	in	scope	and	depth,	with	
negative implications for sanitation investment.
•	 There	is	a	vision	for	sanitation;	the	agenda	has	been	driven	forward	at	the	national	level	and	is	government	owned.
•	 Rapid	urbanization	is	an	important	driver	of	sanitation	investment.
Questions •	 What	is	the	cultural	and	historical	background	to	sanitation	investment?	What	is	considered	“adequate”	
sanitation?	What	are	the	sociocultural	drivers	for	or	constraints	to	improved	sanitation?
•	 Has	there	been	a	high	level	of	activity	around	sanitation	sector	investment	in	recent	years?
•	 How	visible	is	sanitation	as	an	issue	in	policy	debate	/media	coverage?
•	 What	(if	any)	are	the	electoral	returns	to	sanitation	investment?	Was	improved	sanitation	discussed	during	the	
past election campaign? 
•	 What	priorities	does	the	national	sanitation	strategy	signal?	Is	it	linked	to	the	poverty	agenda?
•	 Who	owns/maintains	which	assets	(land,	wastewater	treatment	plant,	network,	etc.)?	How	are	networks	
established and expanded, and what are the processes for connecting new households?
•	 How	do	poor	households	manage	and	treat	their	sewage	(pit	latrines,	septic	network,	etc.)?	Do	poor	households	
have	choices	regarding	different	sanitation	options?	What	incentives	exist	for	households	to	connect	to	
sanitation networks (if this option exists)? How are these incentives perceived by households, central 
government,	local	government,	private	sector,	civil	society,	and	international	donors	and	organizations?	What	is	
the balance between “hard” and “soft” investment in sanitation?
framework focus Sector arena: institutions 
hypotheses •	 Sanitation	has	no	institutional	“home.”	This	adds	to	the	complexity	of	sector	planning	and	resource	allocation	
processes and limits institutional accountability for progress.
•	 National	policy	has	only	a	limited	impact	on	the	planning	and	targeting	of	new	investments,	and	on	service	
delivery; cross-sectoral decision making for sanitation investment is more effective at the subnational level.
•	 Increased	sanitation	investments	are	not	hindered	by	fund	availability.
•	 Policy	makers	consider	that	it	is	possible	to	achieve	cost	recovery	in	sanitation	and	this	influences	the	level	and	
pattern of sanitation investment.
•	 Government	actively	encourages	the	participation	of	NGOs	and	the	private	sector	in	infrastructure	development	
and	service	delivery.	Both	play	a	significant	part	but	the	nature	of	the	relationship	(e.g.,	contract	design)	has	a	
major impact on investment.
•	 National/subnational	institutional	relations	militate	against	increased	investment	in	sanitation.
•	 Investment	prioritization	is	driven	by	the	availability	of	technology	rather	than	local	need.
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Continued
Questions Public investment
•	 What	are	the	institutional	constraints	to	(i)	increasing	allocations	to	sanitation	in	the	national	budget,	(ii)	planning	
sanitation infrastructure, or (iii) constructing and maintaining sanitation infrastructure?
•	 Is	there	an	effective	institutional	home	for	sanitation	investment?	
•	 Do	allocated	budgets	normally	reach	their	intended	destination?	What	are	the	political	economy	influences	(i.e.,	
decision-making	processes	by	powerful	stakeholders)	on	the	flow	of	budgets	in	the	sanitation	sector?	Are	they	
captured or diverted and by whom?
•	 Are	government	budget	commitments	for	sanitation	fully	utilized	during	the	year?	If	there	is	an	under-spend,	is	
this	a	function	of	political	economy	(e.g.,	rents)?	Does	the	government	budget	have	a	mechanism	for	funding	
projects	that	last	for	more	than	one	year?	Does	the	government	budget	include	an	explicit	subsidy	for	the	
recurrent	and	capital	costs	of	sanitation	service	provision	and	investments?	If	so,	is	this	identified	at	central	or	
local level?
•	 Do	government	agencies	responsible	for	managing	the	operation	and	maintenance	of	public	services	have	
separate	accounts	for	sanitation	services?	If	yes,	do	they	clearly	demonstrate	where	investments	are	made	and	
who	benefits	from	investments?	And	are	these	ever	referred	to	in	policy	debate	or	discussed	in	public?
•	 Can	municipalities	borrow	money,	float	bonds,	or	raise	funds	in	other	ways	for	sanitation	services?	Do	onsite	
sanitation	services	have	options	for	different	forms	of	finance?	Are	finances	pooled	with	regard	to	promotion,	
building, collection, treatment, and disposal (for either sewerage or onsite)? Or do they come from different arms 
of	the	federal,	state,	or	municipal	government?	What	kind	of	funding	is	available	for	different	types	of	providers	
(municipal,	state-run	company,	joint	venture	public-private,	private	company)?	If	most	municipalities	access	loan	
funds to build their infrastructure; what are the sources, terms, and conditions?
•	 How	is	household	financing	leveraged	(via	water	bills,	sanitation	tax,	etc.)?
•	 Is	cost	recovery	possible	but	not	introduced?	Why	is	this	the	case?
Questions Private investment
•	 To	what	extent	has	the	private	sector,	or	communities,	been	encouraged	to	participate	in	sanitation	sector	
investment?	What	are	the	political	economy	constraints	or	opportunities	for	private	sector	participation,	including	
concessions, management contracts, or other forms of non-public-sector involvement (e.g., community-run 
schemes)?
•	 What	scale	and	size	of	private	sector	or	community	participation	is	involved	in	sanitation	investment?	How	
successfully	does	this	fit	with	public	sector	investment?	What	are	the	motivations	for	and	outcomes	of	private	
sector	participation?	Are	the	government	and	private	sector	or	community	responsibilities	for	sanitation	stable?	
Does	any	uncertainty	over	this	affect	financing	plans	(e.g.,	unknown	future	ownership	of	assets	or	extent	of	
continuing subsidization)?
•	 How	are	private	sector	or	community	contracts	awarded—by	direct	negotiation	or	some	form	of	competition?	
If	the	latter,	what	form	and	what	were	the	criteria:	informal/formal?	Who	was	responsible	for	the	award?	Have	
contracts been renegotiated and why? How do the terms of the contract benefit society or profit the private 
provide/company?	What	are	the	difficulties	of	operation	facing	the	firm	on	the	political/bureaucratic	arena	and	on	
practical/in-the-field	arena?	Is	the	process	considered	a	fair	process?
•	 How	are	contracts/licenses	awarded,	monitored,	and	renegotiated	for	private	providers?
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Questions national—subnational institutional relationships
•	 In	a	context	of	decentralized	investment,	how	do	the	institutionalized	power	relationships	between	national	and	
subnational	governments	affect	the	priority	afforded	to	sanitation	at	regional	and	local	level?	What	other	services	
are managed in similar ways to sanitation (e.g., water, refuse, housing, power)? 
•	 Are	intergovernmental	transfers	(from	central	to	subnational	governments)	allocated	to	sanitation,	or	do	the	
subnational governments have discretion over how transfers are spent, and thus may not spend funds on 
sanitation? Can local government raise enough revenues to provide sanitation services?
•	 In	contexts	of	decentralized	sanitation	delivery:	What	is	the	regulatory/	legal	framework	and	how	does	this	
impact on sanitation investment and outcomes? 
•	 Is	cross-sectoral	decision	making	more	effective	at	the	subnational	level?	Are	subnational	governments	able	
to	predict	revenue	(capital	and	investment	budgets)	from	national	government?	If	not,	how	does	this	affect	
their	decision	making	on	sanitation?	Are	supplementary	budgets	an	important	part	of	public	finance?	If	so,	do	
sanitation projects tend to get a higher share of the supplementary budget than the normal annual budget? 
•	 Are	subnational	governments	primarily	accountable	upward	to	central	government	or	downward	to	the	people	
they	serve?	Is	there	evidence	of	social	accountability	between	sanitation	service	providers	(public,	private,	
communities) and citizens?
•	 What	characteristics	of	the	political	(party)	system	affect	incentives	for	federal	transfers	to	states/municipalities	
for	sanitation?	Is	sanitation	policy	easier	to	implement	when	local	and	national	governments	are	from	the	same	
party?
hypotheses •	 Within	the	center	of	government	there	is	competition	over	resources,	power,	and	authority	associated	with	
sanitation,	with	negative	consequences	for	investment	levels.
•	 Regulation	of	sanitation	investment	brings	potential	benefits	in	terms	of	transparency,	accountability,	learning,	
and feedback.
•	 Communities	and	households	are	less	interested	in	sanitation	investment	than	in	other	services	and	are	less	
willing to pay for sanitation services.
framework focus Sector arena: stakeholders
Questions Sanitation investment
•	 Which	stakeholders	have	power	over	(i)	decision-making	authority	about	access,	collection,	treatment	(including	
type	of	sanitation	service	provision:	wet,	dry),	and	investment:	(i.e.,	central	government,	local	government,	private	
sector, civil society, international donors and organizations); (ii) regulation and licensing; (iii) implementation, 
investment,	and	maintenance;	and	(iv)	price	setting?	What	are	the	power	and	interest	characteristics	of	these	
stakeholders in relation to sanitation implementation?
•	 Which	stakeholders	(public,	private,	communities,	donors,	IFIs,	etc.)	support	and	which	oppose	pro-poor	
sanitation	services	and	investments	and	why?	What	are	the	perceived	benefits	of	providing	services	and	
investments to non-poor groups? How could this be changed?
•	 Within	the	centre	of	government,	is	there	competition	over	resources,	power,	and	authority	associated	with	
sanitation	between	(i)	line	ministries	and	(ii)	central	and	local	government	levels?	What	are	the	recurrent	key	
points	of	contention?	Which	stakeholders	have	what	kind	of	stakes	in	this?	Why?	How	could	they	be	solved?
•	 How	dependent	is	securing	a	higher	priority	for	sanitation	investments	and	services	on	the	presence	of	
stakeholders who are sector champions? How can support for sanitation improvements be institutionalized?
•	 What	kind	of	regulation	exists?	What	benefits	does	it	bring?	Why	and	how?
Demand for sanitation 
•	 What	motivates	communities,	households,	or	other	groupings	(e.g.,	local	businesses)	to	be	interested	in	
sanitation investments (e.g., tourism, industry, environmentalism, health)?
•	 What	evidence	is	there	of	willingness/ability	to	pay	for	informal	sanitation	services?	What	factors	affect	
willingness to pay?
•	 What	are	the	trade-offs	for	households	(e.g.,	limited	and/or	insecure	income,	difficulties	with	long-term	
investments of promises, risk of maintenance expenses)?
The Political Economy of Sanitation    Annex A - methodology
Continued
www.wsp.org 51
framework focus Sanitation sector process: Building coalitions for change
hypotheses •	 Civil	society	participation	in	national	policy	frameworks	and	processes	is	the	most	effective	way	of	raising	the	
profile of sanitation in central government.
•	 Governments	listen	to	evidence	linking	sanitation	to	development	outcomes.
•	 Governments	feel	pressure	for	accountability	from	civil	society/external	advocacy	on	sanitation.
•	 Securing	a	higher	priority	for	sanitation	investments	and	services	depends	heavily	on	the	presence	of	sector	
champions.
•	 Social	investment	in	local	processes	is	critical	to	sustainability	of	sanitation	investment.
•	 Rural	and	urban	communities	differ	markedly	and	this	necessitates	different	approaches	to	community	
engagement when improving infrastructure and services.
•	 Lenders	and	donors	are	major	drivers	of	pro-poor	sanitation	investments.
Questions •	 Do	governments	feel	pressure	for	accountability	from	civil	society/external	advocacy	on	sanitation?	If	civil	society	
does not push for sanitation, is this due to a lack of consciousness among the public about sanitation as a policy 
issue?	Or	does	it	reflect	a	common	perception	that	sanitation	is	a	private	rather	than	public	responsibility?	Is	this	
due to a deficit in participatory governance?
•	 Do	different	central	and	local	government	ministries	collaborate	on	sanitation	provision	(e.g.,	Ministry	of	Finance	
talks	to	Ministry	of	Health	talks	to	Ministry	of	Water)?	Which	ministries	are	supporters	and	which	are	opponents	
of	sanitation	investments	(champions/opponents)?	Why	do	they	take	this	stance?	How	could	noncollaboration	be	
addressed?
•	 What	is	the	role	of	lenders	and	donors?	How	do	they	collaborate	with	central	and	local	government,	private	sector,	
or communities on sanitation provision? 
•	 In	contexts	of	decentralized	sanitation	delivery,	is	local	government	more	externally	accountable	than	national	
government?	Does	local	government	provide	public	reports	(including	budget	allocation	to	sanitation)	on	(i)	all	
services and (ii) sanitation services?
•	 If	governments	(central,	local)	do	not	invest	in	sanitation,	or	not	in	pro-poor	sanitation,	is	this	due	to	low	capacity	or	
low benevolence?
•	 Does	the	government	actively	encourage	and	support	the	participation	of	NGOs	and	the	private	sector	in	
infrastructure development and service delivery (e.g., via community-driven development support or community-led 
total	sanitation	or	sanitation	marketing)?	(See	also	questions	on	private	sector	participation	above)
•	 Do	national	and	subnational	governments	consult	nongovernment	stakeholders	on	sector	strategy	and	the	
planning	of	new	investments?	What	level	of	participation	exists?	Does	the	government	simply	inform	the	public,	
does it consult with civil society groups, or does it on occasion enter into forms of partnership with civil society 
stakeholders?	Does	it	respond	to	demonstrations?	Is	civil	society	participation	limited	to	“invited”	policy	spaces,	or	
is	it	more	advocacy-based?	Are	some	stakeholders	(officially	and/or	unofficially)	excluded	from	the	debate?
•	 Is	civil	society	participation	in	national	policy	frameworks	and	processes	the	most	effective	way	of	raising	the	profile	
of sanitation in central government?
•	 Do	governments	and	lenders/donors	invest	in	local	processes?	Does	this	impact	the	sustainability	of	sanitation	
investments?	Is	sanitation	investment	driven	by	commitments	to	technological	options	that	are	not	always	tested	
for cost-effectiveness under local processes?
•	 How	significant	is	social	investment	to	the	impact	and	sustainability	of	sanitation	investments?	How	do	poor	
households	manage	and	treat	their	sewage	(pit	latrines,	septic	network,	etc.)?	Do	poor	households	have	choices	
regarding	different	sanitation	options?	What	incentives	exist	for	households	to	connect	to	sanitation	networks	(if	
this option exists)? How are these incentives perceived by households, central government, local government, 
private	sector,	civil	society,	and	international	donors	and	organizations?	What	is	the	balance	between	“hard”	and	
“soft”	investment	in	sanitation?	Do	governments	and	lenders/donors	make	a	connection	between	investment	in	
collective organization and networks and sanitation sustainability? How do they characterize this relationship?
•	 How	do	differing	rural	and	urban	contexts	influence	approaches	to	community	engagement	when	delivering	
sanitation	investments?	Have	community-based	approaches	to	sanitation	been	tried?	Is	community	participation	
perceived	as	making	a	contribution	to	ownership	and	sustainability?	Are	there	any	concerns	about	the	level	of	costs	
involved in community participation and the possible implications of this for financial sustainability and replicability?
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framework focus Distributional impacts
hypotheses •	 Sanitation	policy	has	a	pro-poor	dimension	but	this	has	limited	impact	the	on	the	planning	and	execution	of	new	
investments.
•	 Subsidies	and	capital	projects	earmarked	for	the	poor	are	not	effectively	targeted.
•	 Insufficient	attention	is	paid	to	the	design	of	infrastructure	and	services	suited	to	the	needs	low-income	
communities. 
•	 There	are	secondary	impacts	of	sanitation	investment	on	employment	that	should	be	considered	(gain/loss).
•	 There	is	a	greater	concern	with	distributional	equity	at	subnational	levels	of	government	compared	with	national	
government.
Questions •	 How	is	equity	addressed	in	sanitation	sector	investment?	Has	the	government	made	a	deliberate	connection	
between increased access to sanitation and pro-poor policy? 
•	 Which	stakeholders	support	or	oppose	pro-poor	investments?	Which	stakeholders	capture	benefits?	
•	 Which	socioeconomic	groups	in	which	geographical	locations	benefit	from	sanitation	provision?
•	 Do	subsidies	for	the	poor	exist?	If	yes,	what	kind	of	subsidies	exist?	How	effectively	are	those	subsidies	targeted	
to	the	poor?	Which	powerful	interests	determine	targeting	and	according	to	which	formal	and	informal	rules?
•	 In	contexts	of	decentralized	sanitation	service	provision	and	investment,	is	there	a	greater	concern	at	subnational	
levels	of	government	that	those	services	and	investments	are	distributed	equitably?	
•	 Is	the	equitable	delivery	measured	and	reported	effectively?	Is	the	impact	of	improved	sanitation	measured?	
What	are	the	political	economy	dimensions	that	affect	monitoring	and	reporting?
a.2 research methods, analytical tools, and process 
*Two analytical tools—stakeholder analysis and organi-
zational mapping—were conducted with a subset of key 
informants, generating qualitative data on stakeholders, 
institutions, and processes and quantitative data on the flow 
of money and resources. These are introduced in detail in 
the following.
1. research methods: Semistructured interviews and 
focus group discussions
Semistructured interviews
Semistructured interviews were conducted with key infor-
mants drawn from stakeholder groups inside and outside 
of government in each of the four case studies. Some were 
directly engaged in sanitation sector policy development 
or implementation, some were well-informed observers of 
developments in the sector, and others have been involved 
in sanitation project design/implementation. 
Interviewees were identified with the help of World Bank/
WSP in advance of the fieldwork, with further identification 
through a snowballing process in which initial key infor-
mants identified other interviewees connected to the sector. 
Key informants with different positions and perspectives 
bring their own sets of interpretive biases and analysis of the 
political economy of sanitation. In this type of qualitative 
research—where there is no single absolute truth and where 
difference (rather than standardization) is actively sought—
trustworthiness in interpretation can nonetheless be streng-
thened by cross-checking—or triangulating—the views and 
analysis of different key informants and focus groups.
•	 Key informants were selected from the following 
categories of stakeholders:
•	 Government	 stakeholders/sanitation	policy	makers:	
national and subnational governments, Parliament, 
etc.
•	 Service	providers:	public	and	private
•	 Consumers:	households	and	businesses
•	 Civil	society	organizations	(CSOs),	including	NGOs,	
consumer associations, research organizations
•	 International	 donors,	 organizations,	 and	 project	
teams
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The interview followed the form of a free-flowing conver-
sation with structure provided by the set of hypotheses 
and accompanying research questions. Notwithstanding a 
commitment to clear and plain language, semistructured 
interviews, as an interactive method, allow for questions to 
be clarified with the interviewee during the interview. Inter-
viewers can encourage the interviewee to seek clarification 
so that a shared understanding is developed, increasing the 
quality and reliability of the answers provided.
Focus group discussions
Focus group discussions were conducted with a small num-
ber of interest groups connected to the sanitation sector, 
with prioritization given to perspectives from residential 
community members and civil society organizations (for 
example, consumer protection groups and NGOs involved 
in awareness raising on the importance of sanitation).
Several areas of this research—with associated hypotheses—
lent themselves to being explored through focus group 
discussions. These include questions regarding the nature 
of demand for sanitation, perceptions of what is considered 
“adequate sanitation,” more general perceptions of sanitation 
investment processes and outcomes, and the extent and im-
pact of community participation on sanitation investment 
decision making and outcomes.
Stakeholder analysis (discussed below) has informed the 
purposive sampling of interest groups for focus group discus-
sions. These discussions were organized with specific goals, 
structures, time frames, and procedures and with a group of 
people with a common interest: for example, civil society 
organizations that are advocating for pro-poor sanitation 
investment. 
There are a number of principles that were applied to the 
selection and facilitation of the focus group discussions. 
Groups were typically composed of six to twelve partici-
pants. With larger groups it becomes difficult to ensure 
that all participants can contribute freely and meaningfully. 
With fewer than six people, on the other hand, one or two 
individuals might tend to dominate. The facilitators ensured 
that, although the groups have a common interest, they do 
not include participants who are close friends, as this might 
reduce independent thinking and expression. As with se-
mistructured interviews, triangulating the findings from 
one focus group with one or two additional focus groups 
held with different participants from the same interest group 
increases the trustworthiness of those findings.
2. analytical instruments: Stakeholder analysis 
matrices and organizational mapping
Qualitative and quantitative narrative analyses were aided 
by the use of a set of two standardized analytical tools that 
examine stakeholders, institutions, and processes: stakeholder 
analysis matrices and organizational mapping.
Stakeholder analysis matrices
A “stakeholder” refers to an individual, community, group, 
or organization with an interest—or stake—in a particular 
outcome. The stake is rooted either in the fact that they will 
be affected positively or negatively by the outcome or in their 
ability to influence the prospects for the outcome.
Stakeholder analysis is a systematic methodology that uses 
qualitative data to determine the interests and influence of 
different groups in relation to a policy or sector. A stakeholder 
interest or power matrix maps two variables that describe a 
stakeholder’s interests and power relationship to a particular 
policy or sector. (See figure A.1 for an illustrative example 
from one of the case studies.) We have selected to map the 
interests and power of different stakeholders in relation to 
sanitation sector outcomes. The power dimension refers to the 
extent to which a stakeholder party can affect the outcome 
(on the vertical y axis), while the interest dimension refers to 
whether the stakeholder is positively or negatively affected 
by the outcome (horizontal x axis).
Stakeholder analysis matrices follow a series of steps and 
can be conducted with individual key informants or in 
focus groups. We have worked with a selected subset of key 
informants to populate and explain the matrix. A political 
economy narrative that interprets this matrix for the reader 
was then developed through the further key informant and 
focus group discussions.
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High
Influence
Low
A B
C D
Support Neutral Opposition
Interest
1
2
3
4
5
6
78
9
10
11
12
13
14
Notes:  A = High Power and Support
            B = High Power and Opposition
            C = Low Power and Support
            D = Low Power and Opposition
Organizational mapping
Organizational mapping is a qualitative method for ma-
pping and tracing the cause-effect flow of resources and 
decision making following policy and investment decisions. 
It provides an overview of the formal and informal insti-
tutional framework and organizational practices within 
which sanitation sector behavior and decision making takes 
place. Drawing on our understanding of the stakeholders 
and institutions involved, their interests, and the existing 
power dynamics, this tool traces a sequence of decisions to 
describe and explain how institutions and processes operate 
in each case study country and how these have impacted 
sanitation investments and outcomes. This analysis has 
generated findings on how policy stakeholders, including 
World Bank and WSP in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and 
Senegal have identified and managed 
the political economy risks and op-
portunities through their engagement 
with the sanitation sector. 
Organizational mapping aims to make 
flows of decision-making processes 
around sanitation investment, resour-
ces, information, and activities explicit 
(via flow diagrams) and to identify 
bottlenecks and constraints, as well 
as opportunities for change. When 
used carefully, it can illustrate often-
intricate connections and sequences 
clearly. The tool’s focus on the inter-
vening processes between cause and 
effect makes it an indispensable tool 
in political economy analysis.
Organizational mapping was in some 
instances also applied more specifi-
cally, as a modified form of public-
expenditure tracking, to describe and 
explain quantitatively the flow of 
budget allocations and investments in 
the sanitation sector over a given time 
period. As envisaged, this activity was 
hindered by limits to the amount of 
useful and accessible sanitation data 
(including time series data) that was available.
3. research process
The research was implemented flexibly in order to respond 
to contextual variation in each case study country and 
to the variation in interviewees and focus groups. Table 
A.3 provided the country teams with an overview of the 
methods and analytical instruments available to answer 
the questions under each element of the framework. The 
columns to the right also indicate which stakeholders are 
most likely to be able to provide relevant insights. At the 
same time talking to different stakeholders allowed the 
cross-checking of information. These insights were addi-
tional to the objective analysis provided by key informants 
on all areas of the framework.
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framework element / 
question
method
analytical 
instrument
Stakeholders
SSI FGD SAM OM Government Service provider Consumers CSOs Lenders/Donors
Country context      
Sector arena: institutions
Public investment       
Private investment   
National/subnational	
institutional relationships       
Sector arena: Stakeholders
Sanitation investment      
Demand	for	sanitation	        
Sector process       
Distributional	impacts	       
of political economy analysis. Within the selected countries, 
there is an element of initial stratification involved in the 
purposive sampling methodology. In the case of Brazil, for 
example, discussions of project contexts identified a typology 
of urban sanitation contexts and then purposively selected 
sites based on their learning potential. 
a.4 Feedback, reporting, and dissemination
The principle of dissemination was an important feature of 
the research methodology, enabling knowledge exchange and 
reflection among key stakeholders in each case study country 
and in Washington, D.C. The study design and terms of 
reference did not envisage sophisticated dissemination stra-
tegies, however, and the production of the research outputs 
will need to be part of a broader World Bank dissemination 
strategy that will include commitments by the team of con-
sultants as follows.
At the end of the fieldwork period, the team—in each 
country—offered to facilitate a small debriefing workshop 
(maximum half a day) providing initial findings, inviting 
comments and questions, and providing room for discussion 
Notes: SSI=semistructured interview, FGD=focus group discussion, SAM=stakeholder analysis matrices, OM=organizational mapping.
TABlE A.3 ovErviEw of mEThodS And STAkEholdErS By frAmEwork ElEmEnT
a.3 research sampling and stratification
The research strategy built on a series of purposive (as oppo-
sed to random or probability-based) sampling steps. Given 
the relatively modest resource envelope for this four-country 
research, the study used a “fit for purpose” sampling me-
thodology that we believe captured sufficiently the variability 
of stakeholders connected to the sanitation sector in each 
country and project context. 
Key informants, stakeholder interviewees, and focus groups 
were initially identified through consultations with the na-
tional team consultants and secondary clients. Further key 
informants and sanitation sector stakeholders were identified 
through a snowballing approach and on the back of the 
stakeholder analysis. The selected stakeholders represented 
different “types” of stakeholders (as mapped in the stakehol-
der analysis).
The country case studies were chosen purposively by the 
World Bank/WSP team. The countries selected represent a 
range of sanitation contexts and outcomes, identified to gene-
rate useful operational lesson learning through the application 
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on the recommendations. This helped country stakeholders 
to internalize the research findings while providing an op-
portunity for the research teams to validate the case study 
findings. Debriefings took place in all case study countries at 
the end of the mission with the exception of Brazil where—
due to country office availability—the debriefing took place 
after the draft report had been submitted.
a.5 Methodology modifications based 
on the experience of this study
The fieldwork for this study was staggered, with the Maha-
rashtra fieldwork conducted first in order to allow for me-
thodological reflection and modification ahead of fieldwork 
in the remaining three countries. The field team identified 
three areas for methodological reflection: the treatment of 
research hypotheses, site selection, and case study selection. 
We discuss these below.
1. Treatment of research hypotheses
The application of the research hypotheses was originally 
designed with a scoring element to allow interviewees to score 
each hypotheses on a four-point scale (strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree) as the basis for cross-country 
comparison. It quickly became apparent that in the context 
of research conducted with a wide range of stakeholders in 
different contexts, this scoring would be of limited compa-
rative value.
This realization prompted a broader reflection on the use of 
hypotheses as the basis for the research process. The field team 
found that the detailed thinking and discussion that genera-
ted the set of hypotheses and attendant research questions was 
invaluable for framing and focusing the research. The team 
also found, however, that the process of testing the hypo-
theses was more inductive than deductive. In other words, 
rather than focusing on proving or refuting the hypotheses 
and providing empirical evidence (as in deductive research), 
the research process was more fluid; the research team found 
itself generating working hypotheses, which were tested and 
refined on a more incremental than envisaged in the research 
strategy document. 
The team therefore adjusted the methodology, recommen-
ding that the fieldwork
•	 should	not	be	concerned	with	eliciting	scores	for	hypo-
theses, unless the scoring process was seen as useful 
and appropriate for prompting diagnostic discussion, 
and
•	 should	not	get	stuck	into	a	“one	shot”	deductive	appro-
ach to testing and confirming/refuting the research 
hypotheses, but should instead embrace a more fluid, 
iterative, and inductive approach to developing and 
revising/refining/rejecting working hypotheses.
2. Site selection
A further methodological reflection concerned the challenges 
of identifying and visiting “average” communities once the 
samples had been stratified. The fieldwork team members in 
Maharashtra found that their visits were given a high profile 
by district authorities keen to demonstrate the success of their 
sanitation investment strategies by directing our field visits 
toward high-performing/celebrated villages. This was partly 
a function of a research process that was rapid rather than 
involving a longer period of exposure to a range of villages. It 
was difficult when being hosted by district officers to insist on 
being exposed to average villages in each stratified group. 
The implication for the next round of fieldwork was that 
research teams should do more groundwork ahead of time 
to identify and select sites for field visits in order to avoid last 
minute “engineering” of field visits by host authorities.
3. case study selection
A final methodological reflection concerned the importance 
of having detailed discussions with the WSP (or World Bank) 
country team pre-departure, to ensure local ownership of the 
work and check that the case study selection was appropriate 
and would maximize opportunities for learning. 
In the case of Maharashtra, the working title of the cases stu-
dy—“Community-Led Total Sanitation in Maharashtra”—
caused some initial confusion as CLTS was not a term used 
in that state and the operational approach was quite different 
to CLTS as it is commonly understood. 
WSP in India also expressed some concern that the case 
study should have been concerned with the Total Sanitation 
Campaign nationally, not on a single operational approach. 
The Indian country context is one in which lender/donor-
funded projects are less significant in advancing progress than 
the governments’ own national program. WSP colleagues felt 
that the latter should have been the focus of the study.
The Political Economy of Sanitation    Annex A - methodology
www.wsp.org 57
B.1 Brazil
Overview
This study examines the political economy of investment 
in sanitation (with a particular focus on sewerage) in Brazil 
over a period of roughly one-and-a-half decades, since the 
launch of the Water Sector Modernization Project (known 
in Brazil as Programa de Modernização do Setor Saneamen-
to, PMSS) in 1993. During this period, Brazil transformed 
the institutional landscape of its sanitation sector, gained a 
reputation for innovation in pro-poor sewerage programs, 
and began to make up some of the huge deficit in sanitation 
investment that it had accumulated by the end of the “lost 
decade” of the 1980s. 
In addition to this national (policy) component, the case 
study includes a regional (program) component that focu-
sed on the Bahia Azul program, implemented by the Bahia 
state utility EMBASA in the Salvador Metropolitan Region 
in northeastern Brazil over approximately the same period 
(1995–2007).
Brazil has been a major recipient of World Bank lending for 
WSS investment, both at national and subnational levels, 
with the Bank supporting key federal government programs 
(including the PMSS and PROSANEAR) and significant 
investments by state governments and utilities, principally 
in urban sanitation in major cities and metropolitan regions 
(including Salvador, the focus of the Bahia Azul program). 
Although, given Brazil’s size, the overall proportion of total 
sector investment in the country that has derived from World 
Bank lending is modest (and indeed the Bank provided only 
around 12 percent of the total resources invested in the Bahia 
Azul program), the Bank was perceived as an important 
actor at certain times and in certain places within the broad 
sector processes.
In recent decades millions of poor Brazilian households 
have been connected to public sewerage networks through 
the expansion of conventional services and the introduction 
of innovative alternatives such as the condominial system. 
While Brazil is currently on track to reach the sanitation 
MDG in 2015, a significant  investment will be required to 
achieve universal access to sanitation services, particularly 
in rural areas. The inclusion of sanitation as a priority sector 
in the current government’s flagship Growth Acceleration 
Program (PAC) in 2007, backed by the allocation of R$40 
billion (US$20 billion) of resources over four years for basic 
sanitation and water, appeared to signal that the challenge was 
at last being taken seriously. However, spending has lagged 
behind the increase in budget allocations, as it has proved 
hard to achieve rapid increases in the absorptive capacity of 
a sector that has long had unstable and unpredictable levels 
of investment.
Diagnostic findings
The study’s analysis of the country context shows that on 
the demand side there is an association between sanitation 
(particularly sewerage) and modernity, and while coverage 
for urban water supply  is almost universal, Brazil’s delivery 
of sanitation has lagged far behind. Achieving universal 
coverage in Brazil is, however, complicated by a number of 
technological, social, and economic factors. Social capital and 
social cohesion are important in mobilizing communities 
to invest in sanitation and critical to their ability to lobby 
and exert pressure on local leaders. From a political point 
of view, since President Lula’s election a more rights-based 
rhetoric, which depicts access to improved sanitation as an 
issue of human dignity and a citizen right, has become more 
prominent. Moreover, poor municipalities generally have the 
highest level of support for the Lula government; the increase 
in federal grant funding through the PAC can therefore pro-
vide a political payoff as well as being a pragmatic response 
to limited local investment capacity. 
On the supply side, while there is a clear technological 
preference for sewerage, the modified application through 
condominial sewerage (in which groups of household-
ers assume responsibility for the final links in the system) 
can change the nature of how services are provided, with 
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greater expectations placed on the role of householders. 
Condominial systems also make the service more affordable 
generally and maintain the appeal for different stakeholders: 
for politicians, for example, it creates relatively big, visible 
public works programs for investment. Public and private 
operators, construction firms, and other private contractors 
benefit from these capital works programs. 
Looking at the sector arena, the study found that political 
economy factors at the national level have not resulted in 
opposition to increased sanitation investments per se. Indeed, 
they now appear to be converging around a broad-based 
commitment to such investments that includes support at 
the highest levels of government. However, the study did find 
a significant influence of political economy factors (linked 
both to stakeholder interests and broader ideologies) in the 
disputes among advocates of municipal, state, and private-
sector operations that left the country without a clear policy 
and legal framework for the sector during most of the period 
of one-and-a-half decades covered by the study. The combi-
nation of the 2007 (Water and) Environmental Sanitation 
Law with other legislation on concessions, tendering, public 
consortia, and private-public partnerships seems in the view 
of most interviewees to have finally established the legal and 
policy clarity needed to underpin increased investment, 
though some areas of dispute remain. 
At regional level, the analysis of the Bahia Azul program 
showed that it was a broadly successful example of political 
economy management, which included technically compe-
tent and politically astute handling of relations with the nu-
merous different sources of national and international fund-
ing for a large and complex program. However, the unique 
strength of the political group behind Bahia Azul allowed it 
to ignore the need to engage with municipal governments, 
civil society, and statutory citizen oversight institutions, and 
its political orientation influenced an approach to working 
with communities that privileged top-down and short-term 
mobilization over sustained participation. Had the emphasis 
on social capital been more long term, community engage-
ment with system operation and maintenance might have 
been more effective, and links might have been made to 
other health and urban upgrading programs. In many areas, 
however, both customer and service provider are now more 
satisfied with an arrangement whereby the utility maintains 
the system for a higher service fee.
The sector process analysis begins at the macro level with an 
outline of budget decision processes and resource flows for 
grants and loans from federal government and IFI programs, 
which account for the largest share of investment in the sector. 
While the sector suffers capacity issues around limited viable 
projects, the report also argues that political pressures come 
into play at various points along the pathways to approval 
of projects and disbursement of funds. These may reflect 
publicly announced policy criteria such as PAC allocations 
by region, which have led to an increase of resources allocated 
to the northeast that, while justifiable on equity and poverty 
reduction grounds, has according to some interviewees led 
to the supply of funding outstripping the absorptive capacity 
of state and municipal utilities in the region, with negative 
consequences for quality and efficiency. The study goes on to 
examine the meso level of political economy factors shaping 
program implementation, taking Bahia Azul as an example. 
It concludes by examining the micro level of the delivery of 
sewerage services in low-income communities, focusing on 
the condominial sanitation component of Bahia Azul and 
comparing it with the Environmental Sanitation Company 
of the Federal District’s (CAESB) condominial sanitation 
strategy in Brasília.
Operational implications
Based on the diagnostic discussion, a number of significant 
operational lessons can be drawn from the Brazil case study 
in order to help to inform future World Bank/WSP inter-
ventions.
Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations
Careful and strategic sequencing of operations can encourage 
reforms that increase the overall impact of investments in later 
phases. In Brazil, the conditions laid down for access to the 
relatively modest capital investment component of the PMSS 
provided sufficient incentives for institutional upgrading by 
EMBASA, which was then able to leverage much larger vol-
umes of investment resources due to its enhanced credibility 
and increased absorptive capacity.
Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis
The timing of information flow is important. Even when 
rigorous analysis is undertaken (as was the case with the Bahia 
Azul health impact study), dissemination of key findings can 
get lost, sidetracked, or potentially misused or captured if the 
timing is wrong (for example, at the start of a new political 
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administration). Strategically important studies can benefit 
from a flexible timetable. Interim findings based on monitor-
ing data of the health impact study could have been used to 
steer the debate more actively. 
Realigning accountability
It is not easy to decentralize decision making, resource al-
location, service delivery, and regulation. Helping to clarify 
the roles and responsibilities (or at least the pros and cons of 
different roles and responsibilities) at the federal, state, and 
municipal levels and the capacity requirements at each level 
is an important contribution.
In Brazil, the political left strongly backs and the current 
government favors new forms of social oversight. Linking 
them to regulatory agencies (promoted by the center-right 
groups that dominated the previous government) can increase 
the legitimacy of different service delivery options (technolo-
gies, for example) and solutions around sensitive issues like 
tariff-setting. It may also help to overcome perceptions of 
World Bank biases toward particular approaches, such as 
its perceived bias in Brazil toward enhancing the role of the 
private sector.
Partnership strategy
The World Bank is clearly a potential convener or broker 
of unlikely marriages of convenience between seemingly 
disconnected technical, political, and financial interests. 
The Bank is not perceived to be neutral but must remain 
supportive of the exploration of various options to enhance 
service delivery. 
The perception of being aligned with one political grouping 
may reduce the World Bank’s ability to leverage continuity 
between programs created by different political administra-
tions. On the other hand, in Brazil like in other countries, 
the World Bank brings to the table clear institutional memory 
in the sector.
Public debate and communication
When it has achieved a strong partnership with a particular 
political grouping (as was the case in Bahia), the World Bank 
should make full use of its leverage with this grouping to push 
it toward greater openness to public debate and engagement 
with civil society. Such engagement can both enhance pro-
gram quality during implementation and enhance sustain-
ability by securing broader buy in to program aims.  
conclusions
In Brazil, although the World Bank has accounted for a rela-
tively modest share of total sector investment, it has helped 
to drive innovation and improved performance by encourag-
ing institutional upgrading in once-fragile state utilities and 
by supporting the spread of Brazilian innovations such as 
the condominial approach. The analysis of the Bahia Azul 
program showed that it was a broadly successful example of 
political economy management, which included technically 
competent and politically astute handling of relations with 
the numerous different sources of national and international 
funding for a large and complex program. The program 
was quick to adopt the innovative condominial approach 
to provide sewerage services to low-income neighborhoods, 
making significant investments in social mobilization work 
alongside construction. However, the unique strength of the 
political group behind Bahia Azul allowed it to ignore the 
need to engage with municipal governments, civil society, 
and statutory citizen oversight institutions, and its political 
orientation influenced an approach to working with commu-
nities that privileged top-down and short-term mobilization 
over sustained participation.
B.2 india 
Overview
The Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) was launched across 
the rural areas of India in 1999 and presented an important 
shift away from earlier supply-driven sanitation programs. 
TSC has a set of defined components, which includes in-
formation, education, and communication; community 
mobilization activities; construction of household toilets 
and community complexes; and provision of toilets in go-
vernment schools and anganwadis (child-care and mother-
care centers). Most importantly, TSC differs from previous 
campaigns in that, for most participants, there is no govern-
ment contribution to the capital cost of sanitation facilities. 
Designed as a demand-driven project, the TSC emphasizes 
awareness creation for a cleaner environment and hygienic 
habits at the household and community levels.
The TSC program failed to take off in most of the states until 
2004–5. The political economy of the program provides a 
number of significant reasons for this failure. Most of the 
states were reluctant to implement a low-subsidy program, 
in particular a subsidy that was not extended to households 
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above the poverty line. On the demand side there was a lack of 
a felt need among communities for several reasons, including 
poverty, the ready availability of open space in rural areas, 
lack of information and knowledge, and above all, long years 
of habitually defecating in the open. 
The government of India’s MDG commitments have mo-
tivated it to devise innovative ways to strengthen the TSC, 
including notably an incentive/award scheme designed to 
speed up coverage. This scheme, the Nirmal Gram Puraskar 
(NGP, Clean Village Award), has become one of the key 
drivers of the TSC program. NGP was introduced in 2003 
by the government of India as a postproject reward to village, 
block and district panchayats (councils) that achieved the 
status of Open Defecation Free and fully sanitized unit. The 
NGP was inspired to a large extent by the Sant Gadge Baba 
scheme adopted by the government of Maharashtra.17
The progress of the TSC program as a whole has accelerated 
since 2005, and national coverage was reported to be around 
57 percent by 2008, compared to just 21 percent in 2001 and 
31 percent in 2005.18 A major contributor to this improve-
ment in fortunes is the role that Maharashtra has played as 
a laboratory of good policy and practice.
Diagnostic findings
The study’s analysis of the country context has confirmed 
that decentralization is firmly established in Maharashtra, 
and that some senior political leaders and officers have wor-
ked their way up though the hierarchy, bringing with them 
an understanding of and commitment to grassroots action. 
There is also a long history of social movements led by local 
champions in Maharashtra, including B. R. Ambedkar, who 
spearheaded the liberation of oppressed castes. Sant Gadge 
Baba was a revered pioneer of sanitation and hygiene in the 
state in the nineteenth century and an ideal figurehead for a 
state campaign that incorporated sanitation investment.
The sector arena discussion suggests that in rural sanitation, 
with its relative lack of capital intensive hardware and greater 
focus on process, the stakeholder interests and institutional 
arrangements from the federal down to the local level are 
relatively uncontested and open to influence for progressive 
sanitation investment. Respected leadership, a lack of partisan 
associations, and public recognition for local efforts all helped 
to advance the program. Effective use of limited government 
funds was also integral to its success: since the bulk of state 
government funds were used for promotion and prizes awar-
ded on the basis of transparent criteria, opportunities for the 
diversion of funds were quite limited. Moreover, the use of 
rewards and recognition leveraged considerable community 
investment on top of the funds available from the TSC. While 
the private sector—rural marts and local masons—supported 
latrine construction, private sector participation and associa-
ted regulation were not part of the political economy story 
emerging from Maharashtra. In contrast to urban sanitation 
contexts, there are no big contracts—households appoint 
their own masons—so competition with public services 
does not arise.
The sector process analysis confirms that civil society par-
ticipation (meaning community participation rather than 
NGO participation) has been crucial to the success of the 
government’s demand-driven strategy for sanitation inves-
tment in Maharashtra. Due to a sustained, government-led 
campaign, a gradual shift is evident whereby toilet use is 
becoming institutionalized as the social norm in at least some 
parts of the state—people accept that the time has come to 
make a change. Moreover, a very significant driving force 
behind this demand generation has been the role of sector 
champions. These included a minister and two officers who 
helped to ensure bureaucratic support for the program. They 
believed in rural development and shared a passion for im-
proving sanitary conditions. External development agencies 
had a subtle but significant role at different institutional 
levels. WSP helped by exposing state government and Gram 
Panchayat representatives to promotional approaches and 
low-cost sanitation technologies from other places. These 
inspired and informed the design of a program customized 
to the Maharashtra context. WSP and UNICEF both were 
able to provide flexible resources in a rapid, responsive way 
to fill gaps in government funding and procedures, especially 
in the areas of learning and communications.
17 While the NGP award is given by the central government, the Sant Gadge Baba are disbursed by the government of Maharashtra and can be spent at the discretion of the respective 
panchayats.
18 See Government of India, Department of Drinking Water Supply, http://ddws.nic.in.
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Operational implications
Based on the diagnostic discussion a number of significant ope-
rational lessons can be drawn from the India case study in order 
to help to inform future World Bank/WSP interventions. 
Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations
Effective support can be built by recognizing and suppor-
ting government commitment and local leadership. This 
involves understanding the importance of sector champions 
and tailoring support to help them succeed and scale up 
their impact. A striking feature of sanitation investment 
in Maharashtra has been its success in translating political 
commitment into bureaucratic action. This translation was 
achieved largely through dynamic and committed political 
and bureaucratic leaders, many of whom worked their way 
up from the grassroots. This bureaucratic commitment has 
been bolstered by political incentivizing. Senior officials 
committed to sanitation in the early years in Maharashtra 
have been promoted, albeit sometimes to unrelated sectors, 
and the government recognizes and rewards officers who 
perform well in the sanitation program. This form of political 
incentivizing has now started to be adopted in other states. 
Through sensitive and sustained engagement the WSP was 
able to tailor its support to this locally owned process.
Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis
Lenders and donors can use analysis of comparative advantage 
in global practice to support local policy makers and admi-
nistrations to learn lessons from elsewhere and refine their 
operational framework. This involves identifying how and 
when they can add value to an ongoing process of change in 
investment strategies. The kind of support provided by WSP 
in Maharashtra was geared toward lesson learning through 
exposure to CLTS and scaling up of good practice. This, 
rather than capital investment or strong steering, was exactly 
what was required from external partners in this context.
This type of support can be tied to the promotion of more 
inclusive policy debates. Lenders and donors can look to 
encourage, where appropriate, analysis conducted with a 
broad group of stakeholders to ensure greater inclusion, 
and can link this process to strengthened public debate and 
communication.
Realigning accountability
There is scope for lenders and donors to adapt and support 
models of accountability in the sanitation sector based on 
context. The sector process may not be characterized by the 
kinds of vertical accountability relations central to much 
lender/donor thinking. In the case of Maharashtra, the go-
vernment has encouraged a different type of relationship, in 
which the emphasis is on encouraging private investment and 
private behavior change. In this way government accountabi-
lity shifts from delivery to outcomes. This has been achieved 
by the state focusing on creating a demand-driven approach 
to sanitation investment, facilitated by the state using a mix of 
consciousness raising, subsidies, collective financial rewards, 
“soft” conditionality, and enforcement.
Partnership strategy
The study highlights the utility of ensuring that partnership 
strategies are based on sustained, flexible engagement with 
government partners. The Maharashtra sanitation program 
is strongly government led. Nevertheless, technical and 
policy support from WSP has been strategically important, 
especially in exposing government officials and community 
leaders to new ideas and in helping to strengthen program 
effectiveness.
Public debate and communication
Finally, lenders and donors can support policy makers and bu-
reaucrats to secure and sustain public support for institutional 
change. The state government and district administrations 
in Maharashtra have sought to ensure that the sanitation 
program is well known across the state, and to this end have 
made extensive use of local mass media, with awards repor-
ted widely and given a high profile. This has been critical to 
the program’s success and is reflected in the program budget 
allocation for communication.
conclusions
In Maharashtra, external development agencies had a subtle 
but significant role at different institutional levels. WSP hel-
ped by exposing state- and village-level government represen-
tatives to promotional approaches and low-cost sanitation te-
chnologies from other places within and outside India. These 
inspired and informed the design of a program customized to 
the Maharashtra context. WSP and UNICEF both were able 
to provide flexible resources in a rapid, responsive way to fill 
gaps in government funding and procedures, especially in the 
areas of learning and communications. WSP used the evident 
success of the Maharashtra program in advocacy at national 
level for a shift in emphasis in the Total Sanitation Campaign 
from household inputs (toilet construction) to collective 
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outcomes (an end to open defecation). This national level ad-
vocacy helped to influence changes in the TSC guidelines and 
a strengthened government approach to rewarding outcomes 
with the introduction of the Nirmal Gram Puruskar scheme, 
which provides financial rewards for Gram Panchayats and 
larger units of local government that achieve Open Defeca-
tion Free status. The World Bank–funded Jalswaraj project 
has actively supported the sanitation program, in particular 
by strengthening village water and sanitation committees.19 
The project built institutional within communities, but was 
less successful at integrating with district administration 
sanitation institutions and investments.
B.3 indonesia 
Overview
Indonesia was initially selected as a case study so that synthe-
sized lessons from other case studies—namely, India (rural), 
Brazil (urban), and Senegal (urban)—could potentially 
contribute to addressing political economy challenges in 
influencing sanitation sector reform and decision making. 
However, given recent positive developments in the sector 
(where national commitment to sanitation investment has 
increased significantly), the focus was revised to explore how 
and why government commitment to sanitation has increased 
recently compared to just a few years ago. While the level 
of investments actually needed to address the significant 
sanitation problems in Indonesia is still not sufficient, the 
increasing government interest in investment is a major shift 
from viewing sanitation as a private matter for households. 
Interest continues to increase at a rate unexpected by some 
(particularly external) stakeholders. 
Diagnostic findings
Country context
Historically, interest in sanitation has been extremely low in 
Indonesia. Awareness among all socioeconomic groups and 
even among the media is limited, and the disposal of feces 
is not discussed in households or communities. The formal 
language lacks a word for defecation, and it is culturally not 
accepted to discuss sanitasi in public. Moreover, many parts 
of Indonesia are geographically well endowed with rivers and 
natural drainage channels, and this has meant that household 
waste of all types has been easily disposed of, literally washed 
away in rivers and water courses, taking the problem of dea-
ling with waste both out of view and out of mind. However, 
open defecation is seen as uncivilized behavior, and latrines 
and bathrooms within homes can also be valued as status 
symbols or physical demonstrations of wealth in some cases, 
even though they might not lead to improved disposal or 
treatment of wastewater (for example, they are not connected 
to a proper and safe facility).
At the macro level, a long history of authoritarian rule 
makes advocacy (for sanitation and other topics) difficult, 
and there is the perception that government is not interes-
ted in opinions voiced by the media or civil society. Also, 
the public expects little from government, and this coupled 
with a blurred boundary between public and private service 
provision means sanitation is mainly perceived as a private 
responsibility. This has been reinforced by a lack of interest 
from the more politically powerful middle classes, who are 
usually able to provide privately for their general infrastruc-
ture needs.
The institutional landscape has undergone significant change 
through the initiation of the decentralization process. De-
centralization was rapid, if not instant, and not only gave 
greater administrative independence to local governments 
but also moved financial resources and responsibility for the 
provision of many public services directly to district level. 
The sanitation sector has in consequence seen multiple ac-
tors, with sometimes confusing and overlapping mandates. 
The challenge of aligning, coordinating, and simplifying the 
institutional set up is particularly important as ambiguity in 
mandates means reduced scope for accountability. A further 
key issue faced due to decentralization is redistricting, where 
local politicians can petition for districts to be split into 
smaller administrative units through a mechanism called 
pemekaran. With more money being raised locally through 
taxation, a key motivation for splitting districts has often 
been control over resources and rent-seeking opportunities 
for local elites. While revenues have increased, local budget 
priorities are generally go toward free education, (curative) 
19 The World Bank-funded Jalswaraj project in Maharashtra supports community-led water supply improvements through a grant-making subproject mechanism in some 3,000 
villages (out of some 26,000 in the state as a whole). A recent intermediate impact evaluation of the Jalswaraj project concluded that the institutional strengthening of village water 
and sanitation committees is the most significant contribution of the project to sanitation investment and sustainability.
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health services, and the construction of new government 
offices to house newly formed local administrations, which 
easily crowd out sanitation and other public health promo-
tion issues.
Sector arena
A detailed stakeholder mapping exercise showed that the 
sanitation sector is characterized by an array of stakehol-
ders—with no single national level ministry responsible for 
sanitation policy, and responsibilities shared among at least 
five ministries. This institutional complexity and confusion 
has not only resulted in a reduction of accountability to the 
public for sanitation service delivery but had also a negative 
impact on international lenders’ and donors’ willingness to 
risk funding sanitation investments. 
Given the decentralized nature of service provision, it is not 
surprising that local-level government stakeholders and actors 
have clear influence over budget allocations. This does not 
work to the advantage of sanitation, as local governments 
in most cases prefer to allocate resources to high-visibility 
investments (for example, roads, irrigation, and buildings). 
Moreover, despite certain formal processes being in place, 
informal patron-client relationships play a key role in de-
termining investment priorities and funding from central 
to local governments. Without having any clear guidance, 
criteria, or mechanisms for deciding on funding allocations, 
there is space for political considerations or rent-seeking 
opportunities to influence investments at local level. 
This study is concerned with “pro-poor” investments, but 
that term is not used often in Indonesia’s sector arena discus-
sions. There has been an almost complete lack of investment 
and infrastructure for either rich or poor, who often live at 
very close proximity in mixed neighborhoods (in contrast to 
the more segregated nature of urban centers in Latin America 
or Africa). The problem is therefore not one of investments 
being focused on well-off areas or elites at the expense of the 
poor. The focus needs to be on ensuring an adequate sanita-
tion minimum service package for all households. The term 
“poor-inclusive” is therefore seen as more appropriate for 
Indonesia and more easily accepted among policy makers. 
Sector process
This increased interest in and commitment to sanitation 
has developed over the last two to three years, but since the 
start of 2009 it has become increasingly owned and driven 
by national government stakeholders. There is increasing 
high-level ownership within government (in contrast to some 
past donor/lender-funded projects, which had tended to be 
supply driven), and very recent developments suggest that 
the national budget for sanitation infrastructure is likely to 
be quadrupled in 2010 and will have a separate budget line 
from water.
The Strategi Sanitasi Kota (City Sanitation Strategy, or 
SSK) approach, which was first tested in the Indonesia Sa-
nitation Sector Development Project (ISSDP) in 2006, is 
an evidence-based, strategic development approach led by 
city governments. Based on expressed local demand, with 
external consultants acting as facilitators, the SSK approach 
is a bottom-up process, with participatory room for local 
government. While this approach was rejected by most 
ministry stakeholders initially, several factors contributed 
to its increased acceptance. First, a newly appointed ISSDP 
staff member, who had good personal ties and the effective 
relationships, successfully became a facilitator in building 
relationships within government and increasing interest. 
A change of the director general within Cipta Karya (the 
Directorate General of Housing, Building, Planning & 
Urban Development, Ministry of Public Works) increased 
institutional buy-in. Finally, decentralization increasingly 
challenged the traditional centralized approach.
Another interesting insight from the Indonesian sanitation-
process discussion is defining “sanitation” as solid waste 
management, urban drainage, and sewerage. Linking these 
three elements has created important momentum, increasing 
political commitments to sanitation. Urban flooding has be-
come an increasing problem in many cities, with high levels 
of public concern and complaints when it occurs. Sewerage 
and wastewater would not become topics for discussion at 
the local government on their own, by including them under 
a wider definition of sanitation, backed-up with information 
on the negative effects of poor sewerage, local governments 
had to start thinking about the issue, and some of the ma-
yors, supported by ISSDP, have promoted the benefits of 
sanitation investment.
Operational implications
Based on the diagnostic discussion, a number of significant 
operational lessons can be drawn from the Indonesia case 
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study in order to help to inform future World Bank/WSP 
interventions. 
Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations
Aligning and sequencing operations and support with natio-
nal planning and policy cycles can increase their influence 
on policy and planning. In early 2009 there was government 
agreement that the City Sanitation Strategy approach could 
be replicated and scaled up, and the timing of this agreement 
fits in with the next five-year planning cycle. Sequencing 
different interventions over different timescales (for example, 
awareness raising and improving local planning capacity) has 
been a necessary first step before making local investments 
for physical infrastructure. This helps to ensure that they are 
appropriate, effective, and efficient. 
Understanding the political economy of lending—and 
responding appropriately—can increase the acceptability of 
funding mechanisms and ease negotiations. For example, 
the association of previous loans with corruption and debt 
increased subsequent public and government wariness of 
loans from international lenders. Also, past loan negotiations 
have been delayed partly as a result of requests by lenders (for 
example, for information on internal arrangements between 
local and national government) that were perceived to be 
unacceptable by the government.
Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis
Using the resources and comparative advantage of an inter-
national institution can result in research and analysis that 
is tailored for specific audiences and can inform sanitation 
policy and investment decisions. A comparative study on the 
economic impacts of sanitation was undertaken by WSP-EAP 
in four Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. This 
study was cited by key informants (government, internatio-
nal lenders, and donors) as having been a powerful tool in 
motivating central government stakeholders into action. Two 
related factors can explain this. As a middle-income country 
maintaining high levels of economic growth, Indonesia sees 
itself as a leader within the ASEAN region; when attainment 
levels for some MDG targets have been worse than in other, 
much poorer Southeast Asian countries, it has caused some 
government stakeholders to feel they can, and should, be 
performing better. Second, the government is becoming 
increasingly interested in economic evidence for its policy 
decisions, for example, the cost of health care in consequence 
of lack of sanitation. Understanding these government prio-
rities and targeting research at them have proven successful 
in the Indonesia case. 
Realigning accountability
Increasing clarity over institutional responsibilities can help 
increase accountability from both the supply-side (institu-
tions know what they are responsible for) and the demand-
side (citizens know which institutions are responsible and 
who they should complain to).
Traditional top-down supply-driven approaches to sanitation 
investments have often been unsuccessful or unsustainable, 
but combining them with social investments in bottom-up 
processes can help increase accountability and the sustainabi-
lity of investments even when there is low initial demand. The 
City Sanitation Strategy approach recognizes the difference 
between perceived demands, which often form the basis of 
top-down approaches, and actual demands.
Partnership strategy
Strong longer term support and collaboration with gover-
nment on planning and policy issues, with government 
viewed as a partner, can strengthen the capacity of govern-
ment (central and local) to scale up sanitation planning and 
ensure high levels of national ownership of the process. In 
Indonesia, this has been pursued through identifying and 
supporting appropriate champions. These are trusted faci-
litators and negotiators who can help build and strengthen 
partnerships and relationships among key stakeholders in the 
urban sanitation sector. 
Public debate and communication
Although the media in Indonesia are generally no more aware 
of sanitation issues than the general public and coverage is 
limited, there is potential to develop partnerships that enable 
sanitation messages to be conveyed effectively. The ISSDP has 
recognized this potential in the design of its second phase, 
which will have components on advocacy, campaigning, 
communications, and promotion.
conclusions
In Indonesia a “process approach to engagement” has started 
to pay dividends by increasing pressure for top-down sector 
investment from the center of government and bottom-up 
from local government upward. There is increasing high-level 
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ownership within government (in contrast to some past 
donor/lender-funded projects, which have tended to have 
been supply driven) and very recent developments suggest 
that the national budget for sanitation infrastructure is likely 
to be quadrupled in 2010 and will have a separate budget 
line from water. While the importance of process has long 
been recognized, the Indonesia case study highlights again 
the importance and effectiveness of development partners 
understanding the national and country context, and ensu-
ring the approaches fit this context. 
The Indonesia cases study clearly illustrates the appropriate-
ness and effectiveness of intensive informal approaches built 
on good personal ties and relationships. ISSDP key staff 
met with counterparts from the Ministry of Public Works 
(MoPW) many times to convince them of the potential of 
the SSK approach, but during the first year, advocacy efforts 
toward MoPW were unsuccessful. The breakthrough came 
when an additional person was recruited within the ISSDP 
team who was a formerly a very senior government official 
within the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and had many 
relations both in MoHA and in other ministries, including 
MoPW. He was also a former lecturer in a prestigious univer-
sity from which many MoPW staff had graduated. Through 
intensive informal approaches (for example, breakfast and 
dinner meetings, coffee meetings, and informal gatherings) 
he led the advocacy activities and was successful in getting the 
attention and commitment of MoPW, at least up to director 
general level, and other government agencies and ministries. 
In some instances there were clashes between two director 
generals, but through a series of additional informal mee-
tings these were overcome. The year-long process was slow 
but eventually led to the establishment of the Tim Teknik 
Pembangunan Sanitasi (Technical Team for Sanitation De-
velopment, or TTPS) in November 2007 through a ministry 
decree from Bappenas. Through the TTPS, interministerial 
relationships among MoPW, MoH, Bappenas, MoHA, and 
MoF became more formalized.
In addition to the shifting priorities at national level, there 
have also been significant shifts within some local govern-
ments. The six cities involved in the first phase of the ISSDP 
project have started some initiatives without continued 
prompting from external stakeholders, creating a dynamic 
of their own and proving effective at putting pressure on 
the national government from a subnational level. Local 
government investment levels in some of these cities have 
increased from less than 1 percent of budget to between 3 
and 6 percent, a significant increase given the low starting 
point and other priorities.
B.4 Senegal
Overview
In the 1990s, the Government of Senegal undertook major 
reforms of its urban water supply and sanitation sector. The 
government’s strong commitment to reforms has resulted in 
Senegal’s water sector being regarded as a model of public-
private partnership in sub-Saharan Africa. Following these 
reforms, observers have pointed to a significant higher profile 
of sanitation since 2000, with increasing investment levels 
and a larger number of people gaining access to sanitation 
in urban areas. 
Donor investments play a crucial role in sustaining inves-
tments in Senegal’s urban sanitation sector. While govern-
ment data is likely to underestimate considerably the pro-
portion of donor contributions, estimates by independent 
observers point toward 90 percent. Both, World Bank and 
WSP are key external actors supporting Senegal’s urban sa-
nitation sector. The Bank’s engagement in the wide-ranging 
water and sanitation reforms in Senegal began with a decade-
long Water Sector Project—a US$100 million IDA credit 
was provided in 1995—followed by the Project Eau Long 
Terme. The latter includes the Sanitation Program for Peri-
urban Communities of Dakar (Programme d’Assainissement 
des Quartiers Péri-Urbains de Dakar, PAQPUD), which 
aims to bring onsite sanitation to poor peri-urban areas of 
Dakar. Relying on an output-based approach, PAQPUD has 
supported the construction of 63,000 household sanitation 
facilities by 2004, therefore surpassing its initial target of 
60,000 (by 2006) two years earlier than planned. Building 
on experience and mechanisms developed under the PAQ-
PUD, a new World Bank/WSP-administered project was 
agreed to in 2007: the Global Partnership on Output-based 
Aid (GPOBA), which would help poor households in poor 
areas of Dakar to install onsite sanitation. The outputs in this 
GPOBA-funded sanitation project include not only the hard-
ware of sanitation facilities but, importantly, the “software” 
of support, education, and monitoring from independent 
agents, nongovernmental agencies, and community-based 
organizations. 
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Diagnostic findings
The analysis of the country context for urban sanitation in 
Senegal has resulted in a strong case for the complex relation-
ship between water and sanitation working to the advantage 
of both sectors. While often competing for resources, Dakar 
policy makers were convinced that one sector could not deve-
lop without the other. The wide-ranging institutional reforms 
in the mid-1990s were characterized by well-developed and 
innovative performance contracts for the water sector but the 
exclusion of the underdeveloped sanitation sector from those 
contracts. In hindsight, some observers justified the decision 
to separate water from sanitation on the grounds that it gave 
greater visibility to the traditionally neglected sanitation sec-
tor. However, the real driver for the institutional separation 
was that, in order to make the water sector attractive for 
private investment, it needed to be separated from the far 
less attractive sanitation sector. These reforms provided the 
sanitation sector with the opportunity to develop institutions 
separately, enabling it to benefit from experiences in the water 
sector, such as private sector participation, carefully designed 
contracts, and active community involvement in extending 
and improving services. In a climate of strong support by the 
new political leadership since 2000 (President Wade stated 
repeatedly that “sanitation is a matter of dignity”), PAQPUD 
was started in 2002, and sanitation services for the first time 
were targeted at poor areas of Dakar outside of the reach of 
the existing sewerage network. 
The analysis of the political economy in terms of stakeholder 
interests, influence, and incentives as well as the institutional 
framework (sector arena) suggests that there is no powerful 
opposition to increasing sanitation sector investments or 
conflicts between different levels of government, which of-
ten characterize political economy factors in decentralized 
settings. Several factors contributed to the successful mana-
gement of the political economy, the most important being 
support by the political elite and performance contracts that 
have shaped stakeholders’ incentives and protected inves-
tments from adverse political economy impacts. Recently, 
the sanitation sector has followed the example by the water 
sector, and a performance contract was signed by the National 
Sanitation Office (ONAS) and the Government of Senegal. 
The contract obliges the state to cover the financing gap if 
ONAS achieves certain performance indicators, including 
those for wastewater treatment, investment in the network 
(extension and rehabilitation), new connections and new 
onsite facilities, network maintenance, and financial ma-
nagement. 
The sector process analysis has shown that the World Bank 
played a crucial facilitation role during the WSS reform in the 
1990s. Using the window of opportunity emerging through 
the urgent need to solve the water supply problems in Dakar, 
the World Bank team played a pivotal role in translating a 
general will for reform into a vision for the sector. The team 
also carefully managed initial skepticism about reform and 
private-public partnerships. The process discussion also 
highlights the potential of civil society and community-based 
organizations in successfully creating demand for sanitation 
services in poor communities, for example, by using entry 
points around solid waste collection, wastewater, and draina-
ge—known to be bigger concerns in peri-urban communities 
than sanitation provision. Moreover, launched in 2005, the 
Millennium Drinking Water and Sanitation Program (PE-
PAM) has successfully attracted investments—in particular 
from donors. While observers say that the PEPAM is biased 
in favor of the water sector at the expense of sanitation, 
there is agreement that PEPAM meetings and reviews and 
provide a platform for discussion among a range of actors 
from government, the donor community, civil society, and 
private-sector organizations.
Operational implications
Based on the diagnostic discussion, a number of significant 
operational lessons can be drawn from the Senegal case 
study in order to help to inform future World Bank/WSP 
interventions. 
Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations
The research has found evidence that it is crucial to recognize 
political support and use windows of opportunity to push 
for reform. Both the institutional reform in the water and 
sanitation sector and the later PAQPUD occurred in a clima-
te of political support, initially to solve the problem around 
water supply and later to stress the importance of sanitation 
provision. Moreover, well-linked World Bank staff based 
in Senegal was able to identify champions of change and 
engage with them on a continuous basis. Formal and, more 
importantly, informal meetings built mutual understanding 
and trust and successfully prepared important decisions 
and obtained government support for initially controversial 
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reform aspects, such as the privatization of the state-owned 
water utility (SONEES) prior to 1996. 
Driven by the World Bank, PAQPUD (and subsequently 
the WSP/World Bank–managed GPOBA) for the first time 
brought onsite sanitation and condominial systems to Dakar’s 
urban poor, which had until then been excluded for the most 
part from the network-based service provision in the capital’s 
center. Inspired by the success of the pilot, many engineers 
have acknowledged the merit of alternative means of sani-
tation provision and became advocates of onsite sanitation. 
This shows that successful interventions can have a powerful 
demonstration effect; this may be particular important in an 
environment where the default for urban sanitation provision 
remains the sewerage.
Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis
Donors and lenders have a comparative advantage in provi-
ding rigorous analysis to inform reform and sector choices. 
While in Senegal no explicit political economy assessment 
was undertaken, donors have successfully contributed to 
evidence and, subsequently, an informed sector debate. 
Studies—using national and international expertise—have 
offered policy choices to government stakeholders and con-
tributed to the evidence base used during workshops to 
undertake institutional sector reform. See, for example, the 
tariff study by ONAS/Banque Européenne d’Investissement 
(2008).
Realigning accountability
As outlined above, the carefully designed and contextually 
specific contracts in the water and the sanitation sector pro-
vide the right incentives and strengthen accountability by 
unbundling the functions supporting investment decisions 
and policy implementation. At the same time, performance 
contracts, if designed well, have been shown to protect the 
sector from adverse political influence and vested interests. 
In order to strengthen accountability initiatives from the pri-
vate sector and from civil society more broadly (the demand 
side of accountability), PAQPUD and GPOBA have combi-
ned technological choices around the hardware of sanitation 
facilities with targeted information campaigns. While CSOs 
and the private sector are successful in creating demand 
for sanitation investments, there are still few examples of 
citizens actively demanding better service provision. And if 
demands are made, they generally focus on waste collection 
or rainwater drainage rather than sanitation in the narrow 
sense of the definition.
Partnership strategy
Evidence from the Senegal case study has shown that donors 
can successfully facilitate reform if they have invested in 
long-term and continuous engagement in order to build trust 
among key stakeholders. Well-connected national donor staff 
can play a crucial role in understanding the Government’s 
position and carefully negotiating with the main stakehol-
ders—both supporters and opponents of reform.
While partnerships are built not solely through formal 
meetings, carefully organized and facilitated workshops have 
provided a vehicle for presenting evidence on policy choices 
and managing potential resistance to reform in order to 
generate continuous engagement.
Public debate and communication
PAQPUD and GPOBA have rightly acknowledged that 
investment in communication is key to generating effective 
demand (and advocacy) for sanitation within low-income 
communities. Discussions around wastewater and water 
supply—usually more popular than sanitation—have been 
shown to arouse household interest and can provide the 
platform for discussions around improving sanitation pro-
vision with local communities and consumers. Champions 
of change and self-declared advocates often emerge from 
within the communities and could further be targeted more 
formally through donor-supported projects.
conclusions
In Senegal, the World Bank played a crucial facilitation 
role during the WSS reform in the 1990s. Using the op-
portunity emerging through the urgent need to solve water 
supply problems in Dakar, the World Bank team helped 
to translate a general will for reform into a vision for the 
sector while successfully managing initial skepticism about 
private-public partnerships and opposition from the state-
owned water utility, SONEES. This role was most visible 
through the organization of a range of workshops that helped 
to facilitate and provide clarification on various issues in 
order to find agreement on the nature of contracts. While 
the workshop was acknowledged by all stakeholders as the 
formal vehicle for the process, many discussions were held 
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in between sessions and behind closed doors to discuss and 
reach agreements. In addition to the World Bank team in 
Washington, D.C., a national resident advisor, who was a 
former a member of the Ministry of Water and Sanitation 
and had access to government stakeholders, drove these more 
informal consultations. 
Using its role as credible partner, the World Bank in colla-
boration with the WSP successfully built on the existing 
institutions and increased their focus on sanitation sector 
initiatives. Through its support of PAQPUD, the World 
Bank/WSP partnership for the first time brought onsite 
sanitation and condominial systems to Dakar’s urban poor, 
which until then had been excluded for the most part from 
the network-based service provision in the capital’s center. 
Inspired by the success of the pilot, many engineers have 
acknowledged the merit of “alternative” means of sanitation 
provision. While nobody doubts the demonstration effect, 
sustainability is still at risk once the program’s successor 
comes to an end.
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Global economic and Sector Work (eSW) on the poli-
tical economy of sanitation in four countries
1. Background and rationale
Currently, 2.6 billion people worldwide live without access to 
basic, “improved” sanitation.20 A more systematic assessment 
is needed to identify and address these political constraints 
to improved sanitation for the poor.
For this purpose, the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP, 
administered by the World Bank, in collaboration with 
various governments and other public and private partners) 
and the World Bank are conducting a Global Economic 
and Sector Work (ESW) Study on the Political Economy 
of Sanitation in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal. The 
purpose of the study is to help WSP and the World Bank—
through a better understanding of the political economy of 
sanitation—in their efforts to support partner countries and 
development practitioners in the design, implementation, 
and effectiveness of operations that aim to provide pro-poor 
sanitation investments and services to improve health and 
hygiene outcomes.
Definition of terms: What do we mean by political 
economy of sanitation?
The term political economy is subject to multiple unders-
tandings and definitions. In its original use in academic 
literature, it referred simply to the application of economic 
principles to the practice of public policy of nation-states.21 
tested over the past six years, offers concepts, methods, and 
tools to analyze both the “winners and losers” in the provision 
of sanitation services: Is there equity in the distribution of 
the impacts of development interventions, and what are the 
powerful interests that may support or oppose those interven-
tions or capture related benefits. These are political economy 
issues. Hence, this work is able to draw on the PSIA approach 
with its Conceptual Framework for the Political Economy 
of Reform, developed by SDV (see details in box C.1).22 
This lack has been identified as a component of poverty that 
contributes to 2 million child deaths a year, reduced school 
attendance, and a fundamental deprivation of human dignity. 
According to the study Sanitation and Hygiene at the World 
Bank (Kolsky, Perez, Vandersypen, and Jensen 2005), global 
investment will have to increase to at least US$2 billion to 
meet the MDG target. However, there is ongoing concern 
that governments, at many levels, are not devoting enough 
attention and resources to sanitation services. While there are 
no general figures showing on- and off-budget expenditures 
in the sector at regional levels, evidence at the country level 
illustrates that investments and expenditures in sanitation 
are very low compared to those for water supply and other 
infrastructure services.
Not only is there a lack of focus on sanitation generally, but 
existing sanitation investments and service provision are not 
always pro-poor. They often do not consider sociocultural 
factors that play a role in sanitation, especially in remote rural 
areas. Also, the role that private sector sanitation supply or 
demand plays in people’s decision making about sanitation is 
often not recognized adequately. Efforts to increase access to 
service can benefit better-off urban residents at the expense 
of urban poor, slum dwellers, or the rural population. On 
the other hand, there is a general consensus and evidence 
on the economic and health benefits of adequate sanitation 
services. Many documents suggest that governments’ limited 
sanitation expenditures are determined largely by political 
20 By sanitation we mean the infrastructure and service provision required for the safe management of human excreta, for example, latrines, sewers, and wastewater treatment. 
Hygiene is the set of human behaviors related to safe management of excreta, for example, washing hands with soap or safe disposal of children’s feces.
21 World Bank, 2006. World Bank’s Increased Focus on Basic Sanitation and Hygiene, Water Supply and Sanitation Feature Story #3. World Bank, 2005. Sanitation and Hygiene 
at the World Bank: An Analysis of current activities, Pete Kolsky, Eddy Perez, Wouter Vandersypen, Lene Odum Jensen. UNDP, 2006. Human Development Report 2006 - 
Overview of the Global Sanitation Problem, David Satterthwaite and Gordon McGranahan.
22 Works by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx were all presented under the rubric of «political economy.» 
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rather than technical or economic constraints; there are 
competing demands for resources.23 We follow the current 
common understanding of political economy, as referring to in-
terdisciplinary studies that draw upon social and political theory 
in addition to economic principles in order to understand how 
political actors, institutions, and economic processes influence 
each other. The political economy of sanitation, therefore, 
refers to the political and economic processes and players 
that determine the extent and nature of sanitation inves-
tment and service provision. Understanding and addressing 
the political economy of sanitation consists of identifying 
and addressing impacts, risks, opportunities, participating 
institutions, various stakeholder interests that support or 
oppose the investment in sanitation services for poor and 
vulnerable groups, and the level of policy debate on sanitation 
investment and service provision.
Focus of work: Poverty and Social impact analysis 
(PSia) to assess equity and powerful interests
This work is a unique, innovative way of looking at sanita-
tion investments and service provision. It combines multiple 
disciplines to understand and manage the political economy 
of sanitation. The Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) 
23 World Bank, 2003. PSIA User’s Guide; World Bank, 2005. TIPS; World Bank/OPM, 2008. The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue 
and Development Operations. Report no. 44288-GLB. Washington, DC: World Bank.
24 See World Bank 2003, A User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis. In 2004, the framework of «Tools for Institutional, Political and Social Analysis» was added to the PSIA 
approach. See World Bank/OPM 2008, The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations. 
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methodology,24 This approach will support evidence-based 
decision-making and policy dialogue on sanitation inves-
tment and service provision.
The PSIA perspective views the social, economic, health, 
institutional, political, cultural, and historical context of sa-
nitation as part of one system. A system consists of elements, 
processes, and positive or negative feedback mechanisms. 
When those are altered, they have direct and indirect, short- 
and long-term effects on the entire system. This ESW work in-
corporates the understanding of sanitation access, collection, and 
treatment as part of a whole system. The work further accounts 
for the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of sanitation 
investment and service provision. Finally, decentralization 
and private sector and community participation are often 
seen to increase the complexity of designing and implementing 
sustainable operations, as multiple stakeholders, institutions, 
and competing interests need to be addressed. To assess and 
address this complexity, this work considers upstream dialogue 
and engagement with local governments, the private sector, 
and civil society as entry points to the design of sustainable 
sanitation operations. (See, for example, experience with the 
total sanitation approach in South Asia).
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Box c.1  poverty anD Social impact analySiS (pSia): one approach to 
help Better unDerStanD anD aDDreSS the political economy of Sa-
nitation
PSIA	is	the	analysis	of	the	distributional	impact	of	policy	reforms	on	the	welfare	of	
different	social	groups,	with	a	particular	focus	on	poor	and	vulnerable	groups.	It	is	
an approach to (i) understanding the impact of policy choices and public actions on 
poverty	and	social	outcomes;	(ii)	analyzing	intended	and	unintended	consequences	
of policy interventions; (iii) considering tradeoffs between social costs and benefits 
of policy change by assessing opportunities, constraints, and social risks; and (iv) 
designing appropriate mitigating measures and risk-management strategies when 
adverse	impacts	are	unavoidable.	It	further	analyzes	the	political	economy	of	reform—
reform support and opposition—and the capture of benefits.
PSIA	recognizes	the	need	to	understand	the	likely	impacts	of	policy	adjustments	
on	poor	and	non-poor	groups.	It	identifies	stakeholder	groups	that	have	significant	
influence to (i) support or oppose policy change toward improved outcomes in 
sanitation	 service	provision	and/or	 (ii)	 capture	benefits	of	 sanitation	 investments	
or	service	provision.	It	also	analyzes	institutions,	impacts,	risks,	and	opportunities.	
Finally,	 PSIA	develops	 concrete	 policy	measures	 to	 enhance	opportunities	 and	
address risks and opposition.
A	PSIA	approach	allows	one	to	combine	sanitation	sector	expertise	with	economic	
and social analysis, drawing specifically on (i) institutional analysis—defined as the 
“rules of the game” that people develop to govern group behavior and interaction 
in political, economic, and social spheres of life; (ii) political analysis—defined as 
the structure of power relations and the often-entrenched interests of different 
stakeholders that affect decision making and distributional outcomes—and (iii) 
social analysis— defined as social relationships that govern interaction at different 
organizational levels, including households, communities, and social groups.
The	PSIA	 approach	also	 allows	one	 to	 combine	 analytical	 evidence	with	policy	
dialogue to build coalitions for change toward increased public debate and policy 
making that lead to pro-poor sanitation investment and service provision. 
Key elements of PSia:
•	 Asking	the	right	questions	(assessing	the	context)
•	 Analyzing	stakeholders	(interests,	influence),	incentives,	institutions	(formal,	infor-
mal), impacts, risks (including political economy ), opportunities, processes, and 
policy debates
•	 Understanding	transmission	channels	(price,	access	to	goods	and	services,	assets,	
employment, transfers and taxes, authority (e.g., decision-making power)
•	 Gathering	data	and	information	to	fill	gaps
•	 Enhancing	positive	and	addressing	negative	impacts
•	 Establishing	monitoring	and	evaluation	systems
•	 Fostering	a	participatory	process,	policy	debate,	partnership,	and	coalitions	for	
change
•	 Integrating	risks	into	interventions	(internalizing	externalities)	and	promoting	fee-
dback for policy adjustment
Adapted from User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (World Bank 2003); Tools for Institutional, Poli-
tical and Social Analysis (TIPS) for Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) (Holland 2007); and The Political 
Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for World Bank (World Bank 2008).
Specifically, the work focuses on the 
analysis and understanding of country 
context, sector arena, and sector pro-
cess, as well as on developing Actions 
and recommendations.25
Country context comprises the his-
torical and sociocultural context; the 
policy, political, legal, and institutional 
frameworks; and the power relations. 
Sector arena comprises institutions 
and organizations, stakeholders and 
their economic and political interests 
and perceptions, incentives, impacts, 
risks, and opportunities. 
Sector process comprises the buil-
ding of coalitions for change through 
dialogue, partnership, participation, 
communication, and leadership; the 
interactions between players in the re-
form arena over time; and the leverage 
of WB/WSP operations. 
Actions include concrete recommen-
dations and tools for development 
practitioners to enhance the design, 
implementation, and effectiveness of 
sanitation operations, portfolios, and 
outcomes.
The unit of analysis is concrete WSP/
WB sanitation operations in Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, and Senegal. The 
approach is to use the PSIA methodology 
to combine multiple disciplines to look 
at sanitation service provision from 
both the supply and demand side for 
the following reasons. First, sanitation 
interventions are often add-ons to 
water supply projects and often focus 
25 See annex 3 for a visual illustration.
The Political Economy of Sanitation    Annex c - Terms of reference
72 Global Practice Team of Sanitation
on sound engineering, technical feasibility, and economic 
viability.26 Third, some demand-driven interventions have 
failed as institutional barriers prevent scaling-up and sus-
tainability.
This work examines the influence of vested interests on sani-
tation investment and service provision, both as opponents 
and supporters for improved, pro-poor sanitation. Powerful 
interests may make investment decisions that sustain rents 
and/or capture respective benefits from sanitation inves-
tment decisions. Influential stakeholders, however, can also 
be proponents for more and better sanitation, as is seen, for 
instance, in the “total sanitation” experience in Bangladesh. 
The work also includes analysis of and recommendations 
for incentives, impacts, risks, opportunities, processes, and 
policy debates.
The ESW work acknowledges (in line with existing sector 
thinking) that it is crucial to tailor efforts to focus attention 
on sanitation provision and investment to the local context.27 
as well as upon those other interests that influence decisions 
about the process. The ESW resonates with the WSP 2006 
Sanitation-Global Practice Team retreat.28 Comparatively 
less focus is placed on the following: the special features 
and delivery aspects of sanitation; the influence of political, 
social, and cultural aspects on the design, implementation, 
or sustainability of sanitation interventions; or the political, 
social, and economic impacts that sanitation operations 
have on different social groups, which can affect their sup-
port of or opposition to decisions on sanitation investment 
and service provision. Second, supply-driven, project-based 
interventions have often been unsustainable, as they stalled 
or even reversed when the project support ended.29 The 
work argues that “a central feature of most efforts must be 
to engage with the people that lack adequate sanitation, and 
to build on, or respond to their concerns and initiatives” 
(UNDP 2006, 30).30 Respective discussions focused on the 
need to make informed decisions on sanitation investment 
and service provision that are based on empirical evidence 
and that take a comprehensive sanitation perspective. Fur-
ther, this work promotes the economic impact argument, 
where the lack of sanitation facilities is both a health and an 
economic concern.
The ESW work promotes multidisciplinary analysis, meth-
ods, and tools. Findings will inform the policy dialogue with 
a wide range of stakeholders, including communities and 
households receiving the sanitation services. Hence, the work 
combines social analysis, economic analysis, and operational 
and KSL experience from the sanitation sector. The primary 
audience of this work will be development practitioners 
engaged in sanitation operations and policy debates. The 
ESW will inform the work of partner countries, Country 
Management Units, and Bank task teams of sanitation 
projects, programs, and nonlending activities. By combining 
applied analysis and operational experiences, the work will 
inform the design, implementation, and assessment of such 
lending and nonlending activities as investment projects, 
technical assistance activities, SWAPs, Development Policy 
Loans / PRSCs, and Economic and Sector Works, including 
Sanitation Road Map papers, Country Assistance Strategies 
(CAS), and Country Economic Memoranda. The work will 
inform WB portfolio management and aims to enhance the 
focus on sanitation during the CAS development process. 
2. Objective of this work
The overall objective of the consultancy is to deliver the 
ESW, which includes design, primary and secondary data 
collection and analysis, and report writing and dissemination 
in the four case study countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
and Senegal. Specifically, the consultant firm is expected to 
conduct the work with a multidisciplinary consultant team 
that integrates both (i) in-depth local country knowledge 
with (ii) expertise in social analysis and political economy 
of sanitation investment and provision in order to address 
key questions, such as the following: 
26 For instance, Water Aid (2003) highlights that sanitation is devalued by most governments and donors; sanitation solutions are generally not known or poorly understood; 
communities are rarely involved in policy, programming and innovation; sanitation impact on health and development is not clearly understood; institutional roles and 
responsibilities remain confused at the country level; coordination within the sector and between sectors related to sanitation (water supply, public works, health, agriculture, 
education, etc.) remains weak and undermines sanitation development. 
27 Globally, sanitation projects have moved from supply- to demand-led approaches.
28 OED report on Development Effectiveness (2005: vii) states that effectiveness can be improved by tailoring operations to the circumstances of each country and adapting strategies 
to the local political economy. 
29 UNDP, 2006. Human Development, 30.
30 World Bank, 2006. Sanitation, Wastewater and Hygiene Practice Retreat, 16 November.
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•	 Why	are	sanitation	investments	and	service	provision	
not given adequate priority in lending and nonlending 
work? 
•	 When	such	efforts	are undertaken, why are they not 
strategically targeted toward increasing access to sa-
nitation for the poor? 
Specifically, it is expected that the consultant firm will meet 
the following five objectives: 
1. Apply and refine the Conceptual Framework on the 
Political Economy of Reform, developed by the World 
Bank, based on the approach of PSIA, to the sanitation 
sector.
2. Analyze the political economy of sanitation of the 
selected WSP and WB projects in Senegal, India 
(Maharashtra), Brazil, and Indonesia by working with 
respective project leaders to
a. Identify—through a social analysis perspective—
which stakeholders (including vested interests), 
incentives, institutions, impacts, risks, opportu-
nities, processes, and policy debates support or 
oppose sanitation investments and improved ser-
vice provision and why. The study should examine 
what drives these factors and what could be done 
to increase support for pro-poor sanitation inves-
tments and service provision. The study should be 
sensitive to the ways in which benefits of sanitation 
investments are, or could be, captured by various 
stakeholders.
b. analyze the historical context of the policy, legal, 
and institutional frameworks for and the sociocul-
tural aspects of sanitation, in terms of constraints 
and opportunities for pro-poor sanitation inves-
tment and service provision. 
3. Generate lessons from actual operational experiences 
and produce recommendations on how best to enhan-
ce support for evidence-based decisions in sanitation 
investment. These lessons and recommendations will 
address as appropriate how to overcome (i) opposition 
and resistance to sanitation improvement programs 
and/or, (ii) the capture of benefits by powerful groups, 
which may be detrimental to the provision of sanita-
tion services to the poor.
4. Contribute to raising awareness for sanitation and its 
policy debate through this work’s analysis and disse-
mination.
5. Prepare the final documents (including the Synthesis 
Report) as enhancements to the global policy debate 
and the design and implementation of sanitation 
operations through an operationally tested approach 
to the analysis of the political economy of sanitation. 
Such analysis and understanding will help to promote 
a stronger pro-poor focus and ultimately improve 
health and hygiene outcomes on the ground.
3. Scope of work 
It is expected that this ESW will be carried out by a consultant 
firm having experts with both in-depth country knowledge of 
the four case studies and sanitation and sociopolitical skills. 
Responsible for team management and supervision of ESW 
implementation, the firm’s project leader will supervise and 
guide its case study teams throughout the case study prepa-
rations, implementation, and reporting in order to deliver 
the Synthesis Report. The firm is expected to conduct the 
work in close collaboration with WSP and World Bank staff 
throughout the four phases of (1) desk review, (2) prepara-
tion, (3) applied research, and (4) Synthesis Report writing. 
Separately, the World Bank will hire an econometrician, 
and the consultant firm is expected to cooperate with this 
consultant.31
The work, excluding the economist’s work, will begin with 
an initial kick-off meeting with the firm’s project leader firm 
and the World Bank project leaders. This will help to develop 
a common understanding of the project objectives, goals, 
process, outputs, and final deliverables. The meeting will also 
help to agree upon a clear way forward on the implementation 
of this work. Output: meeting minutes
Phase 1: Desk review, inception report 
The consultant firm will conduct an overall desk review on (i) 
the key political economy literature in the sanitation sector 
in general; (ii) the main issues of the political economy of 
31 The hiring of an econometrician is contingent on extra funding. After the desk review, the firm’s economist and the econometrician, hired separately by the World Bank, shall 
cooperate on a set of hypothesis to test. The econometrician will define an experiment, prepare a survey, collect the data, and prepare some estimation. However, the scope of the 
work of the econometrician should be an add-on to the project and does not replace the task developed by the firm’s economist.
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sanitation in Senegal, Brazil, India, and Indonesia, based on 
the collected country material; and (iii) overarching political 
economy issues regarding the WSP and WB projects in those 
four case study countries. This review includes economic, 
social, political, and sanitation data and perspectives. This 
secondary data analysis report will (a) document positive and 
negative experiences with the political economy of sanitation 
in the literature and operations, (b) highlight challenges and 
opportunities for a better understanding and management 
of the political economy of sanitation, and (c) draw on and 
tailor the Conceptual Framework to the political economy 
of sanitation. This desk report serves as background paper 
for the firm’s case study teams. 
The firm’s project leader will deliver an inception report that 
illustrates a refined study implementation plan. 
Outputs: desk literature report, inception report.
Phase 2: Preparation of applied research: design 
of hypotheses, survey instruments, research 
stratification, logistics
The consultant firm will draw on the Conceptual Framework 
(based on the PSIA approach and tools) and the desk review 
to refine the overall study design that will guide its multi-
disciplinary teams in the applied research phase. This work 
involves the following:  
1. Identification of case study specific hypotheses: The firm’s 
project leader will develop case-study specific hypothe-
ses, based on the desk review and the in-depth local 
expertise of its sociopolitical, sanitation, and economic 
experts, regarding the political economy of the case 
study countries in general and of the sanitation sector 
and the WSP/WB operations in particular.
2. Development of the overall survey instrument and subse-
quent tailoring to the case study context: First, the firm’s 
project leader will draw on the Conceptual Framework 
and the sample research design questions (see TOR 
annex 3) to develop the overall survey instrument, 
in close collaboration with the WB/WSP team. This 
overall instrument will ensure comparability across 
all case studies for the later cross-country analysis and 
the development of transferable lessons for operatio-
nal design, which the synthesis report will present. 
Specifically, the standard survey instrument includes 
the qualitative analysis of stakeholders, institutions, 
impacts, risks, opportunities, processes, and policy 
debate via (i) key-informant interviews and (ii) focus 
group discussions. A suggested methodology for the 
research design can be found in TOR annex 3.
 Second, the consultant firm will tailor the standard 
survey instrument to the case studies’ context by 
adding case-study-specific sociopolitical and sanitation 
information and stratification, tapping into the coun-
try context knowledge of its technical experts. This 
will capture the country-specific political economy 
characteristics (stakeholders, institutions, impacts, 
risks, opportunities, processes, and policy debates) 
that will be assessed and addressed via 
a. key-informant interviews with central and local 
government, parliament, private sector, civil society 
organizations, media, associations, donors and 
lenders; and 
b. focus group discussions with households and bu-
sinesses.
3 Applied research stratification and fieldwork logistics: 
With support from its case study teams, the firm’s 
project leader will prepare the fieldwork logistics in 
the four countries and determine the exact stratifica-
tion for in-country data collection, tapping into the 
country context knowledge of the case study teams, 
each of which will include at least one sanitation 
expert and one sociopolitical expert. The consultant 
firm will select case-study-specific field sites in urban, 
peri-urban, and rural areas, as relevant, and prepare 
the case study fieldwork logistics to assess a sample of 
the WSP/WB project sites and a few nonproject sites 
for comparison and ensure that these
a. adequately reflect (i) the different types of sanita-
tion investment and service provision and (ii) the 
full socioeconomic spectrum of different social 
groups, including poverty and exclusion of certain 
groups, ethnicity, religion, gender, geopolitical 
issues; and
b. are adequately stratified to capture the perceptions 
of the different stakeholders and incentives, the 
institutions and organizations, a wider range of 
distributional impacts and equity considerations, 
a variety of risks and opportunities, processes, and 
the policy debate.
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Outputs: Case-study-specific hypotheses; overall survey ins-
trument; case-study-tailored survey instruments; detailed 
stratification of data collection and field sites (reflecting the 
spectrum of different socioeconomic groups and types of 
sanitation investments and service provision); overall and 
case study specific logistics.
Phase 3: applied research (hypotheses testing) in four 
case study reports
The consultant firm will conduct the applied research through 
its multidisciplinary case study teams, which comprise at least 
one sanitation and one sociopolitical expert per case study in 
Senegal, Brazil, India, and Indonesia, and deliver four case 
study reports. Specifically, the consultant firm will draw on 
the Conceptual Framework to carry out the field research, 
ensuring that its multidisciplinary teams 
•	 apply	the	case	study	survey	instrument	to	collect	the	
qualitative data, using social analysis techniques for key-
informant interviews and focus group discussions; 
•	 analyze	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	data;	and	
•	 deliver	the	four	case	study	reports	that	reflect	distinct	
social, political economy and sanitation perspectives.
The consultant firm is expected to conduct this fieldwork 
in two types of study cases: (i) WB and/or WSP sanitation 
projects that have positive experiences with understanding and 
managing the political economy of sanitation, and (b) WB 
and/or WSP sanitation projects that request assistance for a 
better understanding and managing the political economy of 
sanitation in order to move the operation forward.
1. For projects with positive experience (Brazil, Senegal, 
India), the case study teams will assess the political 
economy of sanitation to learn how the projects 
a. had identified the support and opposition to sa-
nitation investment and service provision, capture 
of benefits, and 
b. have managed to overcome opposition and/or 
capture of benefits in their project design and 
implementation (as relevant). 
 The case study teams will collect and analyze data and 
produce three detailed case study reports. It is expected 
that these reports will  
c. illustrate the analysis of stakeholders, institutions, 
impacts, risks ,and opportunities, as well as the 
processes and policy dialogue, which the WSP/
WB projects have used to (i) better understand and 
manage the political economy of sanitation and (ii) 
have a more equitable and sustainable operational 
design and implementation; and
d. provide respective lessons and recommendations 
for development practitioners. 
 Outputs: applied research and three detailed case study 
reports with project lessons and recommendations for 
development practitioners; and in-country dissemina-
tion measures.
2. For projects requesting assistance (Indonesia), the 
case study team will assess the political economy of 
sanitation 
a. to learn which factors constrain the project design 
or implementation (as relevant) and 
b. develop operational recommendations for both, 
the project and the policy level to overcome current 
operational constraints and improve effective-
ness. 
 The study team will collect and analyze data and pro-
duce a detailed case study report. It is expected that 
this report will
c. illustrate which stakeholders, incentives, institutio-
nal barriers, risks, and processes exist that hamper 
project design/ implementation (as relevant) and 
which powerful interests may sit on rents or cap-
ture benefits, and
d. provide recommendations on concrete measures 
that need to be put in place to overcome opposition 
and/or capture of benefits, as well as improve the 
policy dialogue to enhance project performance 
and effectiveness. 
Outputs: applied research and a detailed case study report 
with recommendations for (i) project improvement in 
design or mid-course corrections for project implementa-
tion (as relevant), (ii) enhanced policy dialogue, and (iii) 
recommendations for development practitioners; in-country 
dissemination measures.
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Phase 4: Synthesis report, dissemination
The firm’s project leader is responsible for producing, delive-
ring and disseminating the Synthesis Report. The report will 
be based on the applied and refined Conceptual Framework, 
the case study reports, inputs from the firm’s technical experts, 
and the cooperation with the separately hired econometrician 
consultant. The project leader will deliver a draft report for 
review by the World Bank, and incorporate all comments 
and feedback into the final report. Specifically, it is expected 
that the Synthesis Report will
•	 consolidate	the	four	case	study	experiences	and	reports	
through a cross-country case study analysis, 
•	 generate	common	lessons	from	the	operational	case	
experiences on how to better understand and manage 
the political economy of sanitation by refining the 
Conceptual Framework to the political economy of 
sanitation, and
•	 translate	the	generated	body	of	analytical	and	operatio-
nal knowledge into concrete operational recommen-
dations and guidance that development practitioners 
can apply to their sanitation work (including inputs to 
PADs, CASs, etc). The purpose is to help them enhan-
ce the policy dialogue and the design, implementation 
and performance of sanitation operations that (i) 
emerge from evidence-based decisions for sanitation 
investment and service provision, (b) have a stronger 
pro-poor focus, and (c) contribute to improved health 
and hygiene outcomes on the ground. This will directly 
inform operational design.
The project leader will submit an annotated outline of the 
Synthesis Report for comments and agreement to the World 
Bank. He/she will then write the draft Synthesis Report, 
and after incorporating all World Bank comments, finalize 
the Synthesis Report and submit it to the World Bank for 
approval. Upon finalization, the Synthesis Report will be 
distributed among the respective stakeholders and results 
disseminated in case study countries. The firm’s project leader 
will work closely with WB/WSP staff throughout the drafting 
of the report, and dissemination. 
Outputs: draft reports, and final Synthesis Report; in-country 
dissemination
4. expected level of effort
The expected level of effort is a total of 31 staff weeks. 
5. Time frame for implementation
It is expected that the contract will be signed by June 2008 
and implemented through April 2009.
6. Outputs and delivery schedule
milestones Description
10% of total allocation
10%
15%
 
 
35%
 
10%
20%
Upon signature of contract
Inception	reports	and	desk	review
Design	of	hypotheses,	survey	
instruments, applied research 
material, and logistics
Applied	research	implementation	
and case study reports
Draft	Synthesis	Report
Final Synthesis Report
outputs Delivery schedule (# of 
weeks after signing of 
contract
1 week
3	weeks
 
7 weeks 
10 weeks
 
 
12 weeks
 
 
 
28 weeks
 
 
32	weeks
37	weeks
Minutes	of	kick-off	meeting
Inception	report	and	desk	
literature report
Case study specific 
hypotheses
Overall survey instrument and 
case-study-tailored survey 
instruments
Detailed	stratification	of	data	
collection and field sites; 
overall and case-study-specific 
logistics
Four detailed case study 
reports as a result of applied 
research
Draft	Synthesis	Report
Final Synthesis Report, 
in-country dissemination
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7. Payment terms
The consulting firm will be hired on a lump sum basis. Pay-
ments will be made in six installments as follows.
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8. Qualification and experience requirements
The consultancy requires the following qualifications and 
experiences. Further details can be found in TOR annex 2.
Essential Skills and experience
•	 Masters	degree	or	better	in	social	sciences	(sociology,	
political science, economics) and sanitary, environ-
mental or civil engineering, public administration, 
etc.
•	 A	track	record	(minimum	eight	years)	of	applied	re-
search and operational experience with the political, 
social, economical, and institutional aspects of sani-
tation in developing countries, particularly Senegal, 
India, Brazil, and/or Indonesia. Previous experience 
in at least two of these countries is essential.
•	 Proven	 track	 record	 on	political	 economy	work	 in	
developing countries from a sociopolitical as well as 
operational perspective.
•	 Experience	with	 understanding	 and	managing	 the	
political economy of sanitation investment and 
service provision at the policy and operational level, 
combining political, social, economic, and sanitation 
perspectives. 
•	 Demonstrated	 track	 record	 in	 collecting	 primary	
sociopolitical, institutional, economic, and sanitation 
data through fieldwork, as well as in processing and 
analyzing multidisciplinary primary and secondary so-
ciopolitical information and data using cross-country 
comparative case study methods.
•	 Proven	track	record	in	translating	analytical	findings	
into recommendations for operations and policies.
•	 Excellent	 report	 skills,	 as	well	 as	 excellent	English	
language skills (both speaking and writing).
•	 Track	 record of project and team management 
skills.
•	 Ability	to	contract	and	manage	consultants	with	so-
ciopolitical and sanitation expertise in Senegal, India, 
Brazil, and Indonesia.
•	 Ability	to	work	in	English,	French,	Portuguese,	and	
Indonesian, or the ability to contract and manage 
consultants who can.
Desirable Skills and experience
•	 Experience	in	working	in	Senegal,	India,	Brazil,	and	
Indonesia
•	 Capacity	 to	 work	 in	 several	 countries	 simulta-
neously.
•	 Previous	 experience	with	 the	Water	 and	Sanitation	
Program.
•	 Previous	experience	with	World	Bank	operations.
9. Working linkages with the World Bank
The team will report to Eduardo Perez eperez1@worldbank.
org, Sabine Beddies sbeddies@worldbank.org, Peter Kolsky 
pkolsky@worldbank.org, and Daniel Benitez dbenitez@worl-
dbank.org, who oversee and supervise the consultancy. The 
firm’s project leader will report regularly on progress of the 
work by submitting drafts of the survey instruments, applied 
research material and case study progress, and reports to the 
World Bank for review. For the case study progress reports, 
the firm’s project leader will mention any problems identi-
fied and solutions developed to address them. The team will 
submit all outputs to the World Bank for review, comments, 
and approval in English in electronic version available in MS 
Word format and as PDF files.
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Tailor	overall,	standard	survey	instrument	and	material	to	
country cases
Provide country and technical expertise to help develop 
the detailed stratification of data collection and field sites
Provide country expertise to help develop the case study 
specific fieldwork logistics
Develop	
overall survey 
instrument 
Tailor	
instrument to 
case study 
context
Detailed	
stratification of 
data collection 
and field sites
Overall and 
case-study-
specific 
logistics
-	 Design	of	overall	
study framework and 
material
-	 Tailor	overall	survey	
instrument and 
material to country 
cases
-	 Detailed	stratification	
of data collection 
and field sites
- Preparation of overall 
and case-study-
specific fieldwork 
logistics
Standard  survey 
instrument 
5.26 
Case-study-tailored 
survey instruments
Detailed	stratification	
of data collection and 
field sites (different 
socioeconomic 
groups & sanitation 
investments/services)
5.27
 
Overall fieldwork 
logistics,
case study specific 
logistics
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
AnnEx 1: ovErviEw of AcTiviTiES, rolES, And ouTPuTS
Involvement of/in firm’s project 
leader
Kick-off Phase
PhaSe 1: DeSK reVieW anD incePTiOn rePOrT
PhaSe 2: PeParaTiOn OF aPPlieD reSearch: 
DeSiGn OF hYPOTheSeS, SUrVeY inSTrUMenTS, reSearch STraTiFicaTiOn, anD lOGiSTicS
firm’ Sanitation 
Specialist(s)
firm’s Sociopolitical 
Specialist(s)
firm’s economist Outputs
Team	Meeting Discuss	and	agree	upon	consultancy	objectives,	focus	and	scope	of	
work, interim outputs, and deliverable
Meeting	Minutes
Team	role	 Team	management	and	
supervision of study 
implementation
5.23
Deliver	ideas	for	potential	hypotheses
Compile and deliver 
desk review report
Desk	Literature	Report
5.25
Inception	Report
Team	membership	to	deliver	the	country	case	studies
Design	case-
study-specific 
hypotheses
-	 Based	on	desk	
review, generate 
testable hypothesis
-	 Decide	on	the	
methods used for 
testing hypotheses
Case-study-specific 
hypotheses
Compile country-specific background information
Continued
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PhaSe 3: aPPlieD FielD reSearch (hYPOTheSiS TeSTinG) in FOUr cOUnTrieS anD rePOrTS
PhaSe 4: SYnTheSiS rePOrT anD DiSSeMinaTiOn
Carry out fieldwork (applying survey 
instruments) to 
-	 collect	the	qualitative	data,	using	
social	analysis	techniques	for	
key-informant interviews and focus 
group discussions,
- analyze data,
- deliver the four case study 
reports that reflect distinct social, 
political economy, and sanitation 
perspectives
Deliver	inputs	to	project	leader	upon	
request
Organize and hold dissemination in-
country
no fieldworkApplied	research	
of	WB/	WSP	
sanitation 
projects (a) 
with positive 
experiences 
of and (b) 
requesting	
assistance for 
understanding 
and managing 
the political 
economy of 
sanitation in 
Senegal,	Brazil,	
India,	and	
Indonesia
Draft	Report,
Final Synthesis 
Report
In-country	
dissemination
Manage	its	
multidisciplinary 
teams to implement 
the applied research 
and deliver four case 
study reports
- Produce and deliver 
draft	report	to	World	
Bank	team	for	review	
and comments
- Revise and finalize 
report
- dissemination 
supervision among 
relevant stakeholders 
in-country
Data	collection	and	
analysis
Four detailed case 
study reports
Draft	Synthesis	Report
Final Synthesis report
In-country	
dissemination
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Involvement of/in firm’s project 
leader
firm’ Sanitation 
Specialist(s)
firm’s Sociopolitical 
Specialist(s)
firm’s economist Outputs
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AnnEx 2: rEquirEd TEAm SkillS And ExPErTiSE
firm’s project 
leader
required Qualifications (education and experience)
required expertise
firm’ Sanitations
Specialist(s)
firm’s Sociopolitical 
Specialist(s)
firm’s economist
Job
purpose
Requires 
interaction 
with
(Post)Graduate	degree	
in social sciences, 
preferably sociology, 
political science with 
a minimum of eight 
years operational 
experience, preferably 
in sociopolitical work 
(research, projects), 
international institutions, 
applied research
- Responsibility for 
managing the project, 
including supervision of 
process and guidance 
to multidisciplinary 
teams
- Responsibility for 
delivering final report 
and disseminating it
-	 Reports	back	to	World	
Bank	team
-	 Manages	project	
budget
World	Bank	staff	and	
country officials
Masters’	degree	in	civil	
engineering, preferably 
sanitary or environmental 
specialty, with a minimum 
of eight years operational 
experience with a focus on 
tailoring sanitation services 
to the needs of the poor, 
and with familiarity with 
the associated institutional 
issues
- Contributes (i) in-depth 
country knowledge and (ii) 
strong technical expertise 
to the multidisciplinary 
team throughout study 
design, implementation, 
analysis, and report writing
- Carries out responsibilities 
of fieldwork, analysis, 
and report writing 
independently but as part 
of a team, and delivers 
inputs and outputs to 
the work of the project 
leader (including Synthesis 
Report)
Counterparts	in	WSP/
WB	sanitation	projects,	
government, private sector, 
civil	society,	and	WB	team
(Post)Graduate	
degree in sociology or 
political science, with 
a minimum of eight 
years of operational 
experience, preferably in 
sociopolitical, institutional 
work, applied research
- Contributes (i) in-depth 
country knowledge, 
(ii) political economy 
expertise, and (iii) 
strong technical 
expertise to the 
multidisciplinary 
team throughout 
study design, 
implementation, 
analysis, and report 
writing
- Carries out 
responsibilities of 
fieldwork, analysis, 
and report writing 
independently but as 
part of a team, and 
delivers inputs and 
outputs to the work 
of the project leader 
(including Synthesis 
Report)
Counterparts	in	WSP/
WB	sanitation	projects,	
government, private 
sector, civil society; and 
WB	team
(Post)Graduate	
degree in 
economics, with a 
minimum of eight 
years of operational 
experience, 
preferably in 
socioeconomic, 
political, and 
institutional work, 
applied research
- Contributes (i) 
in-depth country 
knowledge, (ii) 
political economy 
expertise and (iii) 
strong technical 
expertise to the 
multidisciplinary 
team throughout 
study design, 
implementation, 
analysis, and 
report writing
-	 Analyzes	fieldwork	
data collected 
by sanitation and 
sociopolitical 
experts and 
delivers inputs 
and outputs to the 
work of the project 
leader (including 
Synthesis Report)
Counterparts 
in	WSP/WB	
sanitation projects, 
government, private 
sector, civil society, 
and	WB	team
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AnnEx 2: rEquirEd TEAm SkillS And ExPErTiSE
firm’s project 
leader
firm’ Sanitations
Specialist(s)
firm’s Sociopolitical 
Specialist(s)
firm’s economist
Essential
specialized 
skills, know-
ledge, and 
compe- 
tencies
General
compe-
tencies
- Proven knowledge 
of political economy 
issues of sanitation in 
developing countries
-	 Track	record	of	project	
and team management 
skills
-	 Excellent	skills	in	
sociopolitical analysis 
and cross-country 
comparative case 
study analysis
- Proven track record 
in translating 
analytical findings into 
recommendations for 
operations and policies 
-	 Excellent	English	report	
preparation skills
-	 Ability	to	contract	and	
manage consultants 
with sociopolitical and 
sanitation expertise in 
Senegal,	India,	Brazil,	
and	Indonesia
-	 Ability	to	work	in	
English,	French,	
Portuguese, and 
Indonesian	or	ability	to	
contract and manage 
consultants who can
-	 Ability	to	manage	
multicultural teams and 
projects
-	 Effective	verbal	and	
written communication 
skills
- Understanding of the 
political economy of 
sanitation investment 
and service provision at 
operational level (preferably 
also at policy level)
-	 Demonstrated	track	record	
in collecting, processing, 
and analyzing primary and 
secondary sanitation and 
economic data through 
fieldwork
-	 In-depth	knowledge	of	local	
conditions in sanitation 
and hygiene sector, with 
operational experience in 
case study country(ies)
- Proven ability to integrate 
technical sanitation skills 
into multidisciplinary 
team work, and cross-
country comparative case 
study analysis, including 
translating analytical findings 
into recommendations for 
operations and policies 
-	 Excellent	English	report	
preparation skills
-	 Knowledge	of	official	
country language is highly 
desirable
- Strong verbal and written 
English	communication	skills	
and strong verbal skills in 
the languages in which the 
consultant will be working 
-	 Works	effectively	in	
multidisciplinary and 
multicultural team(s)
- Proven expertise 
in assessing and 
addressing political 
economy issues at 
both the policy and 
operational levels. 
Experience	with	
sanitation sector is a 
plus 
-	 Demonstrated	track	
record in collecting, 
processing, and 
analyzing primary 
and secondary 
sociopolitical, 
institutional, and 
economic data through 
fieldwork
-	 In-depth	knowledge	
of local political, 
institutional, social, 
cultural, and 
historical context with 
operational experience 
in case study 
country(ies) 
- Proven ability to 
integrate technical 
skills sociopolitical 
skills into 
multidisciplinary team 
work and cross-
country comparative 
case study analysis, 
including translating 
analytical findings into 
recommendations for 
operations and policies 
-	 Excellent	English	report	
preparation skills
-	 Knowledge	of	official	
country language is 
highly desirable
-	 Effective	verbal	and	
written communication 
skills
-	 Works	effectively	in	
multidisciplinary and 
multicultural team(s)
- Proven expertise 
in assessing and 
addressing political 
economy issues at 
both the policy and 
operational levels. 
Experience	with	
sanitation sector is 
a plus 
-	 Demonstrated	track	
record in collecting, 
processing, and 
analyzing primary 
and secondary 
social, political, 
institutional, and 
economic data 
through fieldwork
-	 In-depth	knowledge	
of local political and 
economic context 
with operational 
experience in case 
study country(ies) 
- Proven ability 
to integrate 
economic skills into 
multidisciplinary 
team work, and 
cross-country 
comparative 
case study 
analysis, including 
translating analytical 
findings into 
recommendations 
for operations and 
policies 
-	 Excellent	English	
report preparation 
skills
-	 Knowledge	of	
official country 
language is highly 
desirable
-	 Effective	verbal	
and written 
communication 
skills
-	 Works	effectively	
in multidisciplinary, 
and multicultural 
team(s)
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32 World Bank (2003, 2005, 2007).
33 Some experience shows that the Ministry of Finance rather than line ministries make sanitation decisions.
AnnEx 3: rESEArch dESign
As highlighted in section of annex C (“Background and 
rationale”), this ESW is a unique, innovative way of looking 
at sanitation investments and service provision. It combines 
multiple disciplines to understand and manage the political 
economy of sanitation. As the PSIA methodology  (Kolsky, 
Perez, Vandersypen, and Jensen 2005; World Bank 2003, 
2007),32 tested over the past six years, offers concepts, 
methods, and tools to assess both, the equity and politi-
cal economy of reforms, this work is able to draw on that 
experienced approach to apply and refine the Conceptual 
Framework for the Political Economy of Reform to the 
sanitation context in order to assess and address “winners 
and losers,” supporters and opponents, and the capture of 
the benefits of sanitation operations (investment and service 
provision). Below are some suggested sample questions that 
the firm’s project leader may use as research design to develop 
the standard and case-study-specific survey instruments.
1. Country context (historical, policy, political, legal, 
institutional, sociocultural), and power relations: 
What is the cultural and historical background to 
sanitation? What is considered “adequate sanitation” 
in each country? What are the sociocultural drivers for 
or constraints to improved sanitation? Which policy 
level and which entity makes decisions on sanitation 
investment and service improvement? 
a. Why do some countries not invest in sanitation at 
local, regional, and national levels? What are the 
reasons argued in each country? How is sanitation 
covered in national policy (for example, WSS, ur-
ban/rural development, health policy, etc)? What 
political economy factors can be determined to 
influence the level of sanitation investment. For 
example, do projects yielding instantaneous payoffs 
dominate the sanitation agenda? Are national deci-
sions on sanitation investment affected by electoral 
cycles? What are the politics of the policy making 
process? 
b. How do countries that do invest, make decisions on 
where, when, and what to invest in? Why do some 
countries invest so much money in treatment wor-
ks when so few people in the area have basic access 
or a connection to the sewer?  Why do IFIs subsidi-
ze sewerage at 100 percent, but onsite sanitation is 
assumed to be at the cost of the household? What 
really determines which urban and/or rural areas 
get selected for sanitation improvements? How is 
investment in sanitation perceived by households, 
central government, local government, private 
sector, civil society, and international donors and 
lenders? What are the processes that determine the 
answers to these questions? Who decides what, and 
how can we inform/influence the process most 
effectively?33
2. Institutions: What are the institutional structural and 
systemic constraints to (i) increasing allocations to sani-
tation in the national budget (of the case study country); 
(ii) planning sanitation infrastructure; or (iii) construc-
ting and maintaining sanitation infrastructure?
3. Stakeholders: Which stakeholders have power over 
(i) decision-making about access, collection, treatment 
(including type of sanitation service provision—wet, 
dry), investment (central government, local govern-
ment, private sector, civil society, international donors 
and lenders); (ii) regulation; (iii) implementation, 
investment, and maintenance? What common gover-
nance problems to planning and implementation does 
sanitation share with other infrastructure provisioning, 
for example, water supply? How does decentralization 
affect sanitation?
4. Access: How do households manage and treat their 
sewage (pit latrines, septic network, etc.)? Do house-
holds have choices regarding different sanitation op-
tions? What incentives exist for households to connect 
to sanitation networks (if this option exists)? How 
are these incentives perceived by households, central 
government, local government, private sector, civil 
society, and international donors and lenders? What 
are the real and/or perceived benefits to households, 
local government, central government, private sector, 
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civil society, and international 
donors and lenders? 
5. Price and subsidies: What 
is the willingness to pay for 
sanitation and how affordable 
is it? Who pays to meet costs/
recovery? Subsidies, taxes for 
households, service providers, 
local government, private sector, 
communities 
6. Assets: Who owns/maintains 
what assets (land, wastewater 
treatment plant, network, etc.)? 
How are networks established 
and expanded, and what are the 
processes for connecting new 
Households?
7. Employment: Are there emplo-
yment issues to consider (gain/
loss)?
8. Policy dialogue: What is the 
level of debate on sanitation 
investment and service im-
provements (access, collec-
tion, treatment)? Is this debate 
public—where is it conducted? 
What are the reasons for a de-
bate that is not public? 
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figurE c.2 PoliTicAl Economy frAmEwork
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BcOn Associação Brasileira das Concessiónarias Privadas dos Serviços Públicos  de Água e Esgoto (Brazilian As-
sociation of Private Water and Sanitation Operators)
aBDiB Associação Brasileira de Infra-Estrutura e Indústrias de Base (Brazilian Infrastructure and Heavy Industry 
Association)
aeSBe Associação das Empresas de Saneamento Básico Estaduais (Association of State Sanitation Companies, 
Brazil)
aSean Association of Southeast Asian Nations
aSSeMae Associação Nacional dos Serviços Municipais de Saneamento (National Association of Municipal Sanitation 
Services, Brazil)
BnDeS Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (National Bank for Economic and Social Develop-
ment, Brazil)
caeSB Companhia de Saneamento Ambiental do Distrito Federal (Environmental Sanitation Company of the 
Federal District, Brazil)
caiXa Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal Savings Bank, Brazil)
cBO Community-based organization 
clTS Community-led Total Sanitation
cSO Civil society organization 
DFiD Department for International Development (UK)
eMBaSa Empresa Bahiana de Águas e Saneamento (Water and Sanitation Company of Bahia, Brazil)
eSW Economic and Sector Work
FUnaSa Fundação Nacional de Saúde (National Health Foundation, Brazil)
GPOBa Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid
iFi International financial institution
iSSDP Indonesian Sanitation Sector Development Program
M&e Monitoring and evaluation
MDG Millennium Development Goal
nGO Nongovernmental organization
nPG Nirmal Gram Puraskar (Clean Village Award, India)
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OnaS Office National de l’Assainissement du Sénégal (National Sanitation Office, Senegal)
OPM Oxford Policy Management
Pac Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program, Brazil)
PaQPUD Programme d’Assainissement des Quartiers Péri-Urbains de Dakar (Sanitation Program for Peri-urban Com-
munities of Dakar, Senegal)
PePaM Programme d’Eau Potable et d’Assainissement du Millénaire (Millennium Drinking Water and Sanitation 
Program, Senegal)
PFl Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party, Brazil)
PlanaSa Plano Nacional de Saneamento (National Water Supply and Sanitation Plan, Brazil)
PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PMMS Programa de Modernização do Setor Saneamento (Water Sector Modernization Project, Brazil)
PrOSanear Programa de Saneamento para Populações em Áreas de Baixa Renda (Sanitation Program for Low Income 
Areas)
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party)
PSia Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, Brazil)
SnSa Secretaria Nacional de Saneamento Ambiental (National Secretariat for Environmental Sanitation, Brazil) 
SOneeS Société Nationale d’Exploitation des Eaux du Sénégal (state-owned water utility prior to 1996)
SOneS  Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal (state asset-holding company, Senegal)
UnDP United Nations Development Program
UniceF United Nations Children’s Fund
WB World Bank
WhO World Health Organization
WSP Water and Sanitation Program
WSP-eaP Water and Sanitation Program—East Asia and the Pacific
WSS Water supply and sanitation
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